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A SYSTEMS APPROACH TO DOCUMENnW MARITIME FRAUD 
by 
Wring the last decade documentary maritime fraud has 
caused considerable financial loss. The internationality of the 
crime and the difficulties experienced in the investigation and 
prosecution of offenders has caused serious concern both 
nationally and internationally. 
The aim of this research was to examine the system of 
international trade in terms of flow between institutions, 
and to develop a model of the system to identify areas of 
system failures in terms of actual or potential frauds. 
A database consisting of 101 fraud cases was compiled. Detailed 
examination of the cases identified features common to different 
classes of fraud. Systems approach was used to investigate the 
system with particular reference to Bills of Lading and method 
of payment under documentary credits. Conceptual mcdels of the 
three main contractual sub-systems i. e. carriage, insurance and 
payment, and of the total system were developed. The latter was 
used in conjunction with the database to pin-point the weak 
links both within the system and its imiediate envirormLent. 
Using a rwlti-disciplinary international Panel of Experts the 
Delphi technique, appropriately modified, was employed to test 
the hypothesised weak links, determine feasibility of 
implementing the recoamndations and seek information to assist 
in introducing measures to combat fraud. 
The analysis supports the hypothesised weak links identified in 
the environment and reccmuendations to strengthen them. Factors 
creating an environment for fraud are identified, along with 
reasons for not reporting the crime. Information required to 
combat fraud is identified. Prior to payment under documentary 
credits banks should carry out factual checks. The Bill of 
Lading is not a weak link but the people handling the document 
are unaware of its importance. 
Establishmnt of a Conmrcial Crim Research Unit specialising 
in international trade is recamrended, as is the development of 
an educational prograrmTo to increase conmercial awareness. 
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The numbers in brackets thus {11 refer to details 
of legal citations and foot notesi, which are 
placed at the end of a chapter in a chapter 
appendix. 
In chapter 4 there are three major sections. 
Separate numbering is used for each of the three 
sections, i. e. contracts of Carriage, Insurance 
and Payment. 
CHAPTER 1- INTRODUCTION 
From time imremorial society has been plagued by fraud and the 
shipping industry is no exception : fraud has always been known 
to exist in shipping. In the past, it was generally the 
underwriter who was the target of fraud, the intent being the 
collection of insurance on ship and cargo. In sane cases the 
ship was scuttled; in others insurance was effected after the 
ship was lost. In more recent frauds, however, the victim can be 
anyone connected with the transaction but usually the importer 
and particularly the State trading organisations of developing 
countries. The banks and underwriters are, in general, 
indirectly involved. 
During the last -decade maritime fraud has been given 
considerable publicity at both national and international level 
by the media. To indicate the scale of losses due to maritime 
fraud various figures have been quoted, ranging in values in 
excess of $ 200 million per annum in the middle-to-late 1970's 
to about $ 13 billion per annum in 1985 [Sundaresan (1985)]. 
Kapoor (1986a) estimates the minimum loss due to maritime 
fraud to be in excess of $ 31 billion per annum. 
Maritime fraud has, therefore, caused serious concern at both 
national and international levels, resulting in a series of 
international conferences and seminars, and the formation of the 
1 
International Chamber of Commerce's (ICC) International Maritime 
Bureau (IMB). 
The relative ease with which such frauds can be perpetrated and 
the difficulties faced by the investigators and prosecutors, 
highlight the weaknesses of the international trading system 
(Kapoor (1986b)]. There have been several calls for 
changes/improvements in existing practices and recognition of 
the need for systematic examination of international trade 
procedures and documentation (Kerr, j. (1979), Kihlbom (1981), 
Schultsz & Thomas (1983)]. 
This research project is an attempt to answer such calls and 
investigate international trade from a systems point of view. 
The aim of the research project is to examine the system of 
international trade in terms of flows between institutions and 
to develop a model of the system. This model is used to identify 
the weak links which lead to the failure of the system - defined 
as actual or potential fraud. 
This project is important for the following reasons : 
a) it examines the system of international trade as a whole, 
which previously has not been attempted, 
b) it considers the problems of implementation of the 
2 
recormmendat ions as part of the study, 
c) it introduces the use of the Delphi technique into the area 
of international trade to consider policy issues, 
d) it considers the use of information technology to con-bat 
fraud, and 
e) the particular combination of experts it uses should provide 
one of the most comprehensive analyses of maritime fraud to 
date. 
Whilst this research is concerned with Documentary Maritime 
Fraud, other types of frauds have been investigated for the 
reasons given in chapter 2 which examines the historical 
background to determine the factors which could have contributed 
to the resurgence of maritime fraud; the problems faced by the 
investigators and prosecutors are also examined. The chapter is 
based on a Wbiking Paper of the Department of Shipping & 
Transport, entitled I'maritime Fraud : An Overview" [Kapoor & 
Gray (1985)], published by the Plymouth Polytechnic. 
Chapter 3 reviews the systems theory with particular reference 
to soft systems and defines fraud as a failure of the system of 
international trade. It emphasizes the need for a systems 
approach to determine the causes leading to the failure of the 
system, and also identifies the problems of examining the 
elements of the system in isolation. 
3 
Chapter 4 examines in detail the three major sub-systems of the 
system of international trade-, namely carriage, insurance and 
payment. Conceptual models of the sub-systems are developed to 
show the flow of information, documents, goods and money in 
order to focus attention on areas which can be seen as potential 
weak links, leading to the development of the conceptual model 
of the total system. 
Chapter 5 analyses the fraud case database in order to identify 
the weak links both within the systern of international trade and 
its immediate environment. The section on analysis is based on a 
paper, entitled "Analysis of Losses due to Maritime Fraud" 
(Kapoor (1986a)], published in the BIMCO Bulletin (see 
Appendix 5). 
Chapter 6 discusses the research methodology to be utilised for 
the purpose of testing the hypothesis that the weak links 
identified contribute to and facilitate the occurrence of actual 
or potential fraud. An empirical approach of data-gathering is 
used because of the dearth of information and the 
constraints imposed on researchers investigating commercial 
and criminal activities. Whilst it is still in its infancy the 
Delphi technique was selected as the most appropriate method to 
study the problem of maritime fraud because of 
- the complexity of the problem, 
- the international nature of the crime, 
4 
- the complex socio-political and economic aspects, and 
- the involvement of several disciplines. 
Furthermore, as anonymity of the experts is guaranteed by this 
approach they do not feel inhibited and this may produce new and 
creative ideas. 
Chapters 7 and 8 contain the details of the analysis carried out 
on the empirical data. In order to obtain the data a 
multi-disciplinary international panel of forty experts was set 
up to answer two Delphi questionnaires. The most important 
benefit of using a multi-disciplinary panel in the Delphi 
technique is a comprehensive coverage of a complex issue even 
though each respondent contributes a small part of the overall 
picture [Ludlow (1971)]. 
Chapter 9 draws conclusions from the research findings and 
makes recommendations based on them. In addition it recommends 
areas for further research. 
5 
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CHAPTER 2- OVERVIEW OF MARITIME FRAUD 
2.1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
2.1.1 Revolutionary Changes in Shipping 
From about the middle of the 19th. century to the beginning of 
the 20th. century all ships were general purpose cargo carriers 
which could be employed on any trade. The shipowners were not 
faced with any problems of obsolescence. The introduction of 
steamships led to the first signs of specialisation in shipping, 
giving rise to liners and tramps. There was little change during 
the early part of the 20th. century but from about 1955 changes 
in shipping have revolutionised the industry. Examples of major 
changes affecting the industry are : 
- freer availability of credit for the purchase of ships 
- introduction of specialised, capital intensive ships 
- faster turn-around times 
changing role of the shipowner 
shipowner -> ship operator -> multimodal transport operator 
instantaneous communications 
simplification of documentation, and 
widespread use of computers. 
As a result, the industry which for nearly 300 years had been 
developing on evolutionary changes based on custom and 
commercial practice has been totally overhauled in less than 
6 
thirty years. 
In the past it was possible to make long-term plans with 
reasonable accuracy but, nowedays, it is becoming increasingly 
difficult to manage any activity orientated towards the future. 
The industry is now concerned with two dimensions of uncertainty 
- that of the innovation itself, leading to technological 
obsolescence, and that of the political and economic environment 
into which that innovation will be launched at some future date. 
This indicates that any study into international trade should 
take an overall view, i. e. a systems approach is called for. 
2.1.2 Specialisation/Surplus Capacity in Shipping 
Unforseeable political and economic crises have resulted in 
market depressions, which, as in the present prolonged 
situation, have affected not only shipping but every aspect of 
life. This has provided a spur to technological advance and the 
development of : 
a) very large specialised ships (such as Ultra Large Crude 
Carriers, Ore-Oil Carriers, Ore-Bulk-Oil Carriers, etc. ] 
which were introduced to take advantage of the econornies of 
scale due to : 
-a vast increase in the tonnage and distance of the raw 
7 
materials moved by sea, and 
- steady increase in the size of bulk parcels; 
b) advanced cargo handling systems to reduce the turn-around 
time in order to minimise increasing port costs, and this 
resulted in the introduction of pallet, roll-on roll-off, 
container and barge carrying vessels. 
The pattern of shipping's increasing specialisation resulted in 
the shipping industry becoming highly capital-intensive and thus 
very vulnerable to changes in the politico-economic environment. 
In spite of this it would appear that shipowners forget that 
"booms" in shipping are of limited duration and also fail to 
take into consideration the time lag between placing new- 
building orders and the delivery of ships. Witness the large 
investment in new-buildings in the latter part of the seventies 
and the subsequent massive surplus of tonnage, the effects of 
which are likely to be felt to the end of this decade and 
beyond. 
The ready availability of credit has made it possible for the 
volume of orders placed to get totally out of line with shipping 
requirements [MTR (1977)]. This surplus capacity is reflected in 
the number of ships which are laid-up and/or slow steaming. This 
seems to indicate that orders placed were not based upon a sound 
and realistic evaluation of the demand for shipping services but 
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upon purely speculative motives. 
2.1.3 International Trade Documentation 
In the past, trade was conducted on trust and contracts were 
entered into by word of mouth - as can be seen by the 
motto of the Baltic, Our Word is our Bond - with very little, 
or no documentation in some cases. Nowadays paper abounds in 
international trade. Different documents, sometimes in 
different formats, can be required for different types of 
cargo, different modes of transport, different carriers and 
different markets [SITPRO (1981)]. 
However, tM inherently conservative shipping industry was 
reluctant to undertake the examination and revision of 
long-established procedures made necessary by the dramatic 
changes outlined above (see section 2.1.1). Documentation could 
not keep pace with faster turn-around times of vessels and the 
result was delays at ports in discharging vessels, in clearing 
goods through customs and thus in moving goods to their final 
destinations. These delays lead to 
a) delay in obtaining payment, 
b) increased costs for demurrage or surcharges, increased 
interest charges, increased port charges, etc., 
c) loss of customer or even an export market, 
d) loss of revenue for the shipowner if the vessel is placed 
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"off-hire", and 
e) possible introduction of the commercial malpractice of 
delivering cargo without bills of lading (B/L) with the 
attendant problems which accrue therefrom. 
In June 1970 the Simplification of International Trade 
Procedures Board (SITPRO) was set up in the United Kingdom (UK) 
to simplify international trade procedures. An UNCTAD 
"Advisory Services on Trade Facilitation" pamphlet says : 
When it takes 
360 pieces of paper to get a consignment to its destination 
54 signatures for export clearance 
6 weeks to obtain an import licence 
8 hours to type the forms for one consignment 
3 weeks for commercial documents to arrive 
21 days on average for the Customs clearance of containers 
U. S. $ 375 average cost for paperwork per export consignment 
etc., etc. 
then there is an urgent need for remedial action. 
SITPRO's findings indicate that improving the efficiency in the 
shipping office is a management imperative and that, in 
particular, the preparation of international trade documents 
receives little attention from senior management [SITPRO 
(1981)]. In fact, on average 50% of all documents presented 
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under documentary credits are rejected on first presentation 
[SITPRO (1985)]. 
It can be argued that the two major problems facing the industry 
are: that it is loathe to change established practices and, 
its continued reliance, in this day and age, on paper documents 
- in particular the B/L. This point was highlighted by Connell & 
Sutherland (1978) : 
The Chinese affair had left Savundra convinced on 
one thing - that the vulnerability of the 
European world of high finance lay in the 
participants' implicit trust in pieces of paper. 
Provided things looked right, the most 
preposterous fraud could long go undetected. 
(Emphasis supplied) 
This has been proved to be so time and again, particularly 
during the last decade, with Alarming regularity. 
2.2 MARITIME FRAUD 
Fraud has always been known to exist in shipping. For example, 
in his diary Pepys (1663) relates the story of a master who 
borrowed money to twice the value of his ship upon a bottamry 
bond and insured the ship and goods for twice their value. The 
vessel was then "cast away" off the coast of France. When the 
ship was recovered it was found that the cargo was not butter 
but barrels of tallow with a layer of butter on top. The crew 
was paid by the master to swear in court that the weather was 
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very stormy and that they did everything to save the vessel. 
From time to tine a variety of measures have been introduced in 
an attempt to contain and/or combat fraud : for example, the 
introduction of a nunber of statutes, committees and 
organisations. The following were the major developments : 
a) Gambling policies on ships and cargoes offered such obvious 
temptation to fraud that they were taken in hand by the 
legislature : and as early as 1747 an Act was passed 
prohibiting insurances on ships and goods by persons having 
no insurable interest in the ship [Wright & Fayle (1928)]. 
b) In 1856 the Salvage Association was formed to deal with 
marine casualties and losses on behalf of the underwriters 
and to investigate suspicious or "doubtful" losses and marine 
frauds. 
c) Gambling Policies Act, 1909 made it an offence to effect 
insurance without having direct or indirect interest in the 
safe arrival of the ship. This was introduced to curb the 
outbreaks of fraud and criminal conspiracy in the course of 
which vessels were deliberately sunk to claim insurance. 
d) In the American cotton trade the fraudulent conspiracies 
between cotton dealers and railway agents who issued bills of 
lading for cargo never received led to the Liverpool Cotton 
1 
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Bill of Lading Conference in 1907. As a result, a comittee 
was established to lay down rules for the issue of a 
negotiable B/L, leading to agreements in 1911 with the 
American Railway Companies and with shipowners, regulating 
the issue of B/L in the cotton trade. The agreements were 
followed by the State Uniform Bills of Lading and the Federal 
Bills of Lading Acts in 1916 [Schultsz & Thomas (1983)]. 
e) The Far East Regional Investigation Team (FERIT) was set up 
in 1979 to investigate the apparent pattern to some if not 
all of the losses in the Far East i. e. srmll old vessels 
carrying high value cargoes and sinking in deep water in good 
weather without apparent loss of life. 
f) Series of serninars/conferences on fraud prevention. 
g) 7he Camionwealth Commercial Crime Unit (CCCU) was formed in 
1981 with terms of reference which include the facilitation 
and conduct of international investigations into commercial 
crime and related matters and the development of strategic 
and tactical criminal intelligence; the conduct of special 
studies; the dissemination of information concerning modus 
operandi and other matters to Governments; liason with other 
national and international agencies and the development of 
training [Rider (1984)]. 
h) The IMB was formed in 1981 with the objective of receiving, 
collating and disseminating information relating to 
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fraudulent and other suspect practices; also to advise, and 
to conduct investigations on behalf of members involved in 
transactions which they suspect may be suspicious. 
i) Establishment of an Ad hoe Intergovermiental Group 
(hereinafter referred to as IGG) by the UNCTAD Secretariat in 
1982 to consider means of combating all aspects of maritime 
fraud, including piracy. The author considers this method of 
problem-solving has weaknesses. These weaknesses will be 
discussed in chapter 6. 
2.3 RESUrCENCE OF MARITIME FRAUD 
The general unexpectedness of the crisis leading to the present 
recession left the world with a massive surplus of tonnage and 
was further accentuated by the re-opening of the Suez Canal in 
1977. The oil rich States, such as some of the States in the 
Arabian Gulf and Nigeria, finding themselves in a buyer's 
market, continued to import cargo at very competitive rates. 
This sudden increase in trade, in- conjunction with poor port 
infrastructure, led to port congestion and delays of up to, or 
exceeding, -180 days were not unusual. Port congestion poses a 
number of economic and practical problems to an owner whose 
vessel is delayed. The economic problems being : 
a) Delays are extremely costly and have the power to tip the 
profit to loss balance. 
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b) The ship is not earning revenue - yet the shipowner has 
expenditures in the form of all fixed costs as well as the 
less tangible "opportunity cost". 
When faced with the above-4rentioned problems, the owners of 
tramp ships were the hardest hit. They were usually of 
"singleton ownership" and probably little experience, 
therefore, in a desperate attempt to keep their vessels 
operational, they had entered into contracts at break-even or 
uneconomic rate. They soon found their vessels were losing money 
as the delays at discharging ports continued to increase. 
In order to free their vessels for further trading, the cargoes 
were discharged at the nearest/intermediate ports. What probably 
started as a desperate but innocent attempt by the 
owner/charterer to avoid bankruptcy gradually developed into a 
way of making untold profits at very little or no risk for the 
unscrupulous operators. The scale of the problem has been 
illustrated by Ellen (1979a) when he said that "never a week 
goes by without at least one and sometimes up to three different 
cases being notified to me". The numbers of cases handled by the 
IMB from 1982 - 1984 are shown in table 2.1. 
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Table 2.1 : Cases handled by ICC-IMB fran 1982 - 1984 
Nature of case 
Documentary Frauds 
Charter Party Frauds/Oisputes 
Scuttling 
Deviation/Illegal Sale of Cargo 
Insurance Frauds 
voyage/Container monitoring 
Negotiation 
others 
Totals 
1982 1983 1984 
21 19 15 
19 16 13 
4 6 2 
9 6 15 
- 26 23 
15 6 
3 2 
25 14 33 
78 105 109 
Source : ICC - International maritime Bureau. 
2.4 THE NATURE OF MARITIME FRAUD 
2.4.1 Definition 
Courts are of the opinion that once fraud is defined strictly 
their jurisdiction would be cramped and perpetually eluded by 
new schemes which the fertility of man's invention could 
contrive [Kapoor (1983)]. However, to combat fraud one must get 
a better understanding of it; both Ellen (1979b) and Kapoor 
(1983) agree that it is virtually impossible to prevent 
sanething that has not first been defined (Hill (1983)]. 
Maritime fraud has been defined by various people in a number of 
ways. Kapoor (1983) has looked at the definition of fraud in 
great detail, and in his proposed definition of maritime fraud 
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points out : 
Maritine fraud is a generic term commonly used to 
describe the obtaining of mney, or property in 
the goods, or a pecuniary advantage by one or 
more parties to the detrinent, loss or injury of 
the other party or parties, by any one of the 
following means ... 
Kapoor goes on to list 21 different ways in which maritime fraud 
could be committed (see Appendix 51. He has justified the 
inclusion of "pilferage by stevedores" and "theft" by pointing 
out that : 
By common usage within the industry, and in the 
media, it (i. e. maritime fraud) sometimes 
includes certain acts and offences which are, 
strictly speaking, not fraudulent according to 
the definition of "fraud" in general. 
Kapoor (1985b) has since amended and simplified his definition 
of maritime fraud to : 
Maritime fraud is a generic term comonly used to 
describe the obtaining of money, or services, 
or property in the goods, or a pecuniary 
advantage by one or more parties to a transaction 
from the other party or parties, by unjust or 
illegal means. 
2.4.2 Classification 
Classification of maritime frauds is necessary to facilitate 
their exposition and thus assist in the detection process. 
Maritime frauds can be classified in a number of ways, see 
figure 2.1 , and those classifications are descriptive with a 
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considerable amount of overlap amongst the various classes. 
Maritime fraud has been classified by various people according 
to their requirements, for example, the FERIT Report (1979) used 
its classification (see figure 2.1) because it was commissioned 
by the insurance market and as far as the underwriters are 
concerned the two classes of "hull" and "cargo" would be 
satisfactory. 
Kapoor (1983) points out that it would be possible to classify 
maritime fraud according to geographical areas to indicate which 
type of fraud was most commonly perpetrated in those regions. 
He goes on to say that maritime fraud can be broken down into 
two broad classes and that this method of classification would 
highlight the importance of documentary maritime fraud, see 
figure 2.2. 
The importance of documentary fraud cannot be over-emphasised 
as the success of most other types of frauds depends upon the 
fraudster's success in deceiving the victim by the use of 
false/fraudulent documents to induce payment, or part with the 
property in the goods, or to enter into a contract, or in the 
case of a public official to induce the incumbent to act 
contrary to his duty. 
Ellen (1983) points out that it is necessary to differentiate 
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between fraud, misrepresentation and malpractice, for their 
causes and remedies differ. He goes on to say : 
Although one cannot endorse these misrep- 
resentations or malpractices, on certain routes 
these have become acceptable customs of the 
trade. In the present recession, if the owner 
does not please the shippers by issuing back 
dated bills, the business is likely to be lost. 
Container traffic to West Africa invariably 
involves misrepresentation of goods. Carriers not 
complying with this practice will simply lose 
their market share. ... It is safe to assume that 
the above misrepresentations and malpractices are 
largely accepted by the shipping industry. 
It is submitted that as fraud is a species of misrepresentation, 
and a fraudulent misrepresentation is a fraud (Hacking (1980)], 
there is no need to distinguish between them. Furthermore, if 
the malpractice is such that it is intended to deceive a third 
party to his detriment, then it should be treated as fraud. 
Whilst it is appreciated that in the current recession the 
carriers might find themselves losing business or their market 
share, these malpractices and misrepresentations have acquired 
the status of being acceptable as customs of the trade and must 
have been in vogue prior to the recession. Therefore, it is 
submitted that in the past, in the shipping industry fraud was 
being committed for commercial expediency, but in this 
recession, fraud is being committed for survival. 
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2.4.3 Elements of Fraud 
From the previous section it can be seen that in order to 
determine what constitutes fraud one must know the elements of - 
fraud. Kapoor (1983) has identified three elements of fraud, 
namely : 
a) loss or injury to, prejudice or deprivation of property or 
proprietary rights, 
b) loss suffered due to deceit, fraudulent misrepresentation, 
concealment, or an act of deliberate dishonesty, and 
c) the injured party must have acted on the deception. 
2.4.4 Proof of Fraud 
Article 1116 of the Code Civil (1974) lays down that fraud can 
be a ground for avoiding a contract and states that fraud is not 
presumed, it has to be proved. In Derry and Others v Peek {11, 
delivering the judgement of the court, Lord Herschell said that 
to sustain an action of deceit, there must be proof of fraud and 
went on to say : 
Fraud is proved when it is shown that a false 
representation has been made 
a) knowingly, or 
b) without belief in its truth, or 
c) recklessly, careless whether it be true or 
false. 
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A similar view is held in the American Courts, where Justice 
Chimera (21 citing Arthur v Griswold [3) and Lowendahl v 
Baltimre & Ohio R. R. (4} said : 
Fraud way not be presumed. It may not be based 
merely on suspicion, conjecture or doubtful 
inference. It must be established by clear 
convincing- proof of each and every element 
prescribed by law; representations, falsity, 
scienter, reliance and damage. 
Citing Ochenkowski v Dunaj {5} Justice Chinera {6} said that 
"where evidence is equally as consistent with innocence as with 
wrong doing, the innocent construction must be adopted". 
2.5 TYPES OF FRAUD 
2.5.1 Charter Party Fraud 
A charter party (C/P) fraud may be described as the obtaining 
of money : 
a) By-the charterer from the shipowner by the non-payment of 
charter hire and the collection of freight belonging to the 
shipowner, by the issue of "freight prepaid" B/L instead of 
"freight collect" B/L, or 
b) By the shipowner from the cargo owner or charterer, in the 
form of extortionate additional freight by deception. 
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The importance of documentary fraud is further highlighted by 
point (a) above. The variations to the above themes include a 
sub-charterer defrauding the time charterer, shipowner and cargo 
interests (UNCTAD (1983)]. 
There is a very thin line between what is failure of a C/P and 
what is fraud. Failure of a C/P can be due to frustration of the 
contract caused by insolvency, which in turn can be due to 
unforeseen factors such as excessive delays in port caused by 
congestion. Fraud, on the other hand, is a deliberate default on 
the part of one of the parties to the contract [Abhyankar 
(1985)]. Sane of the so-called insolvencies may be deliberate. 
2.5.2 Deviation Fraud/Illegal Sale of Cargo 
It was pointed out in section 2.3 that this-type of criminal 
activity started as an innocent attempt by a desperate shipowner 
to avoid bankruptcy but later developed into a premeditated 
crime. However, there have been a number of cases where the 
shipowners have resorted to illegal deviation when they have 
found themselves in financial difficulties due to one of the 
following causes : 
a) Frustration of the Charter Party due to unpaid hire, 
or demurrage or deadfreight. 
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For example, a vessel loaded cargo in Spain for Saudi Arabia. 
The Spanish agent, who was also the charterer, received freight 
from the shippers. The vessel then proceeded to Italy on the 
charterer's advice and loaded 400 tonne of wire netting. The 
shipowner, who was owed a significant amount of demurrage and 
dead-freight under the charter-party, received no freight. Wben 
the owner did not receive any money after repeated appeals, he 
ordered the ship to Famagusta, in Turkish Cyprus, and discharged 
the cargo under court order to exercise his maritime lien under 
the charter party. In this case the innocent party, i. e. the 
Spanish shipper suffered. 
b) Finding out after sailing that unexpected/excessive delays 
were likely at the discharging port. 
For example, a vessel loaded steel in Bulgaria for Bandar Abbas 
under free-in-liner-out (filo) terms, i. e. the shipowner is 
responsible for the expenses at the discharging port. After 
sailing, the shipowner learned that the vessel could be delayed 
at Bandar Abbas for over four weeks, and that there were no 
facilities for bunkers, fresh water or provisions. The delay 
would almost certainly wipe out his profits. This prompted him 
to divert the vessel to Sharjah and the cargo owners had to 
incur the additional cost of warehousing and on-shipment to 
Bandar Abbas. 
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In addition, there are several cases of premeditated 
deviation/illegal sale of cargo or, in other words, the theft of 
cargo. 
Where a carrier resorts to illegal or unjustifiable deviation 
his action amounts to repudiation of the contract of carriage. 
He is therefore liable for breach of contract for which the 
cargo owner has redress at law in the form of damages. As a 
result of the repudiation the carrier cannot rely on any of the 
terms of the contract which limit his liability. However, the 
cargo owner has no chance of recovering his loss by this action 
as the shipowner usually has no assets or has gone into 
liquidation. 
Illegal deviations have had some far reaching consequences. For 
example, in October 1979 a unilateral order was issued by Saudi 
Arabia, banning any vessel from entering her ports which had 
first called at Lebanon, because several vessels had deviated to 
Lebanese ports to sell their cargo. This was the first ban 
imposed by a country for non-political reasons (Kapoor (1986b)]. 
2.5.3 Tariff Manipulation & Cube-cutting 
Tariff manipulation is the practice whereby a freight forwarder 
obtains money by deception from the shipper and causes loss to 
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the shipowner by either : 
a) Describing the goods as one thing to the shipping company and 
paying less freight but subsequently describing them in a 
different way to the shipper, and claiming a higher freight 
reimbursement, or 
b) Grouping dissimilar items (possibly in a container) under one 
name to induce the shipping company to charge freight at one 
rate for all the items, to their detriment. When claiming 
reimbursement from the shipper, freight is charged at the 
correct rate for each item and thereby the freight forwarder 
obtains more money frorn the shipper than he actually paid to 
the shipping company. 
Cube-cutting is the practice whereby a freight forwarder obtains 
money by deception fran the shipper and causes loss to the 
shipowner by giving to the shipping company reduced measurements 
of cargoes on which freight is charged by volume. When cýaimlng 
reimbursement from the shipper, the freight is charged on the 
correct cubic measurement. 
The shipper can also deceive the shipping company in order to 
pay less freight by either or both of the above rmthods. 
Containerisation can be said to have made the use of these 
malpractices easier. 
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2.5.4 Marine Insurance Fraud 
Frauds of this type are very diverse and usually overlap with 
the other types of fraud that have been considered. The 
frauds are perpetrated with the sole object. 
1of monetary gain 
under the insurance policy. Insurance frauds may be broken down 
into two categories, namely cargo and hull frauds, see figure 
2.2. Cargo frauds usually involve the use of false/fraudulent 
documentation and therefore, may also be classified under 
documentary frauds, which further highlights the importance of 
documentary frauds. 
Examples of hull frauds would cover scuttling, deliberate 
stranding of the vessel, arson, deliberate machinery damage, 
non-disclosure or fraudulent misrepresentation of material facts 
to the insurer. In this type of fraud scuttling was most 
frequently encountered and therefore must be considered in 
greater detail. 
2.5.4.1 Scuttling 
Scuttling is defined as the wilful casting away of a vessel with 
the privity or connivance of her owners. Ship scuttling is not a 
new phenomenon. The first reference to this crime was reported 
in 215 B. C. [Haddon-Cave (1981)]. 
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Figure 2.3 shows that the increase in the recent spate of 
known/suspicious sinkings started around the mid-seventies, that 
is, about the same time as the increase in maritime fraud 
[Kapoor (1986a)]. 
2.5.5 Docmnentary Maritime Fraud 
Kapoor (1983) has defined documentary fraud as : 
The obtaining of money, property in the goods or 
a pecuniary advantage by the issuance of forged 
and/or falsified documents such as : Bills of 
lading, Certificates of quality, origin, or 
insurance, Commercial invoices, Mate's receipts, 
or Letters of indemnity, or the creation of 
worthless entities by one party to induce the 
other party to act on it to his detriment. 
In some cases the docurwnts way be forged or fraudulently 
altered after their execution, in others they may be genuine 
documents but with false information [Kapoor (1985)]. 
In Singapore, 45 maritime fraud cases involving documentary 
credits were investigated during the period 1974 - 1981, of 
which 37 occurred in the last four year period [Ho Peng Kee 
(1983)], indicating a dramatic increase in documentary frauds. 
This point was further highlighted by Sir John Cuckney, Chairman 
of IMB, when he said that the IMB investigated about UO cases 
last year, involving some $288 million, and of this in value 
terms documentary fraud covered $116 million, i. e. 40% 
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(Sundaresan (1985)]. Kapoor's (1986a) analysis of 101 cases of 
maritime fraud, covering the period 1974 - 1983, indicates that 
over 62% of the cases involved the use of forged/fraudulent 
docwents. 
2.5.6 Miscellaneous Frauds 
2.5.6.1 Arson 
The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (1983) defines Arson as 
"the act of wilfully and maliciously setting fire to another 
man's house, ship, forest, etc.; or to one's own, when insured, 
with the intent to defraud the insurers". 
Whilst fires at sea are extremely dangerous, they have, on 
occasions, been used as a means to defraud the insurers. For 
example, in The Campello {7} it was held that the vessel was 
deliberately set on fire with the privity of the owner in order 
to gain from the over-valuation of the vessel. 
2.5.6.2 Theft of oil by deception 
The quadrupling of the price of oil following the Arab oil 
en-bargo has made its theft a very attractive proposition. Oil is 
appropriated illegally in two ways : 
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a) 7heft of bunkers by ship's personnel for personal gain 
It has been alleged that ship's officers on dynamically 
positioned supply ships siphon off bunkers to sell them to 
ships. In order to conceal the operation, false entries are 
made in the log books [Kapoor & Gray (1985)]. 
b) Theft of crude oil for use as ship's bunkers 
Apart from being illegal, this practice is extremely 
dangerous, because crude is very volatile, i. e. has a low 
flashpoint, whereas ship's fuel oil being non-volatile has a 
high flashpoint. 
Allegations that crude oil was being transferred to bunker 
tanks gav4 rise to formal investigations, which were carried 
out by the Liberian Bureau of Maritime Affairs. The 
investigations revealed that on a number of vessels under the 
same apparent management and trading under the Liberian 
flag, crude oil was being introduced into the fuel oil tanks 
on a regular basis at the instigation of or with the 
complicity of the owners [IMB (1985)]. 
In the Liberian tanker "Athena" permanent pipelines, 
concealed beneath the floor plates, were fitted for the 
purpose of diverting oil cargo into the bunker tanks. The 
32 
vessel misappropriated 725 barrels of oil worth $ 21,829 
[Lloyd's List, 15th. May, 1985, p. 31. 
Investigations of fraud cases were carried out to determine the 
modi operandi in each of the above types of frauds. They are 
discussed in chapter 5. 
2.6 PROBLEMS IN INVESTIGATION & PROSECUTION 
Having looked at the various types of frauds it is necessary to 
examine the problems faced by the investigators and prosecutors. 
The international nature of the crime of maritine fraud makes it 
very difficult to identify, let alone to apprehend and prosecute 
the perpetrator(s). This. is due to a corrbination of the 
following factors : 
a) Long distances involved between the buyer and seller. 
b) Limited contact between the perpetrator(s) of the fraud and 
the victims. 
c) Ability to disguise identities behind corporate shields, for 
example by the "creation -of worthless and spurious but 
outwardly impressive entities" [Kerr, J. (1979)], or the use 
of foreign nominees to obscure the commission of the crime 
and thereby avoid detection or, if perchance detected, 
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greatly hamper investigation [Rider (1980)]. 
d) Milti-jurisdictional nature of most frauds. Investigations of 
cases shows that in most situations between four and ten 
countries May be involved, for example : 
A vessel, M. V. "Scuttle", is owned by I. M. Ignorant & Co. 
Ltd. in country A and is registered in country B. The 
vessel is bareboat chartered to Van Ishing Inc. S. A. in 
country C, who spot charters it to Goodwill & Co. Ltd. in 
country D to carry a cargo to be loaded in country E and 
delivered to country F. The officers and crew are from 
countries G and H supplied by Scuttlers Anonymous in 
country I. The cargo insurance is placed by brokers in 
country J with a company in country K. The vessel, on 
sailing from E, deviates and sells cargo in country L, 
and is then scuttled [Adapted from Cooper (1980)]. 
e) Lack of response from the victims. It is estimated that 
one-third of cases are not reported due to the commercial 
attitude of the victims. Some cases are not reported in order 
to avoid adverse publicity. At times the authorities are 
informed 'too late or the victims negotiate with the 
perpetrators to re-purchase their own goods [Ellen (1982)]. 
f) The expense of gathering information and bringing witnesses 
from abroad for trial. Prior to an investigation, the 
officer-in-charge must submit a report of the facts, views 
and intended course of action to the Director of Public 
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Prosecution (DPP) and seek his -advice on the cost and 
eventual result of the investigation and also on extradition 
agreements. As a result very few investigations are completed 
from complaint to eventual prosecution because of the 
international nature of the crin-e. Chaikin (1983) points 
out: 
There is a disturbing trend for domestic law 
enforcement agencies, for a variety of reasons, 
to almost give up when a substantial foreign 
element is involved in the comission of a crime. 
The Roskill Report (1986) points out that the average cost of 
a conmrcial fraud case from the beginning of a police 
investigation to verdict, based on a sample of 10 cases 
lasting rwre than 25 days in which verdicts were reached in 
1981-1984, is E 500,000. The report goes on to say*that this 
does not include the cost of any inquiries carried out by 
external inspectors under sections 431 and 432 of the 
Cmpanies Act 1985. The average cost of the reports produced 
by these inquiries is E 463,000. 
g) The problems of extradition of offenders from different 
jurisdictions. 
h) 7here are certain basic offences, such as theft and piracy, 
which are universally recognised as crimes, but even in such 
cases individual nations have various ways of treating the 
offenders. For example, in the case of the "Salem", despite 
the conclusive evidence of scuttling, the master and the 
chief engineer were released by the Liberian authorities. 
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Wbilst civil law has the ability to resolve complex disputes 
between merchants in international transactions, civil actions 
are not considered by the victims of maritime fraud because 
their success depends upon, inter alia, factors such as [UW-TAD 
(1983)] : 
a) Ability to bring civil action in a court with jurisdiction. 
b) Ability to obtain a judgement in their favour, for which - 
depending upon the type of fraud - major difficulties of 
proof may exist. 
c) Ability to enforce the judgement against the perpetrator(s) 
of fraud, and 
d) Finding sizeable assets on which to enforce the judgement, 
because of the ease with which the proceeds of the fraud can 
be "laundered". 
Developments in communications, technology, transportation and 
the increased mobility of individuals, companies and capital 
have all contributed to a situation where the conception and 
commission of ordinary criminal law offences involve two or more 
jurisdictions [Chaikin (1983)]. These changes have not been 
matched by changes in domestic or international legislation. The 
investigators are not able to compete with the sophisticated 
organisation of the international commercial criminal because of 
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the lack of facilities to exchange information between 
countries. 
Unfortunately, the Criminal Law, when looked at from an 
international point of view, is so unco-ordinated that actions 
against criminals involving two or more jurisdictions are very 
difficult or even impossible to resolve. This is because laws 
are territorially orientated and thus do not take into account 
organised or international conuercial crime using two or more 
jurisdictions [Chaikin (1983)]. This lack of harmonisation in 
international laws and procedures is exploited by the criminals 
[Kapoor & Gray (1985)]. 
The need for international mutual assistance is also highlighted 
by the fact that whilst "conspiracy to defraud" is an offence at 
conmn law [section 5 (2) - The Criminal Law Act, 19771, "a 
conspiracy to obtain a lawful object by unlawful means" is not a 
crime and thus not triable in England {8}. As a result 
anomalies exist even within the legal system of individual 
countries. Imagine the problem when dealing with the legal 
systems of some 200 countries. As Dr. Rider (1984), Chief 
Ccm, nonwealth Fraud Officer, quite rightly points out : 
Apart from the disturbing inability to detect and 
locate crim of a comnercial nature, most 
countries seem to suffer from difficulties in 
getting cases before criminal courts and 
attaining satisfactory results. In the absence 
of judicial determination it is extremely 
difficult to discuss a particular instance of 
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suspected fraud. The laws relating to defamation 
serve as a major brake to this kind of analysis. 
(I)Tphasis supplied). 
In this connection it must be stressed that a recent decision of 
the Court of Appeal {9} was very welcome indeed. The facts of 
the case are : 
In late 1981 IMB had received information that a named, infamous 
fraudster was connected with a new company called Grecian Lines, 
managed by a-company'called maritime Tradition S. A. The IMB 
verified the information and posted a notice in the Baltic 
Exchange, stating that information regarding the activities of 
Grecian was available from the Bureau to members conteinplating 
doing business with the company. As a result of this an action 
for defamation was brought against the Bureau, and Grecian 
obtained a temporary injunction restraining the Bureau from 
further disseminating the allegedly defamatory information about 
the company. 
The IMB appealed to seek relief from the injunction imposed upon 
it by the lower court. The Appeal judges - Lord Denning M. R., 
Lord Justices Griffiths and Kerr - unanimously found that the 
Bureau's actions were justified and that it could issue warnings 
to its mmbers about shipping concerns, even if it did not have 
concrete proof of fraud providing there were "reasonable grounds 
for an honest belief" (Unreported case]. 
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Delays in investigation and prosecution due to lack of resources 
are canpounded by a lack of power to obtain evidence, and delay 
is also a weapon in the armoury of the fraudsters. Many of thern 
try to put off their trials for the following reasons : 
a) 7b enable them to commit more offences in the knowledge that 
the prosecuting authorities are unlikely to charge every 
offence and that even if charged with further offences, 
concurrent sentences are likely to be imposed. For example, 
in Rv Savundranayagan and Walker {101 the Court of Appeal 
affirmed the decision of the lower court, and dismissed the 
appeal against both conviction and sentence. Savundra was 
found guilty on five counts and given a sentence totalling 36 
years, all sentences to run concurrently, so that he was to 
serve only 8 years imprisonment. Similarly Walker was 
sentenced for only 5 years when the total sentence was 18 
years. 
b) To enstire that offences are so stale that the sentences will 
be minimised, and 
c) The hope that witnesses will for one reason or another become 
unavailable, thereby giving a greater chance of acquittal. 
In some countries there may be delays in maritime fraud cases 
where the judiciary is unfamiliar with the concepts and requests 
instruction. In a number of cases the fraudsters, instead of 
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being remanded to custody, are granted bail and subsequently, 
they on occasions not only fail to appear but carry on their 
activities once again under another name. 
The increase in the length of trials - cases of commercial fraud 
which last 100 working days are fairly commn these days - gives 
greater opportunity for something to go wrong - illness or even 
"nobbling" of jurors, which may mean that after many weeks of 
trial the case has to be started all over again at public 
expense. Another problem facing the prosecutors is that of 
getting a jury which is able to understand the complexities of 
financial transactions, let alone pass verdict on whether 
deception has taken place. This indicates that that the present 
system of lay jury in comercial fraud cases is inadequate 
[Lawton, L. J. (1983)]. Rider (1985) points out that similar 
views have been expressed by the Court of Appeal of New Zealand 
and also at the Cannonwealth Law Ministers meeting in Sri Lanka. 
A Fraud Trials Cannittee was set up under the Chairmanship of 
Lord Roskill. The committee was to consider the ways in which 
criminal proceedings arising from fraud could be improved, and 
also the changes required in the existing law and procedure 
which would be desirable "to secure the just, expeditious and 
economical disposal of such proceedings" [Roskill Report 
(1986)]. 
40 
The Roskill Report points out that the present legal system is 
archaic, cumbersome and unreliable for dealing with serious 
frauds, and suggests that fundamental change is required in some 
areas of the law. one of its recommendations is that for complex 
fraud cases falling within certain guidelines, trial by judge 
and two lay members should replace trial by judge and jury. The 
Report was backed by the Lord Chancellor, Lord Hailsham and by 
Lord Denning, former Master of the Rolls, in the House of Lords 
debate on the Report [Abrun (1986)]. 
The recommendation of the Roskill Report (1986) regarding the 
abolition of trials by juries in serious fraud cases has not 
been accepted by the Government as the report failed to present 
any hard evidence that complex fraud trials were being wrongly 
decided because of the failure of the juries to grasp the issues 
[Wolman (1986)]. However, some of the other recommendations of 
the report have been accepted. For example in serious fraud 
cases, the forthcoming Criminal Justice Bill makes provisions 
for: 
a) overseas witnesses to give evidence using live satellite 
links. 
b) the use of evidence taken on overseas camissions in criminal 
trials. 
c) abolition of comittal trials in serious fraud cases. 
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Furthermore, the Goverment is to set up a Serious Fraud Office, 
with powers of investigation similar to those available to the 
Department of Trade & Industry under section 447 of the 
Companies Act 1985. 
The foregoing sections have highlighted the complexity of the 
problem. Wbilst there have been several calls for reform [Ellen 
(1979b), Kerr (1979), Kihlborn (1981), Prakash (1981), Schultsz & 
Thomas (1983)] and a number of short-term solutions found and it 
I has been discussed at great length at several fora, there has 
been a lack of positive action to deal with the problem of 
maritime fraud (Kapoor & Gray (1985)]. Jones (1983) considering 
the problem of cargo losses in the United States has stressed 
the need for systerns analysis, and the same applies worldwide. 
Investigations of the fraud cases have also indicated the 
complexity of the problem. Therefore the author decided to 
examine the system of international trade transactions as a 
whole using the systems approach, with particular reference to 
the B/L and the method of payment under documentary credits. 
Therefore, the next chapter looks at the systerns theory. 
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CHAPTER 3- SYSTEMS THEORY 
3.1 Introduction 
The rapid increase in documentary maritime fraud during the last 
decade has created the need to review the system of 
international trade documentation using a fresh approach. This 
point was highlighted by Ellen (1979) when be pointed out that 
one of the two things which would go some way towards "getting 
to grips" with the problem of maritime fraud was an in depth 
study into the operation of the Bill of Lading and documentary 
credit system. Kihlbom (1981) pointed out that unless the 
present system of international trade under documentary credits 
is made more secure against fraud and forgery it runs the risk 
of collapse. 
It was shown in the last chapter that a number of short-term 
solutions have been devised to deal with the problem. This 
suggests that the various constituent parts have been 
considered as self-contained units. It is submitted that in 
order to find long-term solutions the system of international 
trade documentation should be examined from a systems point of 
view, i. e. as a whole. This point was emphasized at the first 
session of the IGG [UNCTAD Report (1984)]. 
The UNCrAD Report (1986c) in considering the system of 
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ackninistration of investigation and prosecution, points out that 
it is always composed of several different agencies. The Report 
goes on to say : 
The system of investigation and prosecution of 
maritime fraud is one of a very few systems in 
which several different independent agencies are 
essential to, and intricably (sic) involved in, - its operation. In this respect, it can be said 
that this division of responsibility between 
various agencies in each Government actually 
hinders efficient administration of justice and 
criminal proceedings in maritime fraud cases, 
which are usually very complex. 
The disadvantage of this division of responsibility is 
highlighted by Shikita (1982) : 
... each agency tends to isolate itself from the 
rest and works within water-tight compartments. 
None usually pays sufficient attention to the 
possible consequences of its activities on other 
agencies and on the entire systern. 
In addition to agreeing with Shikita, Kapoor (1986a) points out 
that despite the publicity given to international trade frauds 
'n by the media and conferences over the last few years, the-i 
participants of the system of international trade have failed to 
respond collectively; their reaction has been to tighten up---ý 
specific procedures in isolation without considering their 
impact on other elements of the system. 
Another advantage of this approach is that the the effect of any 
changes recomended can be studied. This would be in keeping 
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with the UNCTAD recammendation [UNCTAD (1982)], which states : 
... any suggestions finally put 
forward will need 
very careful consideration to ensure that the 
benefits they offer by reducing the occurrence of 
fraud will clearly offset whatever additional 
operational costs they might give rise to in 
international commerce. 
This chapter, therefore, outlines the systems theory with 
particular reference to soft systems and defines fraud as a 
failure of the system of international trade. It also emphasizes 
the need for a systems approach to determine the causes leading 
to the failure of the system. 
3.2 Definitions of a System 
The word 'system' is used in various ways and its meaning 
changes according to the context. Systems literature is 
inundated with definitions of the term 'system' [Ackoff (1960), 
Hall (1962), Ackoff (1971), Kline & Lifson (1971), von 
Bertalanffy. (1973), Checkland (1975), Gasparski (1975), McCaul 
(1975), Jordan (1981)]. Jones (1982) points out that these 
definitions remain largely abstract and that a newcomer to the 
field would admit to serious difficulty in applying the general 
definition to specific cases, even though he may find them to be 
so straightforward as to be rather obvious and empty. However, 
Jordan (1981) says "the difficulty in defining 'system' results 
from misusing a word that has a simple, clear meaning in a 
general context for a specific, concrete context. " 
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The word 'system' originates from the Greek word Isystemal, 
which derives from Isynistanail (syn + histanai) meaning "to 
bring together" or 11to combine" (Webster's Third New 
International Dictionary (1966)]. The Oxford English Dictionary 
(1961) defines system as, among other things, "a set or 
assemblage of things connected, associated, or inter-dependent, 
so as to form a complex unity. " Checkland (1975) defines it in 
very broad terms when he says 
System is the name of a general model or paradigm 
which can usefully be employed to understand, 
explain or engineer aspects of the real world. 
McCaul (1975) defines a system as : 
Something which is a dynamic combination of sets 
of things in an ordered relationship, such that 
it can repetitively change these sets of things 
into different combinations of themselves. 
However, Checkland (1979c) in his definition includes both 
static or dynamic components and concrete or abstract components 
and connections. He says 
Systems are wholes characterised by connections 
between their components, whether static or 
dynamic, and this is true whether or not these 
components and connections are concrete or 
abstract. 
Systems are most usefully defined in terms of their components 
and these will be considered in chapter 4. Before doing this 
however it is necessary to examine the different types of 
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systems. 
3.3 Classes of Systems 
Jones (1967) and Burton (1968) have given systems 
classifications which are useful in their respective fields of 
interest. More generalised classifications have also been 
produced. For example, Boulding (1956) provides useful 
classification based on a hierarchy of complexity, identifying 
nine levels of complexity, whilst Jordan (1981) has attempted to 
construct a systems taxonomy based on three bipolar dimensions 
which generate eight cells as shown in figure 3.1. However, 
neither the scale of complexity nor the ability to fit the 
systems in one of the eight cells would be useful in tackling 
complex real world problems. 
Checkland (1971) has developed a systems map of the universe 
identifying five basic classes of systems : 
a) Natural Systems 
These are the physical systems which make up the universe, for 
example crystal systems, sun-planet systems, individual human 
beings, seas, etc. Naughton & Peters (1976) however, 
distinguish between Physical and Natural Systems; for example, 
they treat the solar system or an atom as a Physical system and 
a living cell or organism as a Natural system. 
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b) Designed Physical Syst 
These are man-made systems; for example, equipment systems, 
mechanised operational systems, individual tools. 
c) Designed Abstract Sysl: 1 
These may be treated as theoretical systems; for example, 
philosophical systems and knowledge systems. 
d) Human Activity Systems 
These are systems in which people or the activities)of people 
are involved; for example, information systerns , transportation 
systems, legal systems, man-machine systems. 
e) Transcendental Systems 
These are systems beyond the present level of knowledge. 
Using Checkland's terminology, and in keeping with the 
objectives of this work, the international trade system is 
clearly a Human Activity System involving a large number of 
sub-systems of the same class. Examples, by no means exhaustive, 
include trading and commercial systems, transportation 
systems, information systems, adminstrative and planning 
systems. 
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In common with other Human Activity Systems, the international 
trade system influences and is influenced by other classes of 
system, for example, ships, cargo handling equipment, which are 
designed physical systems, and seas and weather, which are 
natural systems. 
3.4 Properties of a System 
In order to analyse a subject using the systems approach it is 
necessary to know the properties or components of a system. 
Jenkins (1969 & 1971) listed ten important properties of a 
system. These properties are : 
a) A system is a complex grouping of human beings and mchines. 
For example, the international trade system comprises, among 
other things, ship-operators, ships, cargo handling equipffent, 
shippers, trucks, insurers and bankers. 
b) A system may be broken down into sub-systems. The amount of 
sub-system detail depending on the problem being studied. 
Flow-block diagrams provide a readily understood way of 
describing these sub-systems. 
For example, figure 3.2 is a flow-block diagram of the 
international trade system showing the flow of goods from the 
shipper to the receiver. 
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c) The outputs from a given sub-system provide inputs for other 
sub-systems. Thus performance of a given sub-system 
interacts with the performance of other sub-systems and 
hence can not be studied in isolation. 
d) The system being studied will usually form part of a 
hierarchy of such systems. 7he systems at the top are very 
important and exert considerable influence on the systems 
lower down. 
e) To function at all the system must have an objective, but 
this is influenced by the wider system of which it forms 
part. Usually, systems have multiple objectives which are in 
conflict with one another, so that an overall objective is 
required which effects a compromise between these controlling, 
objectives. 
As the above three properties are interlinked their examples in 
the international trade system will be examined together. From 
the standpoint of the exporter, international transport is a 
sub-system of the order cycle system, see figure 3.3. From the 
figure it can be seen that the order cycle consists of a number 
of interacting stages, which interact further with other 
systems, or with sub-systems of a wider trading system depending 
on where the systern's boundary is drawn. At the order entry 
stage goods may be processed from stock - interacting with the 
inventory or stock control system - or may be held for 
confirmation awaiting a letter of credit advice, thereby 
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interacting with the banking system. 
Since the less common destinations are infrequently served by 
international sea transport, it may be necessary for the 
exporter to interact with the international shipping system to 
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match delivery dates with the departure dates of vessels. There 
may also be interactions with the designed physical systems; for 
example, in matching the consignment sizes to suit the twenty 
foot standard containers. 
At the order assembly stage there my be interactions with the 
political system. For example, the international regulations 
regarding special marks and labels on packages or the need to 
obtain specialised documentation, such as the Certificate of 
origin and invoices may have to be certified by the Chamber of 
Commerce and/or legalised by the Embassy of the country of 
import. 
At the despatch stage the order cycle systern interacts with the 
administrative and operational systems of the local and/or 
international transport carrier. Figure 3.3 could, of course, be 
expanded to take account of all these interactions. 
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The problem of conflict of objectives ih international trade can 
be identified in a number of instances. For example, the 
conflicting objectives of the buyer and seller, which are 
discussed in detail in the next chapter. Another example of 
conflicting objectives relates to the total flow of goods 
through the international transport system. These conflicts have 
been rife for many years and a number of attempts have been made 
to adopt a more systematic approach. This has resulted in the 
development of such concepts as the total distribution concept, 
the through transport concept, the delivered price concept and 
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total distribution costing (Adapted from Davies & Gray (1985)]. 
For example - the main theme of the through transport concept, 
advocated by the National Economic Development Office (NEDO) in 
its report [NEDO Report 
-(1966)], 
was that the export markets 
should be seen as extensions of the home markets, and in the 
movement of goods from exporter to importer the involvement of 
intermediaries should be minimised. This resulted in changes in 
both the. role of the traditional shipowner and the freight 
forwarder either through diversification or integration (Kapoor 
(1975), Davies & Gray (1985)]. 
f) The system must be designed in such a way that it is capable 
of achieving its overall objective. 
For example, the safe arrival of goods at the destination 
specified by the customer would be the overall objective of the 
system of international transport and the system must be 
designed to achieve that objective. 
g) The system must have a decision taking process to manage or 
manipulate. 
For example, in international transport decisions are made by 
the management of a company. The organisational structure would 
be different for different types of firms. one problem in 
examining the decision-making process of transport companies is 
that they are often part of a larger organisation with 
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non-transport activities. In such cases management decision- 
making policy may be influenced by the Group's overall 
objectives rather than specific transport related issues. 
h) The system nust have clearly defined boundaries which 
delineate the area to be studied. (See section 3.5). 
i) The system must have a performance criterion, which measures 
the extent to which the system is achieving its objectives. 
I For example, the performance criterion of the system of 
international transport could be the profits earned by a 
shipping company : 
- on a particular voyage, or 
- on a particular trade, or 
- over a year. 
However, the performance criterion would vary for different 
approaches, for example, to maintain its market share in the 
long term a liner company may consider that maintaining customer 
goodwill by running a very efficient scheduled service without 
any delays would be a better performance criterion than profit. 
Sometimes it may be necessary to establish a fairly complex 
range of performance criteria. For example, Davies & Gray 
(1985) consider that an international logistics audit by a 
shipper should include the following criteria : 
- Total expenditure on freight by product market or 
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individual custoffer 
- Volm-Les shipped (compared to costs) 
- Cost per kilometre 
- vehicle/container capacity utilisation 
- Costs of bought-in non-freight services (i. e. 
documentation, packing, insurance, etc. ) 
- Bought-in costs per unit of freight cost 
- Customer complaints by product and market 
- Delivery time 
Delivery availability 
Loss and damage rates. 
A system will have an environment, over which it has no 
control but with which it may have important interactions. 
The environment of the international trade systein is very 
complex and varied. It can be seen that the market structure, 
state of the economy, the political state of the countries 
involved, legal requirements, exchange rates and many other 
factors influence the nature of international transport. In 
particular, politico-economic instabilities can give rise to 
traffic fluctuations. 
3.5 Boundaries of a System 
one of the important properties of a system is that it should 
have clearly defined boundaries; this facilitates the 
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delineation of the area to be studied. Naughton & Peters (1976) 
point out that the most conTwn way of defining a system is by 
drawing a boundary around it and listing the elermnts and/or 
sub-systems that are inside. In Human Activity Systems 
boundaries are not easily definable and are usually determined 
by functions and activities of the system as perceived by the 
designer, researcher or analyst. 
Jones (1982) points out that the perception of a system is not 
reached in one jump but in stages, by trial and error. She goes 
on to suggest that the behaviour of certain elements and 
sub-systems should be identified as constituting the 'behaviour 
of interest' and that these and their inter-relationships should 
be included within the system. Kast & Rosenzweig (1981), 
however, point out that "frequently, in the study of social 
organisations, where to draw the boundaries is a matter of 
convenience and strategy". 
For example, when examining and attempting to classify the 
diverse organisational structures of shipping companies, 
different boundaries can be established dependent upon which 
viewpoint has been adopted, a decision which is determined by 
the objective of the exercise. The following are possible 
classifications : 
a) The purpose for which the vessels are used. 
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b) The type of company ownership, i. e. goverment enterprise, 
independent shipping company or a unit within a national or 
international conglomerate. 
c) The nationality of the ownership and its relation to the 
country of registration of the vessels. 
This area can be of particular importance to the study of 
maritime fraud, as in the case when an owner decides to register 
vessels in a different country for economic or legal reasons, it 
brings about a situation in which there is a lack of a genuine 
link between the ship and the State of its registration and, 
among other things, the lack'of effective control by the State 
over the activities of shipowners and the operation of ships. 
Also the simplicity of registration of ships and the difficulty 
of tracing the beneficial ownership have all created favourable 
possibilities for all kinds of maritime fraud (UNCTAD (1984)]. 
However, the difficulty of where to set the boundary remains and 
there is little practical guidance about how to set a boundary 
in a particular systems study (Jones (1982)]. What lies outside 
the boundary is the system's environment. The environment 
consists of elements and/or systems which may or may not be 
interrelated but which way interact with the system. While the 
system cannot control the environment it may influence and 
interact with sane of the elements and/or systems of the 
environment. Feibleman & Friend (1969) discuss the interaction 
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between a systern and its environment at great length. 
Jones (1982) argues that if an element in an environment 
is affected by the system, it must be included within the 
boundary. However if this was done, the system could end up, in 
the extreme case, including everything in the Universe. 
3.6 Systems Modelling 
3.6.1 Systematic and systemic 
The two words "systematic" and "systemic" are adjectives which 
derive from the word "system", the former waning 'arranged or 
conducted according to a plan or organised method' and the 
latter meaning 'belonging to, supplying or affectipg the system 
as a whole'. These two words form the basis of two parallel but 
complimentary approaches. The systematic approach is used : 
a) in the analysis of routine operations, typically those which 
attempt to increase the efficiency of a man-machine system 
[Shubnell (1971)], and 
b) to make an effective contribution to the overall optimisation 
of a problem. 
Examples of this approach are operational research (OR), control 
engineering, systems analysis, mathematical modelling. 
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The systemic or 'holistic' approach stems from the thinking of 
the 'organismic' biologists whose ideas led to what became 
"systems thinking" in the 1940's (Checkland (1979a)]. Naughton 
Peters (1976) point out : 
Systems thinking means being able to perceive 
system in a given situation. It is a kind of 
insight which enables one to look at a complex, 
confused situation and to perceive some degree of 
order, or interconnectedness, in the apparent 
chaos. The order which one perceives is the 
system and the activity of perceiving is what we 
call systems thinking. 
3.6.2 Systems Analysist Systems Engineering & Systems Approach 
The two approaches to systems, by their nature, give rise to two 
different types of systems thinking, viz. 'hard' and 'soft' 
systems thinking. 'Hard' systems are systems, often involving 
industrial plants, characterised by easy-to-define objectives, 
with clearly defined decision-taking procedures and quantitative 
measures of performance [Checkland (1971)], whereas 'soft' 
systems are systerns characterised by complex and involved 
interactions, conflicting objectives and qualitative variables 
replete with value judgements and subjective assessments (Bolton 
et al (1977)] and where decision-taking is uncertain and human 
behaviour way appear irrational [Checkland (1971)]. 
The extreme differences between the nature of the two types of 
systems has led to the development of different types of 
methodologies for dealing with the problems. Checkland (1971) 
62 
stressed the need to develop methodologies appropriate right 
across the spectrum from hard systems to soft systems. Bolton et 
al (1977) have constructed a hierarchy of methodologies and 
point out that there is no clear dividing line between hard and 
soft categories, one shades into the other and most systems have 
a combination of hard and soft sub-systems. 
The expressions systems engineering (SE), systeins analysis (SA), 
and the systems approach seem to have been used synonymously, as 
can be seen from the following quotes : 
Systems analysis is the overall process for 
arriving at the best mix of equipment, personnel, 
and procedural requirements for a system design 
[Chase (1974)]. 
Systems Engineering provides a framework within 
which to tie together many separate and possibly 
divergent disciplines, which otherwise might fail 
to make an effective contribution to the overall 
optimisation of the problem [Jenkins (1969)]. 
What do I mean by a systems approach ? .......... It is identical with what I have called systems 
analysis elsewhere. That is, it is a way to 
investigate how best to aid a decision maker 
faced with complex problems of choice under 
uncertainty [Quade (1971)]. 
Systems analysis studies are addressed to 
situations of policy and strategy where the 
problems and objectives are less structured and 
greater reliance is placed upon assumptions and 
judgements (Shubnell (1971)]. 
on this lack of uniformity, Quade et al (1978) write that what 
the International Institute of Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) 
calls "systems analysis" is elsewhere referred to as policy 
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analysis, operations research, cybernetics, qualitative planning 
or possibly something else. Checkland's (1979b) analysis of the 
initial phases in a dozen accounts of 'hard' systems methodology 
published between 1955 and 1976 also shows that the three 
expressions have been used synonymously. 
Checkland (1981) has traced the systems movement leading to the 
development of the various methodologies for dealing with 
problems and, he has differentiated between SE and SA. 
Discussing the nature of SE and SA Checkland (1978) points out 
that SE is concerned with "creation of a complex man-made entity 
and/or the procedures and information flows associated with its 
operation", whereas SA is the "systematic appraisal of the costs 
and other implications of meeting a defined requirement in 
various ways". He goes on to say thAt both are systematic and 
that both seek alternative ways of achieving a desired end which 
is efficient and if possible economically efficient. 
From the foregoing it can be seen that after nearly thirty years 
the systems movement has not been able to agree on the meaning 
of the expressions SE, SA and the systems approach. Therefore, 
the following meanings will be ascribed to them in this 
dissertation : 
System Approach is an approach to a complex problem which 
employs 'divergent thinking', that is, does not view the problem 
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in isolation but attempts to consider all aspects of it, and 
which recognizes the importance of and concentrates on the 
interactions among the various parts. 
system Engineering is a systems approach which is used in the 
design of hard systems. It is characterised by the definition 
of 'the need' or 'the aim to be achieved', and the selection of 
the rmst economic and efficient way of meeting the defined end. 
Systems Analysis is a systems approach which is used in 
tackling soft systems where the problems are 'ill-structured' 
and where great reliance is placed upon subjective assessments 
and value judgements, but where an attempt is rmde to establish 
measures of performance. 
3.6.3 Systems Models 
A systems model is a simplified description of a system which 
still retains the overall structure of the system, and in which 
Ila loss of resolution is preferred to a loss of breadth" (Martin 
(1980)). Tate & Jones (1975) have defined a model as follows 
A model is a representation of reality made 
sufficiently explicit for one to be able to 
examine the assumptions embodied in it, to 
manipulate it and to experiment with it, and to 
draw inferences frorn it which can be applied to 
reality. 
Ackoff & Sasieni (1968) identify three types of models which are 
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camonly used in operations- research as well as in most 
sciences. Bolton et el (1977) introduce another class of models 
which are very important in systems thinking. The four types of 
models are :- 
a) Iconic models generally look like what they represent but 
differ in size, for example photographs, and are generally 
specific, concrete, and difficult to manipulate for 
experimental purposes. 
b) Analogue models use one set of properties to represent 
another set of properties, for example, contour lines on a 
map are analogues of elevation. In general they are less 
specific and less concrete, but easier. to manipulate than 
iconic models. 
c) Symbolic models use letters and numbers and other types 
of symbols to represent variables and the relationships 
between them. They are the most general and abstract type 
of models, and are usually the easiest to manipulate 
experimentally. 
Symbolic models are used in many areas of transport in 
scheduling problems, cost-benefit analyses etc. For example, a 
symbolic model may be used in the shipping industry to convert 
the World Scale Index to Time Charter Rate for the comparison of 
costs. A standard model used is : 
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(T/C Rate x Dwt. x TPM) + Bunker Costs + Port Charges 
WS = -- -- 
(Flat Rate / 100) x Cargo tonne 
Where : 
WS = Worldwide Tanker Nominal Freight Index, or simply 
World Scale Index. It is used as an index for the 
comparison of different voyage charter (hire) 
rates. 
T/C Rate = Time Charter Rate is the rate per deadweight 
(Dwt. ) tonne per month which the hirer (known as 
the charterer) pays 
' 
to the shipowner for the use 
of the ship for a fixed period of time. 
TPM Time Period Multiplier 
d) Conceptual models are representations of a system as 
perceived by the designer and are used in the early stages 
of design. They include diagrams which illustrate 
i) relationships among various parts of the system 
ii) interaction and flow of energy, materials and 
information both within the various elements of the 
system and between the system and the environment, and 
iii) processes within the system to indicate the sequence of 
activities. 
Conceptual models are used to assist the designer in 
understanding the system and to explain to others how he 
perceives the system. Conceptual models of the various 
sub-systems of the systems of international trade are shown in 
the next chapter. 
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3.6.4 The Use of Diagrams for Conceptual Models 
Conceptual models are best presented as diagrams because they 
represent an overall picture of the system, supporting the adage 
-a picture is worth a thousand words. 
Checkland (1979c) points out that diagrams are very important in 
the use of systems concepts and that the "state-of-the-art" in 
drawing diagrams pertaining to soft systems is deplorable. He 
lays down simple canmon sense guidelines for the process of 
drawing such diagrams. The guidelines are : 
a) decide what type of diagram is appropriate, 
decide on a convention for the diagram's entities and 
relationships, and strictly adhere to that convention, and 
c) provide a key which ensures that different readers will 
interpret the diagram in the same way. 
Bolton et al (1977) draw attention to conmn mistakes in the 
drawing of diagrams and then go on to say that the diagrams 
should be simple, clear, straightforward and thought-provoking, 
and that they should be continually revised as the study 
progresses. 
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3.7 System Failure 
A system failure may be defined-as the inability of a system to 
meet its desired objectives or the production of undesirable 
outputs. These may be caused by weaknesses inherent within the 
system and/or weaknesses created by changes in the environment. 
Once a failure has occurred, it must be analysed to determine 
the weaknesses of the system which could have caused the 
failure, so as to "find coherent explanations in order to 
predict future disasters" (Naughton & Peters (1976)]. Naughton & 
Peters also point out : 
From a policy or planning point of view, ad hoc 
analyses of failures are of little value. They 
may serve valuable functions as ritual 
investigations of tragedies or as face-saving 
bureaucratic exercises. But all too often they 
amount to little more than bolting the proverbial 
stable door after the horse has gone. 
From the above it can be seen that the underlying weakness of a 
system, which could have caused the failure, can only be 
determined by taking a systems approach, and that one should 
look at all aspects of the operation of the system and not try 
to focus on the most obvious cause. At the first session of the 
IGG (UNCTAD Report (1984)) the representative of Lebanon 
highlighted the need for a systems approach to determine the 
causes of failure of the system of international trade. He 
said 
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International shipping trade resembled a chain 
with several links and each faulty link could 
cause a break in the chain; a shipper who failed 
to supervise loading of his goods; a container 
the contents of which were unknown; a careless 
customs service; a bank which did not take the 
trouble)to verify or to gather information; an 
insurance companyl whose representative was 
interested only in the percentage of premium; a 
shipping agency that failed to exercise proper 
control; and a buyer lured by a low price. All 
those elements were an encouragement to 
defrauders. In order to prevent the failure of 
any one of the links in the chain, it was 
necessary to seek out the weaknesses and to 
correct them. It was for that reason that he felt 
the UWCTAD secretariat could be called upon once 
again to prepare an extensive and in-depth study 
of the whole process .... 
3.7.1 Fraud as a Systern Failure - 
Fran the above it can be seen that maritime fraud is an example 
of ýhe failure of the system of international trade. In the 
majority of cases of maritime fraud the buyer, without having 
conducted suitable inquiries regarding the integrity of the 
seller, has entered into a contract where payment is arranged 
under a confirmed irrevocable documentary credit, and the bank 
has paid the seller on presentation of the documents, which have 
been forged or falsified. Figure 3.4 shows an example of 
documentary fraud. 
There have been several calls for reform of the existing system 
of documentary credits [Ellen (1979a), Kerr (1979), Kilbohm 
(1981)], and also for the re-examination of the Uniform Customs 
and Practice for Documentary Credits (UCP) view of the 
70 
LIBYAN BUYER I JU. K. SELLER 
Requests for J' jUnable to supply 
supply of so recommends that 
15000t steel the buyer contact 
bars 
I 
seller in Cyprus 
Buyer opens 1446. CYPRUS SELLER 
documentary 
credit for FORGED DOCUMENTS 
US $5 million - Certificate of non- Invoices buyer 
with Libyan black listed ship 
Issuing Bank dated 7.5.79. 
- Bill of Lading 
(7.5.79) 
Presents forged 
- Packing List (7.5.79) documents to 
- Mill Certificate confirming bank (7.5.79. ) 
Cyprus Bank - EEC Certificate of 
confirms credit 
Origin (2.5.79. ) 
01" 
Collects money 
100 and disappears 
0* 
CONFIRMING 
BANK IN Seller 
CYPRUS makes 
payment allegedly 
against 
documents arranged 
shipment 
from 
W. Germany 
Steel allegedly 
H. V. "QUESTION MARK" loaded at Hamburg CERMAN STEEL CO"ANY 
supposed carrying N Supposed real supplier 
vessel of steel 
What ceally =Money line SO What the buyec thought was happened happening 
Figure 3.4 - Conceptual Model of Documentary Fraud 
Source : Adapted from ICC Publication No. 370 
71 
equitable allocation of responsibilities between the parties 
(i. e. banker/buyer) with regard to their *respective functions, 
duties and opportunities to act to prevent the occurrence of 
fraud [UNCrAD Report (1983)]. It has, however, been argued that 
the buyer should undertake the necessary checks himself and not 
rely on the banks to do more checking because "the main burden 
of preventing fraud should, and does, lie with the buyer" 
[Wheble 1982)]. 
From the above it can be seen that the failure of the systern of 
international trade results in the occurrence of fraud. The 
underlying cause(s) of the failure can only be determined by 
taking the systems approach and not apportioning the blame on 
one party or the other, as Bignell & Fortune (1984) point out 
that looking into the circumstances and background of failures 
would indicate that they are multi-causal and arise from 
complicated, interactive and interdependent prior activities. 
Kapoor & Gray (1985) have shown that the resurgence of maritime 
fraud, i. e. failure of the international trade systern, can be 
traced back to the following interactive and interdependent 
prior activities : 
a) The freight market 'boan' in 1972 led to massive investment 
in new ships. 
b) The unpredictability of the crises leading to the present 
recession left the world with massive surplus tonnage which 
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was further affected by the re-opening of the Suez Canal. 
c) With the quadrupling of oil prices the oil-rich States, 
which were unaffected by the depression, found themselves 
in a buyer's market, and continued to import large 
quantities of cargo at ccmpetitive prices. 
d) The sudden increase in trade, in conjunction with poor port 
infrastructure led to port congestion. Delays of up to and 
sometimes exceeding 6 months were not unusual. 
e) Due to the recession the traders, particularly those frorn 
developing countries, were looking for cheap goods and 
services. 
f) Due to surplus tonnage, 'singleton shipowners' in a 
desperate attempt to keep their ships operational entered 
into contracts at break-even or uneconomic rates. They soon 
found themselves losing money as delays at the discharging 
ports continued to increase. In order to free their vessels 
for further trading the cargoes were discharged at 
the nearest/intermediate ports. What probably started as a 
desperate but innocent attempt by the owner/charterer to 
avoid bankruptcy gradually developed into a way of making 
untold profits at very little or no risk for the 
unscrupulous operators. 
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The above is a brief outline of the various aspects which have 
to be examined in detail in a systems analysis. It does, 
however, show how a systems approach would help in determining 
the causes leading to the failure of the system of international 
trade. It emphasizes the need for a 'soft' systems approach and 
also the need for the identification of the interaction between 
the elements of the system and its envirorment. 
3.8 7he Value of Soft Systems 
A mathematical model, by definition, should be precise and would 
use logic in arriving at a solution. In view of this it seems to 
be an impossible task to develop a mathematical model to 
illustrate the apparently irrational and often illogical 
behaviour of Man. Perhaps an example would serve to illustrate 
the point : 
An entrepreneurial shipowner wants to close a Ideal' quickly, 
and his decision to accept or reject the offer depends, among 
other things, on "the feel of the market" and "gut feeling" that 
against all odds the deal is very good. Both "the feel of the 
market" and "gut feeling" are intangibles, neither of which 
can be quantified to be put into a mathematical model to assist 
the shipowner in his decision-imking. Whereas, with a systems 
diagram in front of him he could systematically assess all the 
relevant factors and, if necessary, come to virtually an 
instantaneous decision whether to accept or reject the offer. 
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Such an approach helps clarify an apparently complex situation 
and may assist the shipowner in identifying flaws in his "gut 
feeling". It should be pointed out that such an approach meets 
resistance from practitioners in many areas of activity since it 
tends to demystify their work and it may result in subsequent 
loss of status or even in the disappearance of much of the work. 
Therefore it is submitted that Checkland (1978), quite rightly, 
recomnends abandoning the 'hard' systems or mathematical 
approach in the area of 'soft' systems problems. This view is 
also substantiated by Quade (1971). In view of the foregoing, 
and bearing in mind that the system of international trade is a 
Human Activity System which operates under conditions of 
uncertainty, as pointed out in chapter 2, it was decided to use 
the soft systems approach to determine the causes leading to the 
failure of the system. 
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Charterparties are demonstrably effective 
instruments of fraud. Bill of Lading, however, 
are superlative. 
Metterman (1983)] 
The numbers in brackets thus (1) refer to details 
of legal citations and foot notes, which are 
placed at the end of a chapter in a chapter 
appendix. 
In chapter 4 there are three major sections. 
Separate numbering is used for each of the three 
sections, i. e. contracts of Carriage, Insurance 
and Payment. 
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CFVU? rER 4- CONTRACTS OF CARRIAGE, INSURANCE & PAYMENT 
4.1 International Trade as a System 
This chapter uses the soft systems approach to develop a 
simplified, conceptual model of the system of international 
trade. The system is then made dynamic by developing conceptual 
models of the three main sub-systems to show the flow of 
information, documents, goods and money. Then a dynamic model 
of the system of international trade is developed for analysis 
in the next chapter. 
An international trade transaction is made up of a number of 
different transactions, each of which form separate contracts in 
their own right. - However, the individual contracts, though 
separate and distinct in their own right, originate as a result 
of the primary contract for the international sale of goods. 
Under a contract for the international sale of goods a seller in 
one country undertakes to supply specified goods to a buyer in 
another country against payment of an agreed sum. ýo protect 
their respective interests there is need for security. The buyer 
does not want to part with the money before he receives the 
goods and similarly the seller does not want to part with the 
goods before he receives payment. This situation is resolved by 
the use of internationally recognised standard terms of 
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delivery and payment, which are incorporated in the contract of 
sale. 
The terms of delivery are governed by standard conditions known 
as "trade terms". These terms are shorthand expressions of 
rights and obligations of the buyer and seller CICC Publication 
No. 354 (1980)]. Their main function is to determine at what 
point the seller has fulfilled his obligations so that the goods 
in a legal sense could be said to have been delivered to the 
buyer. Their secondary functions being to identify : 
- whose duty it is to provide export/import licence, 
- the nature and type of doctzmnts, 
- the extent of insurance protection, etc. 
The most commnly used traae terms are "free on board" 
"cost & freight" (c & f)'and lecost, insurance 
freight" (c. i. f. ). 
The goods have to be transported to their final destinations and 
also insured against loss and/or damage, thereby giving rise to 
contracts of carriage and insurance. Thus in its simplest form, 
the internatinal trade system my be represented as shown in 
f igure 4.1. 
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However, this model can become very complex depending on the 
number of people involved in the transaction, and this, in turn, 
gives rise to further subsidiary contracts, such as the 
contracts of agency, freight forwarding, etc. In addition, since 
the goods on passage may cross several national boundaries, the 
official requirements with reference to customs and other local 
formalities have also to be taken into account; these are 
some of the sub-systems in the immediate environment of the 
system of international trade which interact with it. 
4.2 People involved in the various types of contracts 
The principal actors involved in the three main contractual 
sub-systems are now considered to show the complexity of the 
system and the difficulties involved in determining the weak 
links in the system. 
Figure 4.2 shows the different personnel who may be involved in 
the the main sub-systems. However, depending on the exporting 
and importing countries, the type of goods and the documents 
requested by the buyer, some or all of the-following would also 
be involved : Customs, Port Authorities, Health Authorities, 
Embassies/High Commissions, Stevedores, Port Security officers, 
Chamber of Commerce, Department of Transport, Inspections/Survey 
Agency. 
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Having identified the personnel who may be involved in the 
international trade transaction, each of the contractual 
sub-systems will now be considered in detail. 
4.3 CONTRACT CP CARRIAGE 
The contract of carriage is one of the three subsidiary 
contracts under-the contract for the sale of goods. The contract 
is between the carrier (who may be the shipowner or the 
charterer) and the buyer or seller depending on the trade terms. 
There are two basic types of contracts by which a ship can be 
employed for the carriage of goods at sea -a contract of 
carriage evidenced by a Bill of Lading (B/L), and a Charter 
Party (C/P). Although the two contracts are separate, frequently 
a ship under a charter is carrying goods under a B/L. 
A c. i. f. contract, which contemplates the carriage of goods by 
sea, lends itself to the seller-perpetrated documentary frauds 
because : 
a) for the better part of this century it has constituted the 
most important instrument of overseas trade (Sassoon (1975)], 
and is most frequently used in international seabor-ne trade 
(Abhyankar (1980)], and 
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b) the salient characteristic of this contract is that "the 
property in the goods not only may but must pass by delivery 
of the documents against which payment is made" {11. 
It is for this reason that the contract of carriage under a 
c. i. f. contract is considered. 
4.3.1 C. i. f. Contracts 
Under a c. i. f. contract it is the duty of the seller to arrange 
for the shipment of the goods. He can enter into a contract of 
carriage with the carrier in one of the two ways shown in figure 
4.3. Figure 4.4 is a conceptual model of the process. of entering 
into a contract of carriage, evidenced by a B/L, and the 
shipment of goods. Figure 4.5 is a conceptual model of the 
process of entering into a contract of carriage governed by a 
C/P. Figure 4.6 is a conceptual model of the commercial 
operation of a ship under charter carrying goods under a B/L. 
When the goods are being transported by sea actual possession of 
them cannot be delivered. In such cases "the bill of lading is 
considered to be a symbol of the goods, and its delivery to be a 
delivery of the goods" {2}. 
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Therefore, under a c. i. f. contract "all that a buyer can call 
for is delivery of the customary documents. This represents the 
measure of the buyer's right and the extent of the vendor's 
duty" (3). In Johnson v Taylor Bros. & Co. {41 Lord Atkinson 
pointed out that in a c. i. f. contract, in the absence of any 
special provision to the contrary, the vendor is bound by his 
contract to do the following things : 
a) To make out an invoice of the goods sold, 
b) To ship at the port of shipment goods of the description 
contained in the contract, within the time named in the 
contract, 
c) To procure a contract of affreightment under which the goods 
will be delivered at the destination conternplated by the 
contract, 
d) To arrange for an insurance upon the terms current in trade 
which will be available for the benefit of the buyer, and 
e) With all reasonable despatch to send forward and tender to 
the buyer these shipping documents, namely, the invoice, bill 
of lading and policy of insurance. 
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4.3.2 Importance of Intermediaries 
From figure 4.3 it can be seen that under both approaches to the 
contract of carriage the two principals, i. e. the shipper and 
the carrier, have to rely on the competence and integrity of 
their agents who act as intermediaries. 
In the charter market a good shipbroker is worth his weight in 
gold to his principals. He must know the sources of information 
and must be able to get information for both local and 
international markets. In addition, he must ascertain and 
evaluate all the likely business quoted to him and advise his 
principal, not only of the availability of ships or cargo but 
also give him his personal views of the strength of the market, 
the prevailing market rate and what he thinks of the other party 
to thth- contract. 
Prentis (1979) points out that members of the Baltic Exchange 
would check and re-check the credentials of the principal whose 
business they quote. He goes on to say : 
Many charterers seldorn enquire of the financial 
or operating records of Disponent Owners or even 
bother to enquire the name of the actual Owners 
of the vessel in order that they might check on 
the experience of the said operator. 
Furthermore the use of the so-called "Kerbside Brokers"I, i. e. 
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those who are not members of any Exchange or national or 
international professional associations should be avoided, 
because the "kerbside broker" is only interested in fixing the 
ship as soon as possible and receiving his commission. For 
example, in the majority of fraud cases the chartering has been 
routed through the "kerbside brokers" (Prentis (1979)]. 
Overlaet (1985) points out that the continued decline in the 
ship agency work during the last two decades and the generally 
reducing moral standards of doing business have provided : 
Pretty fertile ground for agents, who saw closure 
or worse, bankruptcy of their old business 
staring thern in the face, to succomb to perhaps 
less than totally honest business methods when 
they saw the opportunity. 
Therefore, to protect the interests of the principals some form 
of control over the intermediaries is necessary. One 
organisation, known as Multiport Ship Agencies Network, based in 
Rotterdam, meticulously scrutinises its members before joining 
and monitors their accounts annually. 
The UNCTAD Secretariat in its report [UNCTAD Report (1983)] 
suggested that : 
In order to put an end to various frauds and 
malpractices attributable to agents who provide 
intermediary services, consideration should be 
given to the formulation of minimum standards 
concerning financial and professional 
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qualifications, as well as of standards of 
conduct, which could be used as guidelines for 
national action in establishing a national 
licensing system or compulsory membership 
requirements in a professional association. 
At the Bombay seminar on "International Maritime and Commercial 
Frauds" (March 1985) one of the resolutions was that shipping 
related intermediaries "should be registered and licenced and 
should provide indemnity bonds for the due performance of the 
voyage by the ship or shipping company whose agents they are". 
And, at the "London International Conference on Maritime Fraud" 
(April 1985) at the Ships' Agents Workshop session it was agreed 
that "some form of licensing was desirable", and one of its 
recommendations was "consideration should be given to the 
requirewents as to proof of financial resources and reliability 
as well as posting a performance bond or guarantee". 
Therefore, the principle of "Caveat Emptor", i. e. let the buyer 
beware, must apply here as well, as in any other business. 
Whilst the choice of a shipping intermediary rests entirely with 
the principal, he should not deal with anyone who is not a 
member of a national or international association. 
4.3.3 Importance of a Bill of Lading 
When the goods for shipment would only comprise a part of a 
general cargo the seller will enter into a contract of 
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affreightirent and will simply receive a B/L for the goods 
shipped. When the seller has sufficient quantity of goods to 
fill a ship he may charter or hire the ship for the voyage. In 
such cases the contract of carriage is the C/P and the seller 
may issue his own B/L or use the carrier's B/L. 
In the- transaction for the international sale of goods, after 
the contract of sale, the most important document is the B/L. 
The importance of a B/L was highlighted by Lord Justice Bowen 
in Sanders Brothers v Maclean & Co. {5} where he said that 
"it is a key which in the hands of a rightful owner is 
intended to unlock the door of the warehouse, floating or fixed, 
in which the goods may chance to be". 
Whilst a B/L has three functions, nwely : 
a) it is a receipt for the goods shipped and contains certain 
admissions by the carrier as to quantity, condition and also 
the date of shipment, 
b) it is prima facie evidence of the contract of carriage for 
the goods, and 
c) it is a document of title, without which neither payment for 
the goods nor their delivery can be obtained. During transit, 
it enables the holder to transfer title to the goods merely 
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by endorsing the B/L, 
its importance lies in the fact that it is a document of title 
to the goods, without which neither payment for the goods nor 
their delivery can be obtained. During transit, title to the 
goods can be transferred by the holder rrerely by an indorsement 
on the B/L, and as a result goods can be bought and sold in 
transit by successive indorsements. Figure 4.7 shows the 
sequence of events in the life of a B/L. 
In the majority of trades the B/L is usually issued in two or 
three originals, and as many as 50 copies in some trades. The 
indorsement and transfer of one B/L out of a "set" is sufficient 
to pass the property in the goods which the B/L represents, and 
that subsequent indorsement of any others of the "set" is 
ineffective for that purpose {6}. As delivery of the cargo is 
effected on production of only one of the originals, the 
shipowner protects himself against wrongful delivery by stating, 
on the B/L : 
In witness whereof the Master, owner or Agent of the ship 
has affirmed to the number of Bills of Lading stated 
below, all of this tenor and date, one of which being 
accomplished, the others to stand void. 
In Glyn Mills Currie & Co. v The East and West India Dock Co. 
16} Earl Cairns said that he understood the above statement to 
mean that if the shipowner had delivered the goods on one of the 
Bills of Lading in good faith, he will have fulfilled his 
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Figure 4.7 - Sequence of Events in the "Life of a B/L11 
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contract and would not be answerable upon any of the others. In 
the sane case Lord Blackburn {71 said : 
... when the master has no notice or knowledge of 
anything but that there are other parts of the 
bill of lading, one of which it is possible may 
have been assigned, he is justified or excused in 
delivering according to his contract to the 
person appearing to be the assign of the bill of 
lading which is produced to him. 
In Sanders Brothers v Maclean & Co. {8}, where the buyer 
refused to pay for a cargo of iron rails because only two out of 
a set of three Bills of Lading were tendered to him, Bowen L. J. 
said : 
... a tender is at all events in compliance with the present contract, by which all the effective 
bills of lading in existence are tendered. If, 
indeed, the absent original had been misused so 
as to defeat the title of the indorsees of the 
tendered residue of the set, the tender would 
have been bad. But the vendee was not entitled to 
reject the tender of the only effective documents 
on the bare chance that a third effective bill of 
lading might possibly have been dealt with when 
in fact it had not. The person who rejects 
effective and adequate documents of title on the 
ground that another document may possibly be 
outstanding, does so at his own risk. 
In view of the above, it is submitted that in all cases the use 
of more than one original should be abolished, because the 
position of the holder of only one original out of many is 
weakened. The risk that the person holding another original may 
succeed in taking delivery of the cargo was exemplified in the 
Glyn Mills case cited above - in this case the consignee 
deposited one B/L with a bank as security for a loan, and with a 
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second B/L obtained delivery from a dock company in whose 
warehouse the goods had been stored after being landed. 
Therefore, as Gram (1983) points out under the present 
practice: 
The shipper is furnished not only with one key to 
the goods but with a number of additional keys 
which may be used or abused. There is a risk of 
double transactions. 
As attempts within the International Chamber of Camerce to stop 
the practice of issuing more than one original have failed [Gram 
(1983)], it is submitted that anyone purchasing goods or giving 
loan on the strength of a B/L should demand the full set. 
In a contract that called for the tender of a full set of bills 
of lading, the buyer was held entitled to reject the tender if 
the requirement is not fulfilled, even though the seller was 
offering an indemnity or an undertaking to produce the third 
{9}. However, in Dixon, Irmaos & Cia Ltd. v Chase National 
Bank of the City of New York (10}, an indemnity of a 
responsible New York bank was accepted in lieu of a missing part 
of a full set of bills of lading, because it was the custom 
among New York banks to accept such guarantee. 
However, a shipowner is not entitled to deliver goods to the 
consignee without production of the B/L {111. Even the rightful 
owner of the goods cannot claim the goods if he is unable to 
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produce a B/L. In Trucks & Spares Ltd. v Maritime Agencies 
(Southampton) Ltd. {12} Denning, L. J. (as he then was) said : 
Whether the property has passed or not, in my 
opinion, they (the buyers) ought to produce bills 
of lading duly endorsed in order to make a good 
title at this stage. 
The reason for the presentation of the B/L is that, as 
pointed out previously, it is "the key" to the warehouse where 
the goods may chance to be. The presentation protects the 
carrier in that he can, normally, rely on the document being 
presented by the right person. Even then, Gram (1983) points out 
that the carrier must act carefully because : 
He way be liable for misdelivery if he is 
informed or should have understood that the 
document has been forged, or that the person 
claiming delivery is not the last endorsee. 
In multiple sale transactions for the same cargo, especially 
where the sea voyage is short, it will be very difficult for the 
ultimate buyer to present the B/L to the carrier to obtain 
delivery, because the shipping documnts, including the 
all-important B/L, would not have reached him by the time the 
transaction is completed. The reason for the delay can be seen 
in figure 4.7, namely, two banks may be involved for each 
transaction, and documents cannot pass through the hands of a 
number of traders and their banks in time [Gram (1983)]. 
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As a result, a system of indemnities has grown, particularly in 
the oil trade, both as between the seller and buyer to whom the 
seller is unable to deliver the B/L, and as between the ultimate 
buyer of the cargo and the carrier for the latter's willingness 
to deliver the cargo without presentation of the B/L (De May 
(1986)]. 
The indemnity given to the carrier will not, however, protect 
him against an action for misdelivery, where it transpires that 
the B/L is not delayed but is being held by a party who has 
reason to assert a claim to the cargo [13}. De May (1986) points 
out that the inequity of the situation was publicised by the 
Chairman of the Documentary Cannittee of Intertanko, and 
resulted in the formation of SeaDocs Registry Limited. The 
purpose of the Registry is to provide custody, information 
transfer and handling services for shipping documents in the oil 
trade and eventually, other bulk trades, by the various parties 
concerned with shipping, trading and financing the cargoes in 
question. 
Furthermore, the law and practice are in conflict when a cargo, 
which is financed by a banker's credit is sold before the voyage 
is completed; the seller is under an obligation in the terms of 
the banker's credit to transmit the B/L promptly. In such a 
situation how can the seller comply with his obligation to 
transmit the B/L to the buyer, when the bank, as pledgee, has a 
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right to retain the B/L as security until it has been paid ? In 
Gatoil International Inc. v Tradax Petroleum Ltd. {14) it was 
held that under a c. i. f. sale it was one of the seller's 
(Tradax's) obligations to take all reasonable steps to forward 
to Gatoil, without delay after shipment of goods, the shipping 
docurrents needed to obtain actual possession of the cargo. The 
Court also held that failure to transmit one original B/L for 
each parcel held by Tradax's bank was a clear breach of a c. i. f. 
contract. 
The situation created by the Gatoil case could also be resolved 
by the use of the SeaDocs Registry. In 1986 SeaDocs successfully 
completed a Pilot Project for Ekofisk crude oil shipped from the 
Phillips Petroleum terminal at Seal Sands, and should be ready 
for live operations in 1987. Wbile SeaDocs Registry is a trade 
facilitation measure, it is believed that it will provide a 
partial answer to maritim fraud [Stork (1985)]. In a publicity 
paper entitled "SeaDocs : Can Technology Beat Fraud ? ", Mr. 
A. B. M. Albert, Marketing Director of SeaDocs Registry Limited, 
says that the three principal reasons why such a system can 
assist considerably in reducing the potential for fraud are - 
speedier and more accurate information, more secure 
canmunications and substantially improved audit trail. 
At the London International Conference on Maritime Fraud (April 
1985) the Workshop on Docurrentation concluded that "the use of 
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a guarantee to the carrier when an original bill of lading 
cannot be produced is an unsatisfactory solution and should be 
avoided", and also that "in bulk trades, a centre like the 
SeaDocs Registry might prove itself to offer a workable 
solution, but modern techniques of comnunication open up the 
road to more elegant and efficient solutions in the long run". 
4.3.4 Signing Bills of Lading 
When presented with a B/L for signature, the Master or Agent 
must examine it for the following : 
a) 7he quantity of cargo, - in bulk shipments it may be difficult 
to ascertain accurately the quantity loaded, in such cases it 
has been suggested that the common practice is that, if the 
B/L figure differs from the ship's figure by more than 0.5% 
the Master should question its accuracy [Bibby Line (1978)]. 
Inaccurate statements in bills of lading as to the quantity 
shipped would seriously prejudice the position of the Owner, 
for if he disputes them he has the burden of proving thern 
inaccurate. In Smith v Bedouin Steam Navigation Company 
{151 Lord Halsbury said : 
... the important point is that there is a 
receipt for the shipment of the goods by the 
persons authorized to give such receipt by the 
owners, and unless it could be shown that there 
was a mistake or some fraud in the receipt, the 
usual result must follow. If that were not so it 
would be impossible to conduct business at all; 
and in the case of a bill of lading, which 
involves the rights of other people, it is more 
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important to assert this doctrine than in the 
case of almst any other document (Emphasis 
supplied). 
b) Description and Condition of the Cargo - This is a very 
important point and the master should ensure that as far as 
is possible the description contained in the B/L is 
consistent with what he believes it to be. He should also 
ensure that the goods loaded, including-their packaging, are 
in apparent good order and condition; if there are any 
defects they should be noted on the B/L. 
c) Date of the B/L - The Master should not sign an inaccurately 
dated B/T. unless as a matter of fact the vessel was 
physically loading on the date in question [Bibby Line 
(1978)]. This is because a stipulation as to time of shipment 
is a condition of the contract under section 13 of the Sale 
of Goods Act 1979. Futhermorep in Ashmore & Son v C. S. Cox 
Co. 1161 it was held that the stipulation as to time of 
shipment is a condition precedent. It is also an implied 
condition of the contract that the B/L shall be accurately 
dated with the date of shipment [17,18}. 
d) Description of the Voyage - The Master should not sign a B/L 
which is inconsistent with any C/P governing the employment 
of the vessel or with his voyage instructions (Bibby Line 
(1978)]. This is particularly applicable in the case of a 
Voyage Charter, where the Charterer cannot instruct him to 
sign a B/L for a destination outside the range of ports 
allowed in the C/P. Furthermore, he should ensure that the 
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port of loading is also correctly entered. This can also 
affect the insurance cover (see section 4.4.4.1) 
e) Payment of Freight - The Master should not sign a B/L marked 
"Freight Prepaid" or with words of similar import, unless 
specifically instructed to do so by the Owners, Time 
Charterers (but not Voyage Charterers) or where the C/P 
explicitly requires him to do so, or where he has good 
evidence that freight had been paid and received by the 
Owners or Time Charterers. 
It is very important for the Master to ensure before sailing 
that either he has issued a B/L under his own signature or 
delegated the signing to the Agent. Under no circumstances 
should the Master knowingly issue a misleading B/L as to 
quantity, description or condition of the cargo and/or date of 
shipment, even on the strength of an indemnity. An indemnity 
given to owners by a shipper in consideration of their issuing 
clean bills of lading may be unenforceable because the Owners, 
by making in the B/L a representation of fact which they know to 
be false with intent that it should be acted upon were 
committing a tort of deceit {191. 
Charity (1986) points out that notwithstanding the fact that 
indemnities may be unenforceable, the practice of issuing such 
indemnities is nevertheless widespread, and the indemnity is 
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almost invariably honoured. From Brown Jenkinson v Percy 
Dalton {201 it does not follow that all indemnities against 
signing clean bills of lading are unenforceable. Indeed, Pearce, 
L. J. said : 
In trivial matters and in cases of a bona fide 
dispute where the difficulty of ascertaining the 
correct state of affairs is out of proportion to 
its importance, no doubt the practice is useful. 
.... The practice is convenient where it is used 
with conscience and circumspection, but it has 
perils if it is used with laxity and 
recklessness. It is not enough that banks or the 
purchasers who have been misled by clean bills of 
lading way have recourse at law against the 
shipping owner. They are intending to buy goods, 
not lawsuits. Moreover, instances have been given 
in argument where their legal rights may be 
defeated or they may not recoup their loss. Trust 
is the foundation of trade; and bills of lading 
are important documents. If purchasers and banks 
felt that they could no longer trust bills of 
lading, the disadvantage to the commercial 
community would far outweigh any conveniences 
provided by the giving of clean bills of lading 
against indemnities. 
4.3.5 Factors Facilitating Fraud involving Bills of Lading 
The foregoing sections show why B/L forgeries and falsifications 
feature in rmst cases. The perpetration of fraud involving B/L 
is facilitated by the following factors : 
a) Shipping documents can be obtained very easily on the open 
market; this includes the B/L - and in some cases those of 
reputable shipping companies. For example, Prentis (1979) 
points out "I have observed in some large Companies Bills of 
Lading lying around on counters awaiting collection". The 
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author has been told by a Director of a major Shipping Company 
that it was only after a massive fraud that they started 
locking up their signed B/L and blank B/L stationery. 
b) Under section 3 of the Bill of Lading Act 1855, in the 
absence of fraud of the shipper or the holder, the B/L in the 
hands of a purchaser shall be conclusive evidence against the 
signatory. 
c) Ship's agents around the world have shown a lack of 
understanding of the fact that the B/L is a document of 
title, and that delivery of cargo without return of an 
original B/L may involve delivery to a person who is not the 
owner of the cargo, or to a company which has in fact 
pledged the cargo to its bank [Hambro (1979)]. In the 
Documentation Workshop at the London International 
Conference on Maritime Fraud (April 1985) the author found 
that the people dealing with B/L in transactions daily were 
not fully aware of its importance. 
d) For documentary credit purposes the shipper requests a clean 
B/L for the goods which are not in apparent good order and 
condition and undertakes in return to indemnify the master 
and the carrier for making a mistatement of fact. This 
indemnity, known as a "letter of indemnity", is considered 
fraudulent in many countries. For example, in Ellerman & 
Bucknall Steamship Co. Ltd. v Sha Bhagajee Sunmull & Others 
{211 the seller obtained a clean B/L on the strength of a 
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letter of indemnity and was able to obtain payment for 
sending coal dust and factory shavings instead of Polystyrene 
powder. 
e) The practice of ante-dating B/L to comply with the terms and 
conditions of the documentary credit regarding the date of 
shipment (22,231, or to beat the imposition of import 
restrictions commencing from a certain date (Large (1982)]. 
f) The increase in the practice of delegating authority to 
charterers and agents to sign B/L on behalf of the master 
[Schultsz & Thomas (1983)]. 
g) B/L are issued in sets of three originals and given to the 
shipper and he is at liberty, if he is dishonest, to sell the 
same cargo twice as only one original is required to obtain 
delivery of the goods. 
h) Excessive trust in the authenticity of the document at face 
value and implicit reliance upon its contents [UNCTAD Report 
(1986a) I. 
i) In some cases, the laxity of the banks when accepting 
documents tendered under documentary credits. 
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4.3.6 The Future of Bills of Lading 
The B/L was in use in the early 16th. century [Bennett (1914)], 
and it is still being used in the same fashion despite the fact 
that technology has revolutionised the shipping industry [see 
chapter 2]. 
From the foregoing sections it can be seen that whilst the B/L 
is a very important document in international trade, it does 
give rise to a number of problems. One of these problems has 
been delay to the movement of goods. Dale (1986) points out 
that since the advent of the faster ships in the 1960's the 
historic B/L has been one of the documents causing delays. He 
goes on to say that it is estimated that these delays affect the 
arrived price of goods by 2% - 8%. 
The document of title function of the B/L is often unimportant, 
for example in trades where payment is on open account terms, or 
where goods are consigned to a subsidiary or in the majority of 
liner trade shipments where goods are not sold during transit; 
or for example in the bulk trades, where the delay in the 
receipt of the B/L by the ultimate buyer increases the risk of 
misdelivery of the cargo or causes him to incur additional 
expenses in obtaining a indemnity countersigned by a bank - the 
cost in the case of a cargo of 100,000 tons of oil is as much as 
$ 150,000 [Ventris (1981)]. 
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The solution to the problem where no document of title is 
required would be to use a non-negotiable Sea Waybill, because 
the production of the document is not required to obtain 
delivery. Similar recommendations were reached at two 
international conferences {24). The United Nations Economic 
Coimmission for Europe (UNECE) Working Party on Facilitation of 
International Trade Procedures (FALPRO) adopted Recommendation 
No. 18 [251 which stated : 
Sea waybills ... should be called for by traders 
whenever the facility is available. Carriers 
should a* lways offer a non-negotiable transport 
document, ... 
Hogan (1987) points out that at a meeting of the Comite Maritime 
International, in London, the Chairman of the meeting, Lord 
Lloyd, said that governments appear to be favouring the adoption 
of a sea waybill rather than the B/L. 
The other problem associated with the B/L is that of fraud. This 
is made possible by its function as a document of title, and as 
pointed out above (section 4.3.5 (h)] can be due to excessive 
trust placed on its face value. At its first session the IGG 
[UNCTAD Report (1984)] in its resolution requested the Trade 
Development Board to invite specialized organisations to develop 
studies, among others, on : 
a) the feasibility of a central registry for bills of lading; 
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b) development of secure bills of lading in order to avoid 
forgery; 
c) possibility of reduction in the number of bills of lading, or 
their replacement by another document. 
The UNECE Working Party on FALPRO adopted Recomendation No. 
18 {26} which stated : 
To avoid delays and demurrage caused by the need 
to send documents by mail, facilities should be 
developed for the preparation of Bills of Lading 
in the country of destination, using automatic 
data processing and transmission. 
Similar views were expressed at the Comite Maritime 
International Lisbon Conference in 1985 [UNCTAD Report (1985a)] 
regarding the use of "Paper-less" systems. The Atlantic 
Container Line (ACL) uses a computerised system for its 
non-negotiable Data Freight Receipt (DFR), however Gro"nfors 
(1977) points out that instead of using papers like the DFR the 
system can be "electronized". 
Several authors (Ingemarsson (1977), Reinskou (1981), Henriksen 
(1982) and Kapoor (1985a)] have proposed the use of cryptography 
as a means of speeding the transfer of and maintaining the 
negotiability of the bill of lading as a document of title. 
However, Kapoor (1985a) has suggested that cryptography can also 
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be used as a protection against fraud (See Appendix 5). 
The author has, in association with Dr. V. Varadharajan - 
formerly of the Department of Communications Engineering, 
Plymouth Polytechnic, developed an Encrypted Bill of Lading 
using an encryption interface unit employing the Data Encryption 
Standard this employs an Apple micro-computer as an 
intelligent terminal. The project is still in its early stage 
and a framework for further development has been formulated. 
Appendix 7 shows a copy of an Electronic B/L in plain language 
and its encrypted form. 
The last decade has seen increasing use of computers and 
electronic data interchange in international trade and 
transport. The most recent example is the Data Interchange for 
Shipping (DISH) Project in which about thirty major shippers, 
carriers and freight forwarders in the U. K. are taking part. The 
system uses international syntax rules, developed by the UNECE, 
so that information can be transferred between incompatible 
computers. Dale (1986) points out : 
This type of paperless transfer of structured 
data, known as EDI (Electronic Data Interchange) 
is expected to grow rapidly in the near future, 
both within the UK and with its links to mainland 
Europe. 
The use of standardised trade data elements and harmonized rules 
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for their interchange have been developed recently by the United 
Nations Joint Electronic Data Interchange Working Group. The 
decision to adopt a universal language for Electronic Data 
Interchange has been taken unanimously by major trading powers 
including Europe, United States and Russia [Interchange (1986)]. 
Davies' (1985) findings indicate that by 1995 transport and 
trading documnts will be replaced by computer-stored 
information, except in developing countries and when tangible 
proof is required in a transaction. This latter point would 
imply legal issues. Several independent sources (Ingemarsson 
(1977); Henriksen (1982); Kapoor (1985a)] have pointed out that 
the legal problems in Electronic Data Interchange can be 
overcome. 
In view of the foregoing, it can be seen that the traditional 
B/L has outlived its usefulness as a document of title as there 
is very little or no security in it, and that by 1995 the 
conventional B/L will be replaced by the "Electronic Bill of 
Lading" by the use of data interchange via computers. 
Having considered the contract of carriage and the factors which 
facilitate the perpetration of fraud involving Bills of Lading, 
the next section examines the contract of insurance. 
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4.4 CONTRACr OF INSURANCE 
4.4.1 Introduction 
The contract of insurance is the second of the three subsidiary 
contracts which follow from the contract for the international 
sale of goods. The contract is between the buyer (in f. o. b. and 
c&f. contracts) or the seller (in c. i. f. contracts) and the 
insurer. 
whilst the "origin of marine insurance is veiled in antiquity 
and lost in obscurity" the concept of marine insurance has been 
traced back to 215 B. C. by Livy. Even in those early days 
fraudulent claims like false statements about losses and 
deliberate scuttling of ships were known to exist (Dover 
(1975)]. 
It is very difficult to define insurance in simple terms. 
Basically insurance may be treated as a financial arrapgement 
between one party (the assured) and another party (the insurer), 
whereby the insurer agrees to indemnify the assured for a 
fortuitous loss sustained by him (the assured) as a result of 
certain unforeseen events. The insurer, for a small fee (the 
premium), distributes the loss among a number of persons who may 
be exposed to the same risk, but who do not suffer a loss at the 
same instant as the assured. In marine insurance the unforeseen 
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events are the fortuitous maritime perils. 
In addition to the normal perils of the seas, the ships in the 
seventeenth century were haunted by pirates and privateers. They 
also encountered the following perils which added to their 
burden of loss [Barbour (1929-30)] : 
a) insufficiency of navigational marks along the coasts; 
b) arrests, embargoes, seizures, or ruinous fines and levies 
arbitrarily imposed by princes; 
c) the use of convoys to protect the merchant ships meant that 
all vessels sailing under convoy arrived at their 
destination at the same time and thus competition for 
markets turned to the disadvantage of the merchants as 
freight rates fell to unprofitable levels; 
d) fully laden ships had to wait weeks for their convoys and 
this led to an increase in the costs incurred and loss of 
profits, and catastrophic losses if the goods were 
perishable; and 
e) the captains of the convoyers sormtimes exacted fees from the 
masters of the merchant ships, though the service was 
supposed to be financed by customs dues. 
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To overcome these losses and to lessen the risks of their 
adventures the merchants and shipowners introduced the following 
measures : 
a) the practice of distribution of investments in shipping by 
buying shares in a ship which could be divided into a number 
of shares, 
b) shipnent of a consignment in a number of ships, and 
c) merchants interested in a certain trade agreed to share 
pro-rata one another's losses by mischances at sea. 
These measures were in addition to the practice of insuring 
ships and goods in transits through policies underwritten by 
persons not otherwise interested in the adventure, a practice 
which was prevalent in the thirteenth century in the Italian 
commercial cities. The advantage of the insurance policies was 
that they gave protection against all kinds of losses. 
The large sums of money involved in the transactions led to 
fraudulent practices such as overvaluation by placing insurance 
in two or more places or with two or more groups of insurers or 
insuring ships known to be lost. This led to the introduction of 
legislation to prevent frauds and extortion. The insurers also 
practiced deception : for example, by starting rumours of the 
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capture of valuable ships they induced the owners to insure 
their ships at high rates. Some insurers evaded their 
obligations under the policy, forcing the assured to sue under 
the policy to recover the sum due to him when a loss had 
occurred. Frequently the insurers demanded proof of loss which 
the assured was unable to supply. In some cases, even when loss 
was proved, the insurers forced the assured to accept less than 
was due unto him so as to avoid lengthy and expensive court 
actions. 
The following statutes were introduced to repress such 
malpractices and to impose penalties on individuals perpetrating 
fraud against the insurers, and also to prohibit specplative 
insurances and gambling on marine adventures : 
- Prevention of Fraud Statute, 1725 [11 Geo. I Chap. 291* 
- Marine Insurance Act ("Gambling Act"), 1745 (19 Geo. II Chap. 
371 
Prevention of Fraud Statute, 1803 [43 Geo. III Chap. 1131 
The Gwning Act, 1845 [8/9 Vict. Chap. 109]. 
4.4.2 The Marine Insurance Act, 1906 
The contract of marine insurance is governed by the marine 
Insurance Act (M. I. A. ) 1906 (hereinafter referred to as the 
Act]. This section examines the basic principles of marine 
insurance to determine the liability of the insurer. 
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The Act codifies the Law relating to marine insurance. Section 1 
of the Act defines marine insurance as a contract of indemnity, 
whereby the insurer undertakes to indemnify the assured, in 
manner and to the extent thereby agreed, against marine losses, 
that is to say, losses incident to the marine adventure. Section 
2 of the Act states that the contract of marine insurance may, 
by its express terms, or by usage of trade, be extended to 
protect the assured against losses on inland waters or on any 
land risk which may be incident to any sea voyage. 
According to Section 3 of the Act there is a marine adventure, 
in particular, where any ship, goods or other movables are 
exposed to maritime perils, which are defined as perils 
consequent on, or incidental to, the navigation of the sea. That 
is to say, perils of the seas, fire, war perils, pirates, 
rovers, thieves, captures, seizures, restraints, detainnents of 
princes and peoples, jettisons, barratry, and any other perils, 
either of the like kind or which may be designated by the 
policy. The section also identifies the ship, goods or other 
movables as "insurable property". 
When considering the question of fraud the following basic 
principles of marine insurance must be considered : 
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4.4.2.1 Insurable Interest 
This principle is embodied in Section 5 of the Act, which 
provides every person who is interested in a marine adventure 
has an insurable interest. In particular, a person who stands in 
any legal or equitable relation to the adventure or to any 
insurable property at risk therein, and as a result of which he 
may benefit by safety or due arrival of the property, or be 
prejudiced by its loss or damage, or by its detention, or may 
incur a liability in respect of which. Sections 7- 14 of the 
Act identify the persons who have or may have an insurable 
interest in the property at risk in a marine adventure. 
It must be remembered that for an insurable interest to exist in 
the property, the property must exist. In a number of 
documentary frauds insurance has been effected on non-existent 
goods - it follows that as there is no insurable property the 
assured has no insurable interest and the risk does not attach, 
i. e. the insurer is not liable. 
In view of the above, in order to claim under a policy of marine 
insurance the assured must have an insurable interest, otherwise 
the contract is void under Section 4 of the Act. Section 4 of 
the Act makes "gaming" and "wagering" contracts void. A gaming 
or wagering contract is one where the assured neither has an 
insurable interest nor has any expectation of acquiring such an 
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interest. Where a policy is issued "interest or no interest" or 
"without further proof of interest than the policy itself" (i. e. 
policy proof of interest) or with other similar terms, the 
policy is deemed to be a gaming or wagering policy, and is 
therefore void. 
Section 6 of the Act provides that the interest must attach, 
i. e. the assured must be interested in the subject-matter, at 
the time of the loss, though he may not have been interested 
when the insurance was effected. Furthermore, the assured way 
recover although he may not have acquired his interest until 
after the loss, provided the subject-natter was insured "lost or 
not lost". The exception to this is if the assured was aware of 
the loss at the time of effecting the insurance and the insurer 
was not. This Section is very important in international 
transport where the property in the goods may be transferred 
from the buyer to the seller at a number of points depending on 
the "trade terms". 
4.4.2.2 Utmost Good Faith 
This principle is embodied in Section 17 of the Act which 
provides that a contract of marine insurance is based upon 
utmost good faith (uberrimae fidei) and, if this utmost good 
faith is not observed by either party, the other party may avoid 
the contract. In The Litsion Pride Ill it was held that 
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"avoidance" in this section meant avoidance "ab initio"j, i. e. 
from the beginning. 
Closely linked to this principle is Section 18 of the Act which 
imposes upon the assured a strict duty to disclose every 
material circumstance, which is known to him or which ought to 
be known to him,, to the insurer before the contract is 
concluded. If the assured fails in this duty the insurer may 
avoid the contract. A circumstance is deemed to be material if 
it would influence a prudent insurer in fixing premium, or 
determining whether he will take the risk. 
Section 20 of the Act provides that every material 
representation made by the assured or his agent during 
negotiations for the contract must be true. If they are untrue 
the contract may be avoided. In Carter v Boehn {21, Lord 
Mansfield pointed out that the underwriter trusts the 
representations of the assured and believes that the assured is 
not holding anything back. The keeping back of any circumstance 
to induce the underwriter to estimate the risk as if it did not 
exist is a fraud. Lord Mansfield went on to say : 
Although the suppres sion should happen through 
mistake without any fraudulent intention, yet 
still the underwriter has been deceived, and the 
policy is void because the risk run is really 
different from the risk understood and intended 
to be run at the time of the agreement. 
ý "**** Oo Good faith forbids either party, by 
oncealing what he privately knows, to draw the 
other party into a bargain owing to his ignorance 
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of that fact, and his believing the contrary. 
4.4.2.3 Indemnity 
As stated earlier, under Section 1 of the Act, marine insurance 
is a contract of indemnity i. e. thig principle holds that the 
assured should not stand to gain as a result of the loss 
sustained. Section 32 of the Act, provides that where two or more 
policies are effected on the same adventure and the sums insured 
exceed the indemnity allowed by the Act, the assured is not 
entitled to receive any sum in excess of the indemnity allowed. 
The exception being the valued policy, where "unless it is 
avoided the value is conclusive" {31. 
In practice, marine insurance policies are usually "valued 
policies", and are covered by Section 27 of thd Act, which 
provides that a valued policy is a policy which specifies the 
agreed value of the subject-cotter insured, and subject to the 
provisions of this, and in the absence of fraud, the value 
fixed by the policy is conclusive. Dover (1975), quite rightly, 
points out: 
This Section (i. e. Section 27) has been the 
subject of some criticism, as it is regarded as 
presenting inducements towards over-valuation and 
correspondingly to fraudulent claims (Emphasis 
supplied). 
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Deliberate over-valuation with the intention of cheating the 
underwriter will, if discovered, make the contract void. 
However, it would be very difficult for the underwriter to prove 
that the over-valuation was fraudulent. It would also be very 
difficult for the insurer to avoid a hull policy on the grounds 
of excessive over-valuation because he should have a knowledge 
of the market value of ships. 
If the over-valuation is so excessive as to make an ordinary 
risk into a speculative one, the policy way be avoided on 
grounds of non-disclosure or misrepresentation of a material 
fact (4). The test for determining whether over-valuation is a 
material fact was laid down by Bailhache, J. {51 : 
The test is whether the discrepancy between the 
insured value and the actual insurable value is 
of such a nature as to change the character of 
the risk from a business risk to a speculative 
risk. If the discrepancy is such as to change the 
character of the risk, then there ought to be 
disclosure, but not otherwise. 
4.4.2.4 Proximate Cause 
According to this fundamental principle, in order to establish a 
right of recovery in any claim, the loss must have been 
proximately caused by a peril insured against. This principle is 
embodied in Section 55 of the Act, which provides further that 
in particular, unless otherwise provided in the policy, the 
insurer is not liable for any loss attributable to the wilful 
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misconduct of the assured, or for any loss proximately caused by 
delay, though the delay may be caused by a peril insured 
against. However, the insurer is liable for any loss caused by a 
peril insured against, even though the loss would not have 
happened but for the misconduct or negligence of the master or 
crew. 
The term "proximate cause" means the cause which predominates in 
efficiency and not the latest or closest in time {61. 
However, the Act recognises the fact that there may be instances 
where due to the provisions of the policy the principle of 
proximate cause should not be applied (Templeman (1981)]. 
In scuttling cases i. e. cases where the vessel has been 
deliberately cast away with the privity of the owner, the 
proximate cause is the deliberate action which causes the loss. 
For example in 7he Gregorios; {71, the mortgagee's contended 
that the proximate cause of loss was the entry of water and not 
the act which caused the water to enter the ship. In his 
judgement Viscount Cave (8) said : 
There appears to me to be something absurd in 
saying that, when a ship is scuttled by her crew, 
her loss is not caused by the act of scuttling, 
but by incursion of water which results from it. 
... The scuttling is the real and operative cause 
- the nearest antecedent which can be called a 
cause; and the subsequent events are as much part 
of the effect ... 
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In general, the burden or onus of proof regarding the cause of 
loss or damage being an insured peril rests with the claimant, 
namely the assured {9,10}. If howevev, the evidence submitted 
by the assured as to the cause of loss is different from that 
submitted by the underwriter, the Court has to review all the 
evidence and decide on a balance of probabilities which party is 
to succeed. In order to succeed the party upon whom the burden 
of proof rests must establish a preponderance of evidence in 
support of their case {11,12,13). 
4.4.3 Effecting Insurance 
The practice of placing insurance on the market is outlined 
below 
The shipowner or cargo owner/shipper way make approaches to the 
insurance market either directly or indirectly. The direct 
approach is only possible with insurance companies and thus the 
market is limited. The indirect apprpach may be through a member 
of the British Insurance Broker's Association (BIBA) or through 
Lloyd's brokers. The advantage of using a broker, who is an 
agent of the assured, is that he has a much wider market 
available to him, especially if he is a Lloyd's broker - as the 
Lloyd's market is only open to members of Lloyd's, see figure 
4.8. 
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Figure 4.8 - Direct and Indirect Approaches to the 
Insurance Market 
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The Assured instructs the broker to effect insurance on his 
behalf, giving him all the information necessary, including the 
amount to be insured, to enable the broker to negotiate the best 
possible terms. The instruction is known as "the order". It is 
the duty of the broker to abide by the principle of utmost good 
faith and disclose all material facts and truly represent all 
material circumstances to the insurer. Similarly it is the duty 
of the assured to give to the broker all the necessary 
information. 
Once the broker has received the order, he should make enquiries 
to ensure that there is no misunderstanding between the assured 
and himself. The broker now prepares "the slip", which is a 
piece of paper on which the broker writes the details of the 
risk he is placing. The information must be sufficient for the 
underwriter to identify and assess the risk. 
The broker, armed with the details on the slip, approaches 
several underwriters to obtain -quotations, to sound the market 
rate - especially where the business is new to the broker - and 
selects the most advantageous quote. However, if the broker 
knows the business he approaches the acknowledged leading 
underwriter to obtain the rate. Once the broker has obtained the 
lead (or the first line) i. e. the first underwriter has 
accepted a substantial proportion of the risk, he will go round 
the market obtaining lines from other underwriters till the 
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whole risk has been placed. In some cases the broker may have to 
use the services of another broker to complete the placing, and 
in some cases he rmy "over-place" the risk. 
once the placing of the risk is complete, the broker prepares a 
cover note for the assured advising him of the terms and 
conditions of insurance, and also the names of the insurance 
companies and the amount placed with each, except in the case of 
Lloyd's underwriters - where the total risk placed with them is 
shown as "placed with Lloyd's". At this stage the ship insurance 
is complete. However, cargo insurance can only be completed when 
the exact value of the goods shipped is known, unless the 
assured knew the exact value to be shipped at the time of giving 
the order. Figure 4.9 is a conceptual model of the practice of 
placing insurance in the marine market. 
The broker has a duty to make a full disclosure of all material 
facts to the insurer. Failure to do so would enable the 
underwriter to avoid the contract. However, if the broker 
wilfully misrepresents a material fact, he is guilty of fraud 
and, therefore, liable to the insurers for the consequences 
{14}. 
Under Section 43 of the Act, unless otherwise agreed, where a 
marine policy is effected through a broker he is responsible to 
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the underwriters for the payment of the premium. Therefore, it 
is submitted that the broker should, before accepting business, 
check the creditworthiness and track record of the assured. 
4.4.4 7he New marine Policy (1982) 
The Lloyd's S. G. policy was adopted by the London insurance 
market in 1779. The letters S. G. stood for Ship and Goods 
respectively. Thus the S. G. policy was an insurance policy for 
both hull and cargo insurance. Although the policy wording was 
very complex and archaic it was used for over two hundred years 
with several adaptations and amendments, mainly because a vast 
number of court cases had estaýlished explicitly the meaning of 
the words and phrases used in the policy. 
The antiquated wording of the Lloyd's S. G. Policy has been 
criticised and has been variously described as "being clumsy, 
imperfect and obscure" and "an absurd and incoherent instrument" 
(as quoted by Parks (1983)1; in City Stores v Sun Insurance 
{151 it was described as being tediously wordy, confused and a 
verbal mishmash. In its Report on Marine Insurance [UNCTAD 
Report (1978)) the UNCTAD Secretariat also criticised the S. G. 
Policy form. 
In order to forestall UNCTAD's move towards international 
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uniformity the London insurance market decided to replace the 
S. G. Policy with a simple document containing blank spaces for 
the following information - Policy number, Name of assured, 
Vessel, Voyage or period of insurance, Subject-matter insured, 
Agreed value (if any), Amount insured, Premium, and Clauses, 
Endorsements, Special conditions & warranties. The new form of 
policy came into force on lst. January 1982, and all business on 
the S. G. form was phased out by lst. April 1983. 
Three sets of cargo clauses were drafted to replace the existing 
"All Risks". "With Average" and "Free frorn Particular Average" 
clauses. The clauses are known as the Institute Cargo Cfauses 
(1982) "A"# "B" and "C", and are for use with the new marine 
policy form. They are easy to understand and "reflect a 
decidedly new approach" (Parks (1983)]. The risks covered and 
the statutory exclusions as per M. I. A. 1906, along with other 
practical exclusions are now shown in the clauses. 
4.4.4.1 Analysis of the Institute Cargo Clauses (1982) 
In each set of Institute Cargo Clauses the provisions are 
grouped under the following main headings : 
Risks covered, Exclusions, Duration, Claims, Benefits of 
insurance, Minimising losses, Avoidance of delays, and Law & 
Practice. 
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The (C) Clauses provide the basic standard cover which is 
restricted to loss or damage reasonably attributable to major 
casualties, such as fire, stranding, sinking, collision, etc. The 
(B) Clauses provide an intermediate standard of cover which 
includes the cover provided by the (C) Clauses plus loss due to 
earthquake, volcanic eruptions or lightning, total loss of any 
package loss overboard or dropped during loading/discharging 
operations, and entry of water into hold or cargo compartment. 
The (A) Clauses provide the broadest standard of cover on an "all 
risks with exceptions" basis. 
The (A) Clauses provide insurance against all loss or damage 
arising from fortuitous causes. The (B) and (C) Clauses name the 
risks to be covered with the proviso that these risks are subject 
to certain exclusions within the clauses under the exclusions 
heading, namely General Exclusions Clause, Unseaworthiness and 
0 
Unfitness Exclusions Clause, War Exclusions Clause and Strikes 
Exclusions Clause. 
When properly shipped in vessels of reputable and experienced 
carriers the (C) Clauses would provide adequate cover for low 
value-for-weight/volume cargoes or raw materials destined for 
further processing, e. g. copra, coal, ore, etc. Items suitable 
for cover under (B) Clauses would include goods normally 
resistant to general types of damage, e. g. heavy machinery, 
hides and skins, seeds, etc. The (A) Clauses would be the 
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preferred choice for consumer goods, finished products and high 
value goods. Where the assured feels that the (B) and (C) 
Clauses do not provide adequate cover the (A) Clauses should be 
used. 
Certain exclusions have been introduced to protect the 
underwriters fran loss due to the consequences of frauds and put 
the burden of loss with the assured. This will, it is hoped, 
induce the assureds to take greater care in selecting their 
trading partners. The risks not covered are : 
- Loss, damage or expense arising from insolvency or financial 
default of owners, managers, charterers or operators of the 
vessel [Clause 4.6 in (A), (B) & (C) Clauses] 
- Deliberate damage or destruction of the subject-matter insured 
by the wrongful act of any person or persons (Clause 4.7 in 
(B) & (C) Clauses] 
However, a "Malicious Damage Clause" is available for use with 
the (B) & (C) Clauses where the underwriters agree to delete 
Clause 4.7. 
Clause 5 in the Institute Cargo Clauses (A), (B) & (C) waives 
breach of warranty of seaworthiness and the implied warranty of 
fitness of the ship to carry the subject-matter insured, but 
131 
only where the assured or their servants are not privy to such 
unseaworthiness and unfitness to carry the goods at the time of 
loading. 
Clause 10 in the Institute Cargo Clauses (A), (B) & (C) provides 
that where, after attachment of the insurance, the destination 
is changed by the assured, the subject-matter is held covered at 
a premium subject to prompt notice being given to the 
underwriters. But they are at liberty to change the conditions 
of the policy. Furthermore, the 1982 Clauses do not maintain 
cover where any omission or error has been made in the 
description of the interest, vessel or voyage. 
4.4.5 Fraud and Marine Insurance 
Marine Insurance was introduced to add an element of financial 
security so that the assured could conduct trade without the 
risk of loss. Fran the insurer's point of view, however, the 
large sums involved in transactions introduced another type of 
risk, namely that of fraud. 
It was pointed out earlier (see chapter 1) that in the more 
recent frauds the victim can be anyone connected with the 
transaction for the sale of goods and that underwriters are 
involved indirectly. The underwriters become involved when 
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either the victims or the perpetrators of fraud make a claim 
against them under the insurance policy. Thus insurance frauds 
may be considered under two headings, namely : 
a) Direct insurance frauds are those frauds which are 
perpetrated with the sole object of monetary gain under the 
insurance policy. Examples of this type of fraud would 
include : 
scuttling 
deliberate stranding, 
- arson, 
- deliberate machinery damage, 
- non-disclosure Anisrepresentations, 
- false shortage/damage claims with the connivance of a 
surveyor/consignee. 
b) Indirect insurance frauds are those frauds in which the 
victims of fraud look to the underwriters to recover their 
losses under the insurance policy. Examples of this type of 
fraud would include 
- issuing clean B/L for damaged goods 
- deliberate ornission of the fact, in the B/L, that goods 
have been stowed on deck, 
- Fraudulent jettison claim - In the timber trade in the 
Far East, the B/L is issued stating that a certain 
quantity of cargo has been loaded, which is either not 
loaded at all or which is short-shipped. Log books will 
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record bad weather and for the safety of the adventure 
the non-existent cargo is jettisoned. On arrival at the 
port of destination a claim is lodged for the alleged 
cargo thrown overboard (Praksah (1981)]. 
The difficulty faced by an insurer in scuttling claims is that 
if he alleges fraud the onus of proving the privity of the owner 
rests on him. As pointed out earlier (see chapter 2), where the 
evidence is equally as consistent with innocence as with wrong- 
doing, the innocent construction must be adopted. In The 
Zivonia {16} Bingham, J. said 
The insurers and cargo-owners have not satisfied 
me, according to the high standard of proof 
required, that the owners wilfully cast away the 
vessel. 
In Th6 Gloria {17} Brandon, J. said : 
Scuttling is a crime, and the Court will not find 
it has been committed unless it is proved. with 
the same degree of certainty as is required for 
proof of a crime. 
In addition to the above-rrentioned difficulty, it is submitted 
that the practice by the insurers of settling out of court and 
maintaining a loss portfolio has given the modern fraudster 
opportunity to develop his line of business to perfection. These 
points were highlighted by two leading insurers, Schulz (1981) 
and, Rayakar (1982) who says : 
The marine insurance market seems to have 
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developed an "ostrich policy" along with its more 
conventional policies. Competition and rivalry 
impose upon underwriters the golden rule of see 
no evil, hear no evil and speak no evil. 
The complete lack of communication and 
co-operation between the underwriters on an 
international level is responsible for those who 
indulge in questionable trade practices and 
getting away with their loot. Insurers prefer to 
keep a stiff upper lip and pay out claims 
liberally rather than investigate doubtful 
claims. 
Between 1975 and 1977 21 vessels were involved in some form of 
maritime fraud on cargo picked up from or destined to India 
[Desai (1985)]. Purely as a protective measure the Indian 
insurance industry devised an effective system of "approving" 
ships and shipping companies and charging a high premium for 
non-approved vessels [Rayakar (1982)]. 
Desai (1985) points out that in 1977 the General Insurance 
Corporation of India (GIC) took on the responsibility of 
screening vessels coming to Bombay in search of export cargo. On 
application from the ship's agent GIC would verify : 
- the financial standing of the owners, operators, charterers 
etc. by calling for balance sheets and a confidential report 
from the banks. 
- the ownership of the vessels including the number of vessels 
owned. 
- the flag and tonnage of the vessel. 
- the vessel's classification certificates and if the vessel is 
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not classed or is over 20 years of age, a satisfactory survey 
report by a Classification Society's surveyor is insisted 
upon. 
- the details of P&I cover. 
- the agency appointment of the ship's agent particularly when 
the agent signs the B/L. 
- the vessel's operation and charter, and a copy of the C/P is 
obtained. 
The application for approval is required for each voyage 
separately except in the case of regular lines and established 
ship agents. In case of singleton ownership or where there are 
other unsatisfactory features, GIC obtain an undertaking from 
the owners and their agents to withold 80% of the gross freight 
earnings in India till the satisfactory completion of the 
voyage. The Reserve Bank of India is duly advised so that they 
do not allow transfer of funds. In cases of insurance for non- 
approved vessels the insurers charge 2% additional premium to 
discourage shippers from booking cargoes on that vessel. 
This type of approach could succeed in the fairly sheltered 
market of India. It is hoped that both insurers and brokers 
in other countries would also check the credentials of the 
owners before accepting insurance. However, Ellen (1985) points 
out that in the last 18 month insurers have taken more notice of 
the risks. 
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4.5 CONTRACr OF PAYMENr 
4.5.1 Introduction 
Having obtained the documents under the contracts of carriage 
and insurance namely the B/L and the insurance policy or 
certificate the seller presents thern to the confirming 
bank, along with the commercial invoice and other documents 
required by the credit, to obtain payment for the goods shipped. 
This section, therefore, examines the contract of payment which 
is the last of the three subsidiary contracts which follow from 
the contract for the international sale of goods. 
Over the years businesses have developed various methods of 
payment ranging from payment in advance to 'trading on an open 
account. The open account is used where the exporter trusts the 
buyer and the buyer's country implicitly and treats him like a 
local credit-worthy customer to wh(xn, either an account is sent 
for payment to be rendered within a fixed period of time 
(usually one month), or a "usancell Bill of Exchange (B/E) is 
sent with the shipment (i. e. the buyer is extended a period of 
credit the period depending on custom). Whitehead (1977) gives a 
list of the various methods of payments as follows 
a) Cash with order 
b) Export House transactions 
c) Documentary Letters of Credit, or simply documentary credits 
(L/C) 
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d) Transactions using Foreign B/E 
i) Documents against payment (D/P) 
ii) Documents against acceptance (D/A) 
e) Open Account. 
and goes on to say that the methods are listed in order of 
trustworthiness of the distant custmsearr with the method 
advisable for an unknown customer placed first. However, it must 
be stressed that one should not deal with an unknown custoner. 
The majority of international payments are, however, either 
made by L/C or B/E or a combination of the two methods. When 
traders have confidence in each other, payment for foreign trade 
is under B/E but in less ideal situations-they have to rely on 
the credit of a banker, in which case payment is arranged by 
L/C. 
Redfern (1976) points out that L/C are also used for the 
following reasons : 
a) the beneficiary is forced to insist on a credit by government 
regulation - India is a case in point where everything must 
be paid by L/C due to Exchange Control Regulations. In Japan, 
with few exceptions, exporters must obtain payment on terms 
no less favourable than cash, and this requirement is most 
easily met by means of the credit. 
138 
b) the seller way have a liquidity problem and needs the credit 
to discount with his bankers to enable him to purchase raw 
materials to execute the buyer's order; or on the strength of 
the credit he may purchase the raw materials. 
c) in the case of barter type deals in which the buyer and 
seller wish to both buy and sell. This can be covered by the 
buy er clausing the credit to the effect that payment will 
only be made against evidence of specific counter purchase by 
the seller as stipulated by the buyer. 
4.5.2 Documentary Credits 
Buyers and sellers who know each other fairly well and trade 
regularly use the open account method of payment. In fact, 50% 
of all United Kingdom's (UK) exports are now conducted under 
open account. The disadvantage with open account is that there 
is risk of non-payment where foreign exchange is not available. 
However, where the buyer and seller do not know each other and 
are trading for the first time - ideally the seller would like 
to receive payment before he parts with the goods and the buyer, 
on the other hand, would like the goods in his custody before 
parting with the mney. 
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The conflicting interests of the buyer (also may be termed as - 
"accredited 'buyer", "applicant", "consignee", "importer" or 
"account") and the seller (also may be termed as - "accreditee", 
"beneficiary", "consignor", "exporter" or "shipper") with regard 
to the tine of payment are reconciled by the use of a L/C. 
However, the terms applicant and beneficiary are in general use 
and, therefore, they will be used throughout. 
The L/C offers a unique and universally used method of 
achieving ac ommercially acceptable compromise by providing for 
payment to be made against documents that represent the goods 
and make possible the transfer of rights to those goods [ICC 
Publication No. 305 (1981)]. 
Wheble (1976) explains very clearly how the docunentary credit 
can assist both the buyer and the seller : 
It interposes the bank's expertise on behalf of 
the buyer to secure constructive delivery in the 
form of documents of title representing the 
goods, or of non-negotiable documents evidencing 
their movement to the buyer. It substitutes the 
credit-worthiness of the bank for that of the 
buyer to assure the seller of payment, 
conditional upon him presenting the required 
documents and complying with all the other 
conditions set out in the credit. 
Harfield (1958) describes a L/C as a legally enforceable promise 
to pay money upon performance of stated conditions. ICC 
Publication No. 305 (1981) defines documentary credit as 
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follows : 
It is a written undertaking by a bank (issuing 
bank) given to the seller (beneficiary) at the 
request, and in accordance with the instructions, 
of the buyer (applicant) to effect payment (that 
is, by making a payment, or by accepting or 
negotiating bills of exchange) up to a stated sum 
of money, within a prescribed time limit and 
against stipulated documents. 
4.5.3 Operation of a Documentary Credit 
A lucid description of the operation of a L/C, given by Lord 
Justice Scrutton in Guaranty Trust Ccapany of New York v Hannay 
{11, will be found in Gutteridge & Megrah (1984). The process of 
establishing a L/C is also known as "opening", "arranging" or 
"issuing" a docLunentary credit. As the term issuing is in 
general use it will be used hereinafter. The buyer and the 
seller upon reaching agreement enter into a contract for the 
sale of goods, which calls for payment to be made under a L/C. 
The rules which interpret the current practice and create a 
framework for L/C operations are the Uniform Customs and 
Practice for Documentary Credits (UCP), formulated in 1933 and 
revised in 1951,1962,1974 and most recbntly in 1983 by the ICC 
Camission on Banking Technique and Practice. These rules were 
formulated to meet established and standard commercial needs 
based on established and standard methods (and documentation) of 
international trade. The 1983 Revision, which is found in the 
ICC Publication No. 400 (1983), came into force on lst. October 
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1984. The UCP forms the basis of the contractual relationship 
which arises from the issue of a L/C. 
Article I of the UCP provides 
These articles apply to all documentary credits, 
and are binding on all parties thereto 
unless otherwise agreed. They shall be 
incorporated into each documentary credit by 
wording in the credit indicating that such credit 
is issued subject to Uniform Customs and Practice 
for Documentary Credits, 1983 revision, ICC 
Publication No. 400. 
As a result of all documentary credits being issued subject to 
the UCP, Gutteridge & Megrah (1984) point out that "applicants 
for credits and beneficiaries must contract out if there is 
anything in them which is inappropriate or unacceptable". 
It must be remembered that documentary credits do not form part 
of the contract for the sale of goods. Article 3 of the UCP 
makes this very clear and further states that banks are in no 
way concerned with, or bound by, such contract(s), even if any 
reference whatsoever to such contract(s) is included in the 
credit. This has been substantiated in both English and American 
courts (2,3}. 
Figure 4.10 is a conceptual model of the process of issuing a 
L/C. The buyer (applicant) approaches his bank (issuing bank) to 
142 
CA 
I- 
A. 
r 
1.4 = 
1ý M . U. " 0 0a cn 
CA 
W 
94 
= E. 94 0 0.4 0 .4 =) 
k. 0 PU P., ýl .4 Ol ZA W44 0 
. 91C ci ca ad 
F. z -a 0 go : 3C 0. 1.4 U) 
1-4 -a ILD 
.4 94 C4 Q w CA cn = I- cz 
U3 cn 94 
> C) C-) U Ol z0 94 
z 
04 
13. 
14 
0 
0-4 
1-4 
PM 
z 
0 
1.4 
0 
1-4 
ow 
>- 
41 41 
I'll 
44 r. 
0 C: cis 10 w 
co is 0w 
.4 di %4 9: 6 4J 54 
> C6 $4 
u00 10 41 cc 44 
Aj 
uur. 
-ý4 ýr .40 
cn C) = 
44 2 
40 : 3. . ý. 0, -0 = .0A. ý4 
.0 Is 0a ý4 64 as 
ý4 " C, 0w 
PL. ta pa 0 -tj $4 co 10 a00 4j 04 C: 4j 
0 $Q CL. 01 4 P. 1: 0w 43 r. 
w Cw to 4) J-- 4u 40 
UX $4 13 44 cc u .0 41 
13 
14 a* 0a -0 ta. 
0 al 0) 
4 ,1 W 
V3 
1 4 . z 
u 41 0 &A 41 at -V 0 44 
z lk. o . -a 044a0 03 
1-4 V4 0 r. 6Q 
w C) - 4 C: 24M. "4 0 *0 
ý 1 
z . . w .0 a so 
-4 0 ý4 44 A. 0= 60 40 A00 
CQ 1.4 as 14 V4 40 
od 1ý cc -4 a 4j a .400ww &J 
au -4 .0A. > 1* 14 Q ci a 44 39 w 14 Ill. aj 
P4 . Q 00 to -4 w co u0 %4 H -3 0% Q P4 " 0 cc 10 4.1 44 w "4 "" :Aw 44 
H CLI 0 .3 to r. 1,0 14 0 Ca 14 40 rm w 14 9: 93 It 
60 40 -4 lu 0vw4.6 0 
44 $ - 4 co Q. 75 94 w 11 Ij 0: 4A 
ZO -4- 01 
d -4 0 44 0 41 r. 44 4j -4 ww v4 aj .4 .0 0r r ,, zz 
00w 
-3 
- . 64 
PW Q cn 
,, q !g 099 
AW 
0 E- 
LLI 5 CQ 0 äi 
0 - ( 10 2 
N z 0 
U 
F 
z 0 
z 1-4 
C):: 
LH 
-i LLI 
U) 
Figure 4.10 - Conceptual Model of the Process of Issuing a 
Letter of Credit 
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issue a documentary credit in favour of the seller 
(beneficiary). To do -this the buyer completes an application 
form, which contains instructions for the buyer and on which he 
must specify the terms and conditions under which payment is to 
be made. 
The buyer and the issuing banker must, in order to safeguard 
their positions, make sure that there is no ambiguity in the 
terms and conditions of the credit. Megrah (1977) points out, it 
behoves both the applicant and the issuing bank to exercise 
imagination to ensure that the credit issued is neither lacking 
in, nor includes, some feature which can later give rise to 
trouble. 
Barlow (1977) points out that whilst it is readily adaptable in 
its own sphere of operation, a L/C must be recognised as a 
precision instrument. This is amplified in Articles 5 and 22 (a) 
of the LJCP. 
The issuing bank then draws up'the advice for the beneficiary on 
standard forms, and sends it to its correspondent bank in the 
beneficiary's country to advise him of the existence of the 
credit and the terms and conditions against which payment is to 
be made. In this case the second bank is known as the "advising 
bank". The issuing bank sends the advice for the advising bank 
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on a similar form. At this stage the contract between the 
applicant and the issuing bank is complete. 
The second bank may simply act as an advising bank in which case 
it advises the credit "without engagement" i. e. under no 
obligation to pay the seller. If this is the case it will so 
state in the advice. However in accordance with Article 8 of the 
UCP it shall take reasonable care to check the apparent 
authenticity of the credit which it advises. It appears that 
fraudulent credits usually come from the issuing bank direct to 
the beneficiary (discussion in Seminar on "Troubleshooting 
Letter of Credit", held in London, March 1986). 
If the second bank is asked to add its own undertaking-to'that 
of the issuing bank's it is known as the "confirming bank" and 
the credit is called a "confirmed credit". This means that the 
confirming bank undertakes to make payment against correctly 
tendered documents. 
on receipt of the advice the seller insures (if required under 
the contract of sale) and ships the goods, obtains a B/L and 
presents it with the certificate of insurance (if 
applicable), commercial invoice and any other documents 
specified by the credit, to the bank where the credit is 
available. Under Article 11 (b) of the UCP all credits must 
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nominate the bank which is authorized to pay (paying bank), or 
to accept drafts (accepting bank) or to negotiate the credit 
(negotiating bank). According to Article 11 (d) the paying 
(accepting or negotiating) bank checks the documents against the 
credit, and if they "appear on their face to be in accordance 
with the terms and conditions of the credit" it will pay (accept 
or negotiate) according to the terms of the credit. It will then 
forward the documents to the issuing bank for reiabursement. 
The issuing bank examines the documents and, if satisfied that 
they meet the terms and conditions of the credit, it will 
reimburse the paying (accepting or negotiating) bank. Article 21 
(c) of the UCP introduces timing regarding reimbursement by the 
issuing bank. The issuing bank will then release the documents 
to the buyer upon payment of the amount due, or upon other terms 
and conditions agreed between thern. 
4.5.4 Types of Documentary credits 
For the purposes of this dissertation it will be assumed that 
basically there are three types of documentary credits namely, 
revocable, irrevocable and confirmed irrevocable, because the 
UCP, which has been recognised by the banking coaTnunities in 156 
countries [ICC Publication No. 305 (1981)], provides for only 
those three. types, except the transferable credit, which has 
been provided for in Article 54. 
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4.5.4.1 Revocable Credits 
A revocable credit is a credit which can be amended or cancelled 
at any time without warning or notification to the beneficiary 
{4}. The issuing bank may amend or revoke the credit either at 
the request of the applicant or when it feels that the buyer 
will not be able to reimburse the bank. 
This type of credit involves considerable risk for the 
beneficiary, as the credit may be amended or cancelled before 
payment, acceptance or negotiation has been effected, even 
though goods have been shipped. Conversely, this type of credit 
involves very little risk for the buyer and gives him maximum 
flexibility. Article 9 of the UCP governs this type of credit. 
As this form of credit involves a-great risk for the beneficiary 
it is not in common use and therefore will not be considered. 
4.5.4.2 Irrevocable Credits 
An irrevocable credit is a credit which constitutes a definite 
undertaking of the issuing bank to pay, accept or negotiate 
drafts, provided that the stipulated documents are presented and 
that the terms and conditions of the credit are complied with. 
According to Article 10 (d) of the E)CP this type of credit can 
only be amended or cancelled if all the parties thereto agree. 
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From the seller's point of view there is greater assurance of 
payment with this type of credit, but he still remains dependent 
on the undertaking of a foreign bank. This undertaking is 
still subject to political, economic and comnercial risks which 
may prohibit transfer of funds to the seller's country. 
Due to various reasons, at the time the documents are tendered, 
the advising bank way realise that it would be unable to obtain 
reimbursement from the issuing bank for the money paid to the 
beneficiary [Watson (1981)]. In such circumstances, Watson says, 
no payment would be made, even if the documents tendered were in 
order. It is for this reason that the seller asks the buyer, and 
the buyer approaches the issuing bank to request a bank in the 
seller's country to add its own undertaking to that of the 
issuing bank. 
4.5.4.3 Confirmed Irrevocable Credits 
A Confirmed Irrevocable Credit is an irrevocable credit to 
which, at the authorisation or request of the issuing bank, 
another bank has added its confirmation; such confirmation 
constitutes a definite undertaking of such bank (known as the 
confirming bank), in addition to that of the issuing bank, 
provided that the stipulated documents are presented and that 
the terms and conditions of the credit are complied with. 
According to Article 10 (d) of the UCP this type of credit can 
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only be amended or cancelled if all the parties thereto agree. 
Fran the seller's point of view this type of credit provides the 
greatest security, provided documents tendered meet the terms 
and conditions of the credit. 
The addition of the undertaking of a bank in the seller's 
country does not affect the buyer in any way except when the 
confirming costs are to his account, in which case it is the 
most expensive type of credit. 
4.5.5 Contractual Relationships in Documentary Credit Operations 
The parties involved in documentary credit transactions are : 
a) The buyer or the applicant who requests and obtains the issue 
of the credit. 
b) The issuing banker who issues the credit. 
c) The correspondent banker who is the overseas representative 
of the issuing banker and acts as an intermediary between the 
issuing banker and the seller. He may undertake one of the 
following roles : 
1) He merely advises the beneficiary of the existence of the 
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credit, in which case he is known as the advising banker, 
or 
2) He may advise and confirm the credit by adding his own 
undertaking to that of the issuing banker, in which case 
he is known as the confirming banker. 
Normally the advising/confirming banker pays, accepts or 
negotiates the drafts tendered with the documents, in which 
case he also becomes the paying, accepting or negotiating 
banker as the case may be. 
d) The seller or beneficiary in whose favour the credit is 
normally issued. 
e) If the credit is freely negotiable by any bank another banker 
may be involved. This banker, who must be willing to 
negotiate the credit, is known as the negotiating banker. He 
may be any banker to whom the beneficiary takes his drafts 
and documents for negotiating. 
Before one can consider the relationships between the various 
parties involved in documentary credit transactions, it must be 
remembered that all these relationships are based on the tender 
of documents specified in the credit, and not on the goods to 
which the documents relate. This is clearly specified in Article 
4 of the UCP and has been substantiated by various court 
decisions, for example Dexters Ltd. v Schenker & Co. {51. 
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Articles 1.5,16 (a), and 17 to 20 inclusive, of the UCP provide : 
Article 15 
Banks must examine all documents with reasonable 
care to ascertain that they appear on their face 
to be in accordance with the terms and conditions 
of the credit. Documents which appear on their 
face to be inconsistent with one another will be 
considered as not appearing on their face to be 
in accordance with the terms and conditions of 
the credit. 
Article 16 (a) 
If a bank so authorised effects payment, or 
incurs a deferred payment undertaking, or 
accepts, or negotiates against documents which 
appear on their face to be in accordance with the 
terms and conditions of a credit, the party 
giving such authority shall be bound to reimburse 
the bank which has effected payment, or incurred 
a deferred payment undertaking, or has accepted, 
or negotiated, and to take up the documents. 
Article 17 
Banks assume no liability or responsibility for 
the form, sufficiency, accuracy, genuineness, 
falsification or legal effect of any documents, 
or for the general and/or particular conditions 
stipulated in the documents or superimposed 
thereon; nor do they assume any liability or 
responsibility for the description, quantity, 
weight, quality, condition, packing, delivery, 
value or existence of the goods represented by 
any documents, or for the good faith or acts 
and/or omissions, solvency, performance or 
standing of the consignor, the carriers, or the 
insurers of the goods, or any other person 
whomsoever. 
Article 18 
Banks assume no liability or responsibility for 
the consequences arising out of delay and/or loss 
in transit of any messages, letters or documents, 
or for delay, mutilation or other errors arising 
in transmission of any telecommunication. Banks 
assume no liability or responsibility for errors 
in translation or interpretation of technical 
terms, and reserve the right to transmit credit 
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terms without translating them. 
Article 19 
Banks assume no liability or responsibility for 
consequences arising out of the interruption of 
their business by Acts of God, riots, civil 
commotions, insurrections, wars or any other 
causes beyond their control, or by any strikes or 
lockouts. Unless specifically authorized, banks 
will not, upon resumption of their business, 
incur a deferred payment undertaking, or effect 
payment, acceptance or negotiation under the 
credits which expired during such interruption of 
their business. 
Article 20 
a. Banks utilising the services of another bank 
or other banks for the purpose of giving 
effect to the instructions of the applicant 
for the credit do so for the account and at 
the risk of such applicant. 
b. Banks assume no liability or responsibility 
should the instructions they transmit not be 
carried out, even if they have themselves 
taken the initiative in the choice of such 
other bank (s) . 
c. The applicant for the credit shall be bound by 
and liable to indemnify the banks against all 
obligations and responsibilities imposed by 
foreign laws and usages. 
Fran the above articles it can be seen that they have been 
designed to relieve the bankt, in the absence of negligence, 
of virtually all liabilities and form the basis of contractual 
relationships which arise from the issue of documentary credits. 
Pennington et al (1978) while discussing the provisions of the 
UCP are of the same opinion and say : 
In certain respects these provisions define the 
standard of care expected of issuing banks, but 
in other respects they absolve thern from duties 
and liabilities which they would be under at 
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common law, particularly in respect of the acts 
and. omissions of advising and confirming banks 
(Emphasis supplied). 
4.5.5.1 Relationship between Buyer and Issuing Bank 
A banker who issues a documentary credit is under a contractual 
duty to the applicant to follow his instructions and to carry 
them out carefully. If there is a breach of this duty by the 
banker - either by taking up documents which do not conform to 
the terms and conditions of the credit, or refusing to accept 
correctly tendered documents - he is liable to the applicant in 
damages for the consequential loss he (the applicant) suffers, 
as well as losing his (the bankers's) right to reimbursement by 
the applicant. 
The applicant is under a duty to put his instructions in a clear 
form {61. This is reinforced in Article 14 of the UCP. If the 
instructions are ambiguous the banker will not be at fault if he 
can show that he adopted what was a reasonable meaning {7}. 
Furthermore, the applicant should be aware that the banker 
cannot be called upon to interpret trade customs and terms 
{8}. 
The use of imprecise terms and loose phraseology is also 
disapproved of by the UCP in Articles 22 (b), 38 (a) and 50 (c). 
For example, terms such as "first class"i "well known", 
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"qualified", "independent",, "official" and the like should not 
be used to describe the issuers of any documents to be presented 
under a credit; imprecise terms such as "usual risks" or 
"customary risks" should not be used to describe insurance 
risks; and expressions such as "prompt", "imriediately", "as soon 
as possible", and the like should not be used. 
If for some reason the applicant cannot meet his contractual 
obligation of putting the issuing bank in funds when they become 
due, the banker has a general lien by the operation of law over 
all securities belonging to the applicant which are delivered to 
the bank by him or on his behalf or for his benefit {9}. 
securities for this purpose have been held to include Bills of 
Lading and other documents representing the goods in transit 
{ 1ø}. 
4.5.5.2 Relationship between Seller & Issuing/Confirming Bank 
The letter of credit, when accepted and acted upon by the 
beneficiary, becomes the contract between the banker and himself 
{11) -wholly independent of the contract of sale and the 
relationship between the buyer and the banker {12). This is 
clearly specified in Article 6 of the UCP. 
The beneficiary is under an obligation to tender the documents 
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which ccmply strictly with the stipulated documents, terms and 
conditions of the credit. They must be the usual shipping 
documents and be reasonably and readily fit to pass current in 
commerce {13}. Furthermore, as the documents are the security of 
the issuing banker for the money covered by the credit, they 
no, st be of "good merchantable order", so that if the money was 
not forthcoming the issuing banker would have realisable 
documents from which he could reimburse himself for the risk he 
had undertaken {141. 
The banker on the other hand, must comply strictly with the 
instructions contained in the credit {15,161, and must examine 
all documents with reasonable care, pursuant to Article 15 of 
the UCP, to ascertain tha t they comply with the terms and 
conditions of the credit and are Consistent between themselves, 
otherwise they would not be good tender {17). similarly 
documents which, properly read and understood, called for 
further inquiry or are such as to invite litigation are bad 
tender {181. 
However, pursuant to Article 15 of the UCP, if the banker 
accepts documents which, on their face appear to be complete and 
regular and in accordance with the terms and conditions of the 
credit, but are in fact forgeries or contain false/fraudulent 
statements, he is not liable under Article 17 of the UCP. This 
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view has been substantiated in American {191, English {201, 
German {21} and Irish {22} courts. 
In Equitable Trust Company of New York v Dawson Partners Ltd. 
{23} Lord Sumer said : 
There is no room for documents which are almost 
the same, or which will do just as well. Business 
could not proceed' securely on any other lines. 
The bank's branch abroad, which knows nothing 
officially of the details of the transaction thus 
financed, cannot take upon itself to decide what 
will'do well enough and what will not. If it does 
as it is told, it is safe; if it declines to do 
anything else, it is safe; if it departs from the 
conditions laid down, it acts at its own risk. 
In view of Lord Sumer's {241 speech it may be construed, and 
quite rightly, that it is the bank's duty to ascertain that the 
documents tendered comply with the terms and conditions of the 
credit literally, in order to safeguard its position. . 
However, sometimes it may not be possible to comply literally 
with the terms of the credit due to an omission {25}. In such 
cases to refuse payment for an obvious mistake is to defeat the 
object and value of irrevocable documentary credits as a means 
of facilitating international trade. 
In Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v Van Denberghs Ltd. 
Otbers f 26}, Mr. Justice Roche said that he was perfectly 
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satisfied that the trouble in the case was not due to divergence 
of documents but : 
... by reason of general weakening of the produce 
markets which marked the close of 1920, was such 
that the trouble afterwards became acute. 
Therefore the divergence of the documents 
although it caused no trouble made a ready excuse 
and reason for the non-implementing of the 
contract in question. 
This view is further substantiated by Bardenhagen's (1976) 
statement : 
Economic conditions, poor ones that is, are 
blamed for a multitude of sins. One wonders 
whether this phenomenon has caused the increase 
over the past few years, in the number of 
rejections of documents by buyers (and perhaps 
issuing bankers). 
Pennington et al (1978) point out that if the documents"taken up 
by the banker do not correspond with the terms of the credit and 
the discrepancy is not obvious, the bank is liable only if a 
competent banker acting with a reasonable care would not have 
accepted the docments tendered {27). 
If, however, there are some discrepancies noticed - for example 
inconsistencies in the various documents {281F or suspicious 
obliterations/alterations in the Bill of Lading {29}, or the 
documents do not conform to the terms of the credit {30}, or 
alteration without apparent authority [ICC Publication No. 371 
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(1980)] - the banker should be put on guard and, exercise 
reasonable care to scrutinize all the accompanying documents for 
clues which would aid him in determining whether the terms and 
conditions of the credit have been met {31). 
Article 23 of the LJCP which deals with documents other than 
commercial invoice, transport and insurance documents states 
that the credit should stipulate by whom such documents are to 
be issued and their wording or data content. If this is not 
stipulated , banks will accept such documents as presented, 
provided that their data content makes it possible to relate the 
goods and/or services referred to therein to those referred to 
in the commercial invoice(s) presented. The documents referred 
to in Article 23 would be - Mrehouse Receipts; Delivery Orders; 
Consular Invoices; Certificates of Origin, of Weight, of Quality 
or of Analysis. 
Under Article 41 (c) of the UCP the seller is under an 
obligation to ensure that the description of the goods in the 
camiercial invoice corresponds with the description in the 
credit. However, in other documents the goods may be described 
in general terms not inconsistent with their description in the 
credit. 
The doctrine of strict conformity should not be taken to lengths 
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which will defeat the object of using docun-entary credits, which 
is to facilitate international trade, as pointed out by District 
Judge Wallace in Bank of America National Trust & Saving 
Association v Liberty National Bank & Trust Co. of Oklahoma 
City (32} : 
Although there is a line of authority which could 
be interpreted to require that each "t" be 
crossed and each "i" be dotted by any and all 
banks dealing with letters of credit -and drafts 
negotiated thereunder, such an interpretation of 
this line of authority is improper. Certain 
practical considerations must be taken into 
account in determining whether the terms of the 
letter of credit have in fact been met. 
Similarly there is a line of authority which would indicate that 
practical considerations must be taken into account in 
determining whether the terms and conditions of the credit have 
in fact been met {33,34,35,36). The courts tend to frown upon 
cases of mere technical defences where in essence the 
contractual understanding between the parties has been met {37}. 
The banker must, however, accept correctly tendered documents, 
regardless of any dispute between the buyer and seller {38j391. 
4.5.5.3 Relationship between Buyer and Seller 
In a contract of payment the only contractual relationship which 
exists between the buyer and seller is that derived from the 
contract of sale, which calls for payment by documentary 
credits, that is, the opening of the credit in favour of the 
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seller. Therefore this relationship is of no consequence to the 
banks and thus will not be considered further. 
4.5.5.4 Relationship between Issuing Bank & Advising Bank 
The relationship which exists between these two is that of the 
principal (issuing bank) and agent (advising bank). Article 11 
sections (c) and (d) deal deal with the relationship between 
the issuing bank and the advising bank. 
If the applicant should wish to include detailed instructions in 
order to protect himself he is discouraged from doing so under 
Article 5 of the UCP. If Article 5 is read in conjunction with 
Article 20 (b), which excludes the issuing bank's liability and 
responsibility should the instruction transmitted by them not be 
carried out by the intermediary bank, even if they were 
responsible for its choice, the applicant for the credit will 
bear the loss. This situation where the principal (issuing bank) 
is not responsible for the action of its agent (intermediary 
bank) is in conflict with the Law of Agency. 
In Maran Road Saw Mill v Austin Taylor & Co. Ltd. (401 Ackner, 
J. said that "an advising bank is an agent of the issuing bank 
for advising the credit but acts as principal vis-a-vis the 
beneficiary". It is submitted that, as principal, the issuing 
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bank would be liable for the acts and omissions of the advising 
bank, i. e. the agent, as though it had done them itself, even 
though it had exercised due diligence in selecting the other 
bank (the agent). 
In Equitable Trust Co. v Dawson Partner's Ltd. (41} and Calico 
Printers Association v Barclays Bank Ltd. {42} the issuing bank 
was held liable for the acts and ornissions on the part of its 
agent i. e. the advising bank. 
4.5.5.5 Relationship between Advising Bank & Seller 
Russell (1986) points out that this relationship depends upon 
precisely what the advising bank has undertaken to do. ýhere 
the advising bank merely acts as the channel of comunication 
between the issuing bank and the beneficiary, or where it pays 
or accepts the beneficiary's drafts, it does so as agent of the 
issuing bank. Under Article 8 of the UCP where the advising 
bank merely advises the credit without engagement, it shall take 
reasonable care to check the apparent authenticity of the credit 
it advises. 
However, if the advising bank confirms the credit, it gives its 
undertaking as a principal to the beneficiary. In such a case 
its obligations are similar to those of the issuing bank. 
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4.5.6 Refusal to Pay the Beneficiary 
In view of the banker's definite undertaking, under an 
irrevocable credit to pay the beneficiary, the applicant cannot 
require the banker not to pay. Mr. Justice Megarry {431 pointed 
out that he would be slow to interfere with irrevocable credits 
specially in the sphere of international banking, unless a 
sufficiently grave cause was shown. He went on to say : 
For interventions by the court that are too ready 
or too frequent might gravely impair reliance 
which, quite properly, is placed on such credits. 
In Hamzeh Malas & Sons v British Inve Industries Ltd. {44}, the 
plaintiffs, a Jordanian firm, applied for an injunction 
restraining the sellers from drawing under the second of two 
letters of credit. The application was refused, Jenkins, L. J. 
stating : 
.. the opening of a confirmed letter of credit 
constitutes a bargain between the banker and the 
vendor of the goods, which imposes on the banker 
an absolute obligation to pay, irrespective of 
any dispute which there may be between the 
parties on the question whether the goods are up 
to contract or not. 
In the same case, Sellers, L. J. 1451 pointed out, "there may 
well be cases where the Court would exercise jurisdiction, as, 
for example, where there is a fraudulent transaction". The same 
opinion has been expressed by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 
in Transworld Industries Inc. v Girard Trust Bank (461 : 
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the circumstances which will justify an 
injunction against honour (of a letter of credit) 
must be narrowly limited to situations of fraud 
in which. the wrongdoing of the beneficiary has so 
vitiated the entire transaction that the 
legitimate purposes of the independence of the 
issuer's obligation would no longer be served. 
In Bank of America National Trust & Savings Association v 
Liberty National Bank & Trust Co. of Oklahoma City {47) the 
defendant bank, who issued an irrevocable letter of credit on 
behalf of its customer, were instructed by their customer to 
refuse payment of the draft drawn under the credit, on the 
grounds that the terms of the credit had not been met. In his 
judgement District Judge Wallace said : 
.. Where a material defect exists, even though 
avowedly the defense is raised to protect the 
customer of the bank urging the defense, there is 
no reason, moral or legal, why such-a defense may 
not be urged, particularly where strict 
compliance doubtless would have fully protected 
the customer and assured the customer of 
receiving the quality of goods bargained for. 
In view of the above the next section examines the effect of 
fraud on the relationship between the various parties to the 
contract of banking. 
4.5.7 Fraud & Documentary Credits 
Docm-entary credits are used as the vehicle for the majority of 
maritime frauds. The perpetration of the crime is facilitated to 
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a large ineasure by Articles 4,15,16 and 17 of the UCP. 
Article 4 of the UCP provides that in credit operations parties 
deal in documents, and not in goods. Article 15 of the UCP 
requires banks to examine all documents with reasonable care to 
ascertain that they appear on their face to be in accordance 
with the terms and conditions of the credit. Article 16(b) 
imposes a duty on the banks to determine, on the basis of the 
documents alone, whether to accept or refuse them. However, 
Article 17 states that "banks assume no liability or 
responsibility for the form, sufficiency, accuracy, genuinenessr 
falsification or legal effects of any docments ... to. 
Thus if a forged/fraudulent document, which appears on its face 
to comply with the terms and conditions of the credit, is 
presented to the bank, the bank is under a duty to pay the 
beneficiary f48}. If the appearance of compliance masks some 
fraudulent dealing with the goods, that is not the banks concern 
{49}. Furthermore, the bank is neither bound to see to the 
genuineness of the B/L, nor is it required to make inquiries at 
the office of the ship's agent as to whether the goods have , in 
truth, been received on board [50}. 
Where the fact that the documents presented to the bank are 
forged or fraudulent is apparent from their face, the bank will 
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not pay. However, Russell (1986) points out that where documents 
are forged or fraudulent, the fact that they are not in 
conformity with the terms and conditions of the credit may be 
apparent from their face, or it may not. In the unlikely 
event the forgery or fraud the documents do not appear to comply 
with the terms and conditions of the credit, the bank pays on 
them at its peril. This is not because of the forgery or fraud, 
but because the bank failed to comply with the doctrine of 
strict conformity. 
The only exception to the doctrine of strict conformity is when 
there is a clear fraud of which the bank has notice {511. 
However, this exception is interpreted very strictly (Powles & 
Hazelwood (1984)]. The mere assertion or allegation of fraud 
would not be sufficient {52). Russell (1986) identifies four 
situations under the "exception rule". They are 
a) The bank has no knowledge or even suspicion of any forgery or 
fraud, 
In this situation the bank must pay, and is entitled to be 
reimbursed by the buyers {53}. 
b) The bank suspects that fraud has occurred or an allegation of 
fraud is coamunicated to the bank by the buyers, 
In this case, if nothing further can be established, the bank 
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must pay and is entitled to reimbursement by the buyer {541. 
c) It is clearly established to the satisfaction of the bank 
that a fraud has occurred, but there is no evidence before 
the bank to show that the seller knew of the fraud, and 
Surprisingly, it was unanimously decided by the House of Lords 
in United City Merchants (Invesbments) Ltd. v Royal Bank of 
Canada {55), that once again the bank must pay and is entitled 
to reimbursement by the buyer. 
d) The bank has positive proof that a fraud has been committed 
and that the seller knew of this fraud. 
It is only when both these facts are established to the 
satisfaction of the bank that it must not honour its obligations 
under the credit. 
The decision in the United City Merchants (L)CM) case 156} goes 
against both authority and reason. For example, in old Colony 
Trust Co. v Lawyers' Title & Trust Co. (571 it was stated : 
obviously, when the issuer of a letter of credit 
knows that a document, although correct in form, 
is, in point of fact, false or illegal, he cannot 
be called upon to recognize such a document as 
complying with the terms of a letter of credit. 
A similar reasoning has been put forward by Gutteridge & Megrah 
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(1984) and was adopted by the Court of Appeal in the UCM case 
{581, and also by the American Court {59}. In the UCM {60} case 
the B/L gave a false date of shipment, i. e. the document was 
false; the invoice quoted double the actual price of the goods 
because the buyer wanted to exchange Peruvian currency for U. S. 
dollars. It was thus in breach of the Peruvian exchange control 
regulations, i. e. the document was illegal. It is subuitted 
that, as the seller was party to the fraud of the buyer, the 
principle of the independence of the bank's obligations should 
not be extended to protect the unscrupulous seller (see Sztejn 
v J. Henry Schroder Banking Corporation [61}). 
In his judgement in the UCM case {62} Lord Diplock stated that 
as the seller was not aware of the fraud of the loading broker, 
there was no cause of action against him. However, in a decision 
of the Judicial Cautittee of the Privy Council {63}, in which 
Lord Diplock was one of the presiding judges, it was held that 
the issue of a fraudulent B/L by the Shipping Company, 
apparently as agents, and presented by the seller (who had no 
knowledge of the fraud) under the credit gave a clear cause of 
action against the seller. 
In his speech in the UCM case {64} Lord Diplock said : 
The exception for fraud on the part of the 
beneficiary seeking to avail himself of the 
credit is a clear application of the maxim ex 
turpi causa non oritur actio or, if plain English 
is to be preferred, "fraud unravels all". The 
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Courts will not allow their process to be used by 
a dishonest person to carry out a fraud. 
It is respectfully submitted that the decision in the UCM case 
seems to indicate that the Courts are prepared to allow fraud to 
be carried out by adhering strictly to the provisions of the 
UCP, which to all but the unscrupulous seller seem to be 
inequitable. For example, it has repeatedly been asserted that 
the current UCP is a significant aid to the commission of 
documentary frauds and that it should be revised or supplemented 
to offer better protection to the buyer (Ellen (1979a),, Kerr 
(1979), Kihlbom (1981)]. The UNCrAD Report (1983) observes that 
in any review of the UCP, consideration may be given to whether 
the rules allocate the responsibilities between the parties in 
an equitable manner. 
The American Courts are more liberal in their interpretation of 
the fraud exception because interlocutory relief appears to be 
more easily obtainable there {65}. In United Trading Corporation 
S. A. v Allied Arab Bank {661, referring to the more liberal 
approach of the American Courts Ackner, L. J said : 
There is no suggestion that this more liberal 
approach has resulted in the commercial 
dislocation which has, by implication at least, 
been suggested would result from rejecting the 
respondent's submissions as to the standard of 
proof required from the plaintiffs. 
It is encouraging to note that the English Courts are beginning 
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to realise that the extremely strict interpretation of the fraud 
exception is not in the best interests of international trade. 
This can be seen from Lord Justice Ackner's {671 judgement in 
which he said : 
... we would find it an unsatisfactory position if, having established an important exception to 
what had previously been thought an absolute 
rule, the Courts in practice were to adopt so 
restrictive an approach to the evidence required 
as to prevent themselves from intervening. Were 
this to be the case, impressive and high-sounding 
phrases such as "fraud unravels all" would become 
meaningless. 
4.5.8 Bank Super-service 
It was pointed out in chapter 2 that SITPRO's findings [SITPRO 
(1981)] indicate that preparation of international trade 
documentation receives little attention from the senior 
management. The results of another study carried out by SITPEZO 
and Midland Bank [SITPRO (19ý5)] show that on average 50% of all 
documents presented underdocumentary credits are rejected on 
first presentation. This would imply a lack of knowledge of the 
UCP by the parties dealing in international trade. 
This lack of knowledge and the consideration of international 
trade documentation as a necessary evil, taken in conjunction 
with the fact that the banks conduct a superficial examination 
of the documents tendered under the documentary credits makes 
this method of payment one of the weakest links in the system. 
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This leads to a failure of the whole system of international 
trade : the failure within the context of this study is the 
occurrence of fraud. Therefore, there is a need to inform the 
participants of international trade about the shortcomings of 
this system as Barlow (1985) points out : 
Buyers should be strongly advised that : where 
any doubts exist as to the genuineness of a 
seller, documentary credits should not be used 
unless the accountee can make his own 
arrangements within the documentary requirements 
of the credit to prevent its possible misuse. 
This lack of knowledge can be overcome if the banks advise all 
applicants for the credit of the shortcomings of this system 
when the applicant is giving his instructions. They should also 
be prepared to offer an additional service of checking the 
authenticity of the documents before payment. This service has 
been referred to as the "bank super-service". 
At its first session the IGG in its resolution [UNCrAD Report 
(1984)] requested the UNCTAD Secretariat to prepare an in-depth 
study on the feasibility of a bank super-service scheme. This 
su, rx--r-service involved the bank carrying out additional checks 
before payment under documentary credits. 
Prentis (1979) recommended that the banks should be encouraged 
to use the Lloyd's Register and Lloyd's Shipping Index as a 
means of preventing fraud. Tugwell (1985), a banker, has 
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supported this idea and suggests that : 
In order to help minimize the success of such 
frauds and other abuses in documents represented, 
banks can certainly check the authenticity of 
details on the documents by consulting Lloyd's 
List, Lloyd's Register, Lloyd's Shipping Index 
and Lloyd's Intelligence Service. 
Moreover, even those who do not support the super-service idea 
admit that a check of this nature could have prevented some 
frauds [Wilson (1979); Barlow (1985); Wheble (1985)]. Whilst 
there are both those who support the idea and those in 
opposition, it is submitted that each group is considering their 
limited and sectional interests. 
In response to a questionnaire sent out by the UNCrAD 
Secretariat (UNCTAD Report (1985a)] the majority of the replies 
opposed the idea of a "bank super-service" without giving any 
particular reason, simply indicating that such a service would 
not be practically feasible. In response to the question - 
"Would such a *procedure result in delaying payments under 
documentary credit transactions" ? one of the replies was - 
"Delayed payments resulting from the scheme could reduce the 
value of the documentary credits as a method of payment". 
It is submitted that it would appear from that reply that some 
members of the banking community are more worried about the 
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damage that delays would cause to payment under documentary 
credits, rather than the damage that is being caused by the use 
of the system as an instrument of fraud. 
However, it is still hoped that some action will be taken by the 
banks to introduce additional checks before payment is made, in 
order to prevent the fraudster from taking advantage with 
impunity of the system as it exists today, i. e. "loaded against 
the buyer". This point was stressed at the opening address to 
the Seminar on "Prevention of Shipping Fraud" by Mr. Justice 
Kerr (1979), as he then was, when he said : 
The evolution of systematic changes in our 
everyday practices, particularly in relation to 
Banker's Documentary Credits, is what I see as 
the real objective (of the seminar). 
This divergence of opinion between the different participants 
highlights the need for a 'holistic' approach in order to 
identify and eliminate the weaknesses of the system (see chapter 
3). 
4.6 The Conceptual Model of the System of International Trade 
Having examined the conceptual models of the main contractual 
sub-systems of international trade, it was possible to develop 
the conceptual model of the total system. Figure 4.11 represents 
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a model of the total system. The model was shown to a number of 
practising managers dealing regularly with international trade 
transactions and there was general agreement that it helped to 
clarify the sequence of events. This model was used in 
conjunction with the fraud case database to identify the weak 
links within the system. 
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Key to Figure 4.11 
1. Contract for the sale of goods concluded and payment to be 
by confirmed irrevocable credit. 
2. The buyer requests his bank to issue a L/C in favour of the 
seller. 
3. The issuing bank issues the credit and asks the intermediary 
bank to confirm the credit. 
4. The confirming bank advises the seller that a confirmed 
irrevocable credit has been issued in his favour. 
5. on being advised that the credit is available the seller, if 
-necessary, approaches 
the Department of Trade or similar 
body to obtain an export licence. 
6. The seller also obtains a certificate of origin frorn the 
Chamber of Commerce or similar body. 
7. The seller gets a certificate of weight, quality, analysis, 
etc., as required by the terms and conditions of the credit, 
from an independent surveyor. 
8. The goods are insured and a certificate/policy of insurance 
is obtained from the insurer. The risks insured against 
should be those required by the credit. 
9. The good are shipped. 
10. A shipped Bill of Lading is obtained from the carrier. 
11. The seller presents the documents mentioned above along with 
the commercial invoice and a draft to the confirming bank. 
12. The bank checks the documents and pays, accepts or 
negotiates the credit as necessary. 
13. The confirming bank forwards the documents and draft to the 
issuing bank. 
14. on being satisfied with the documents the issuing bank pays 
the confirming bank. 
15. The issuing bank advises the buyer that it has the documents 
and delivers them to him in lieu of payment or as agreed. 
16. The buyer pays the bank and obtains the documents. 
17. The buyer presents the Bill of Lading to the ship or the 
ship's agent. 
18. The ship or the ship's agent delivers the goods in lieu of 
the Bill of Lading. 
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Take an imaginative fraudsman, azm him with guile 
and a xerox machine, turn him loose in a 
ccmmercial world where vast sums change hands on 
the strength of documents, and the sky is the 
limit. 
[Haight (1980)] 
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CHAPTER 5- ANALYSIS OF FRAUD CASE DATABASE 
5.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 presented an overview of the problem of maritime 
fraud. This chapter analyses the fraud case database. The 
database was compiled from published literature, case law, 
information supplied by the ICC - International Maritime Bureau 
(the collaborating establishment) and personal interviews with 
special investigators of Security Investigation Services (SIS) 
and New Scotland Yard. 
101 cases of fraud have been included in the database. It was 
possible to identify values of losses in only 72 cases : these 
ranged from $ 30,000 to $ 56 million (see section 5.6). The 
cases included in the database consist mainly of frauds where 
forged/fraudulent documents were used. A small selection of the 
cases analysed have been included in Appendix 1. As some of the 
cases are subjudice, the names of the parties have been omitted. 
Analysis of the database was carried out to identify the modi 
operandi and also to pin-point the features coranonly found 
within the different classes of fraud. The findings will be used 
in conjunction with the conceptual model of the system of 
international trade, developed in the previous chapter, to 
identify the weak links in the system which have contributed 
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to the failure of the system, i. e. the occurrence of actual or 
potential frauds. 
5.2 Charter Party Fraud 
Investigation of the cases has revealed the following modi 
operandi : 
5.2.1 Charterer Defrauds the Shipowner 
a) A vessel is Time-chartered. The hire is paid at stated 
intervals, usually fortnightly or monthly, the first 
instalment being paid in advance. 
b) The vessel is either sub-chartered on a voyage charter or 
run on a liner service. A particularly advantageous freight 
rate is offered to shippers. 
c) Cnce the cargo is loaded, the charterer collects the 
freight and issues "freight prepaid" B/L, defaults on 
further hire payments and absconds or goes into 
liquidation. If the charter party calls for the issue of 
"freight collect" B/L and the shipowner issues such B/L, 
the charterer collects the freight and replaces the 
shipowner's B/L with a fresh set endorsed "freight 
prepaid". The substitution is done without the knowledge of 
the shipowner. 
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5.2.2 Shipowner Defrauds the Charterer/Cargo owner 
a) The vessel loads cargo, freight is collected and B/L issued. 
b) Instead of proceeding to the destination, the vessel diverts 
to a convenient port en route on the pretext of change of 
crew, provisioning or repairs. 
c) In port the vessel is arrested by an "accorrmodating 
creditor" for unpaid bills. 
d) The vessel is sold by a court order, to meet the claim which 
is greatly exaggerated by collusion between the two parties. 
In such cases the vessel is sold free of all encumberances of 
the previous owner, including the contract of affreightment 
obligations - even as to the cargo on board. 
e) The purchaser, i. e. the new owner of the ship, demands 
additional freight from the cargo owner/charterer to complete 
the voyage. The previous owner, the creditor and the new 
owner are all part of a parent company. 
A variation of this scheme is when the shipowner deviates to a 
small Greek port and sells the cargo under a court order to 
recover for the alleged loss of charter hire or the freight (IMB 
(1984c)]. For example, in 1977 at least 12 vessels under Greek 
beneficial ownership arrived at small Greek ports where they 
made application to the Courts to be allowed to discharge and 
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then dispose of the cargo under the contention that the owners 
had not been paid either the charter hire or the freight [Wright 
(1981)]. 
Figures 5.1 and 5.2 are conceptual models of the above two types 
of frauds. 
5.3 Deviation Fraud/Illegal Sale of Cargo 
Investigation of the fraud cases has shown that the following 
comnon features are found in deviation frauds : 
a) The shipowner is usually of "singleton ownership". 
b) 7he ship is sailing under a "flag of convenience", usually 
Panama, or under the Greek flag. 
c) Cargo is loaded usually, but not always, for a port where 
there is considerable delay due to port congestion. 
d) After sailing from the port of loading, there are changes to 
the vessel's name, flag and/or nominal ownership. This is 
usually achieved by selling the ship to a new company which 
the shipowner opens or purchases in, say Liberia or Panama. 
For example, the ship "Gale" changed her name four times in 
three months and changed her flag from Greek to Panamanian 
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[Ellen & Campbell (1981)1; the "Betty" on a voyage from 
Rijeka (Yugoslavia) to Jeddah (Saudi Arabia) made an 
unscheduled stop at Pylos (Greece), where she changed her 
name, flag and owners [Conway (1981)]. Vessels not only 
changed names, but put into small ports and changed the 
entire crew who completed the perpetration of the fraud. 
There is evidence that professional crews were maintained for 
this purpose (Wright (1981)]. 
e) The cargo is sold illegally, say in the Middle East where, 
due to political strife, the goods could be sold without 
questions being asked. For example, vessels deviated to 
Lebanese ports to sell their cargo. From the end of 1977 up 
to September 1979 vessels disappeared into Lebanon at the 
rate of about two to three every month 
. 
[Wright (1981)], and 
then 
f) The vessel sails and resumes operation under a new name, or 
is scuttled to hide the fact that cargo has been stolen, in 
which case there is an overlap with insurance frauds. 
Figure 5.3 is a conceptual model of this type of fraud. 
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5.4 Marine Insurance Fraud 
In this type of fraud, scuttling was the factor most frequently 
encountered. Therefore it is being considered in greater detail. 
5.4.1 Scuttling 
During the 1920's there was a spate of scuttlings. 
Investigations reveal that in the majority of cases the 
following features could be found 
a) libe shipping company was in financial trouble and probably 
having difficulty in meeting the mortgage payments. For 
example, in The Leonita. {1) the owners owed four-fifths of 
the purchase price of the vessel and the vessel had ceased to 
make any profit, 
b) The vessel was experiencing difficulties in contracting 
charters, 
c) The freight rates were low, 
d) The vessels were grossly over-insured. For example, The Arnus 
{21 which was worth E 14,000 was insured for E 174,000, and 
The Leonita {3} was worth E 55,000 and insured for 
E 245,000. Both vessels sank one -month before the policy 
expired, and 
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e) Vessels sank in calm sea and fine weather {4,5,61. 
The sinking of the vessel resulted in : 
- Payment of mortgage froin the insurance proceeds, 
- Recoupment of investment in the ship, 
- Loss of a burdensome shipping venture, and 
- "Windfall" profits. 
It was shown in chapter 2 that the acceleration in the recent 
spate of known/suspicious sinkings started around the 
mid-seventies (see figure 2.3). In some of the modern day 
sinkings the above-mentioned features are present, but in the 
majority of cases, particularly in the Far East, some or all of 
the following features have also been identified 
a) The vessels are usually more than 15 years old and are in 
very poor condition, hence the coining of the term "rust 
bucket". 
b) These vessels are usually registered under flags of 
convenience, particularly Panamanian. The Far East Regional 
Investigation Team's (FERIT) findings reveal that of the 48 
cases investigated more than 80% of the vessels were under 
Panamanian flag (FERIT Report (1979)]. Kapoor's (1986a) 
analysis of 70 known/suspicious sinkings showed that about 
63% of the vessels were under the Panamanian flag. He points 
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out that this figure could have been higher as the port of 
registry of 20 vessels was not known. 
c) The vessels allegedly carry high value cargoes (for example, 
"Averilla" and "Oh Dai" were purported to be carrying large 
quantities of cloves, palm oil, brass scrap and PVC resin 
[Sundaresan (1983)]) or the cargo may secretly be discharged 
at an intermediate port [IMB (1982)]. This overlaps with 
deviation fraud. 
d) Ibe cargo owners may also be involved along with the 
shipowner. For example, the "Gulf Prosperity" and "Guru 
Angadh" were owned by companies in which the purported 
shipper B. S. Aujla had an interest (Conway (1981)]. 
e) There is usually no loss of life and the crew normally save 
their personal effects, though the ship's papers are usually 
lost. For example, "when the crew of 'The Tropaioforos' were 
eventually rescued they were found to be astonishingly well 
dressed and clean-shaven for mn who had hurriedly abandoned 
ship in the early hours of the morning" [Haddon-Cave (1981)]. 
f) The ships usually sink in deep water and allegedly in bad 
weather. 
g) The ships are usually over-insured, for example "The 
Tropaioforos" M was valued at E 38,000 but was insured for 
E 200,000. 
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h) The involvement of the same people (shipowners, agents, 
shippers and crew) in a number of cases indicates that a 
number of small syndicates are operating. For example, in the 
case of "Averilla" and "Oh Dai" the same shippers were 
involved, namely, B. S. Aujla Company, Bentrex & Co., and 
Palmex Enterprises and in each company B. S. Aujla had a 
controlling interest (Lauriat (1980)] (Cf. point (d) above). 
In some cases the company is specially set up for this 
purpose,, a very good example of this was the case of "The 
Saled' 18 1. 
The vessels usually develop leaks or there are unexplained 
explosions on board, for example, "The Tropaioforos" {9} 
was alleged to have struck "an unknown submerged object" as a 
result of which water began pouring into the holds; and "The 
Goldsky" {10} was supposed to have suddenly developed a large 
vertical crack in the port side shell plating of the engine 
room. 
k) In some cases the sinking is faked, i. e. the vessel does not 
sink but reappears elsewhere under a new identity. 
The majority of such cases do not come to court for the 
following reasons : 
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a) The difficulty of Proving on a balance of probabilities that 
the vessel was sunk by a deliberate act of someone on board 
and that the shipowner was privy to the act, i. e. complicity 
of the shipowner. For example, in "The Michael" {11} the 
owner's privity could not be proved, even though it was 
common knowledge that the ship had been scuttled, and that 
Komiseris, who had also been on "The Goldsky" {121, had 
boasted about his actions. 
b) A few unexplained sinkings are always accepted by the 
underwriters among their claims portfolio. it has been 
suggested that insurers pay out on claims they know to be 
fraudulent in order not to prejudice future business 
(Lauriat (1979)]. 
c) Out of court settlements. 
5.5. Documentary Maritime Fraud 
Investigation has shown that sane or all of the following 
features are commonly found in documentary fraud cases : 
a) Goods in high demand are offered at prices below the market 
rate, by a seller who or from a country which is not the 
normal source of supply. For example, the Cubans purchased 
coffee at $1.39 per pound, 15 cents below world market price 
and were defrauded of $ 8.7 million [Time (1979)]. 
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b) Dealing with and trusting hitherto unknown persons. For 
example, the Angolan goverment dealt with the unknown Perez 
(or Pires) not once but on three occasions, despite the 
fact that the cargo was not forthcoming on the first two 
occasions. As a result the Angolans lost $ . 8.4 million 
[Paxman (1979), Conway (1981)]. 
c) Payment is always by mans of irrevocable documentary credit. 
d) Sale is on cost insurance and freight (c. i. f. ) or cost and 
freight (c. & f. ) terms. 
e) Buyers are inexperienced and usually from developing 
countries. For example, Angola encountered five major 
maritime frauds in less than two years after gaining its 
independence (Abhyankar (1980)]. This could be attributed to 
their lack of comercial expertise in international trade 
transactions. 
f) The victims have no recourse against the underwriters or 
carriers. If there is no cargo the victims do not have an 
insurable interest and therefore, the risk does not attach. 
If the B/L is forged or fraudulent the carrier is not liable, 
or if the carrier is liable he may have no assets and thus 
the buyer has a worthless cause of action (13). If the goods 
exist but do not start the contemplated voyage, and the buyer 
has paid out on the fraudulent B/L, the risk does not attach; 
therefore the victim cannot claim on the insurance (14). 
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g) The shipowner and the crew are usually innocent. 
5.5.1 Documentary Fraud Scenarios 
In the perpetration of documentary fraud any one of the 
following scenarios may be enacted : 
a) Non-existent cargo on a non-existent ship 
- Savundra defrauded the Chinese Govermnent of $ 1.23 million 
by allegedly shipping non-existent cargo of 45000 drums of 
lubricant on a non-existent ship (Connell & Sutherland 
(1978)]. 
- The Nigerian Government paid out $6 million for a 
non-existent cargo of 94,000 tonne of cement apparently 
shipped on 8 non-existent ships {15}. 
Non-existent cargo on an existent ship 
In this category there are two possibilities, namely, the 
vessel named in the B/L is actually at the port of loading 
(or even in the vicinity), but is loading cargo for some 
other port, or the vessel named in the B/L is trading in 
another area or is undergoing repairs. There have been 
several cases of both versions and some examples are given 
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below : 
- B/L showed that the cargo was shipped on board "Anna" and a 
vessel called "Anna" was at the port of Wolgast on or about 
the correct date [16). 
- B/L showed that a cargo of frozen chicken was loaded on 
board the "Multi-Frost" in Tan*pa (U. S. A. ), but at that time 
the vessel was off Luanda in Angola [Brown (1982)]. 
- B/L showed that a cargo of 1500 tons of beef was loaded on 
board the "Maco Viking" which at that time was undergoing 
refit in a Norwegian shipyard (Paxman (1979)]. 
- B/L showed that a cargo of 1000 tons of palm oil was loaded 
on board the "Cool Girl" in Copenhagen. At that time the 
"Cool Girl" was in dry dock in Rotterdam [Paxman (1979)]. 
c) Sending rubbish or inferior quality goods instead of the 
contracted goods 
For example : 
- In the case of Bguitable Trust Company of New York v Dawson 
(17) it was revealed that instead of sending a full 
consignment of vanilla beans the cargo shipped consisted of 
only one percent vanilla beans and the rest was old iron, 
wood and rubbish. 
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- Cowhair, other material and rubbish was shipped in 50 cases 
instead of bristles {18}. 
-A certificate of analysis was issued based on the analysis 
of a sample of ore taken to the chemist but the ore shipped 
was worthless {19}. 
d) Date of shipment is fraudulently altered or a false date is 
entered on the B/L to show that the goods have been loaded 
within the contract period to meet the L/C requirements {20, 
21). This would be forgery under section 9(1)g of the Forgery 
and Counterfeiting Act 1981. 
e) The buyer may obtain delivery of goods from the shipowner on 
the strength of a letter of indemnity and then sell the B/L 
to an innocent third party 
f) The buyer may present a forged B/L to the carrier to obtain 
delivery of the cargo without payment for the goods to the 
bank where the original documents are being held. 
g) The issue of two sets of B/L for the same cargo. 
For example, the owner of the "Viki V issued two sets of 
B/L, one to the genuine Iranian consignees and the other to a 
"bonafide" Egyptian buyer (IMB (1982b)]. 
h) The use of forged/fraudulent documentary credits. In this 
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type of fraud two possibilities exist : 
i) the seller and buyer conspire to defraud the paying bank, 
or 
ii) the seller induces the buyer to send goods on the 
strength of the fraudulent documentary credit. 
False invoicing of goods to contravene exchange control 
regulations, or to pay less Customs duty on imports. 
k) Misdescription of goods in order to : 
i) export/import banned goods, or 
ii) claim export subsidy on goods under the Comwn 
Agricultural Policy (C. A. P. 
-) 
of the European Economic 
Community (EEC), or 
iii) claim compensation under the Monetary Compensatory 
Amounts (M. C. A. ) in the EEC. 
Figures 5.4 and 5.5 are conceptual models of documentary fraud 
cases. 
5.6 Analysis 
Analysis of the modi operandi and the comnon features of the 
various types of fraud reveals, inter alia, heavy involvement of 
Greek and Panamanian flag vessels. This has been substantiated 
by two independent analyses which show that in 75% of the cases 
Greek and Panamanian vessels have been involved, see tables 5.1 
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and 5.2a (tables are placed at the end of- the chapter). The 
results of Ellen & Campbell's (1981) analysis in terms of flag 
of vessels involved in 93 cases of Charter Party and Documentary 
Frauds reported up to November 1979 are shown in table 5.1. 
Table 5.2 shows the analysis of 52 cases of non- or mis-delivery 
of cargoes [Perry (1979)]. 
An analysis of 70 known/suspicious sinkings carried out - see 
table 5.3a - showed that 44 vessels were under the Panamanian 
flag. This figure could however be higher as the port of 
registry of 20 vessels was not known. As stated earlier (see 
section 5.4.1) FERIT's findings reveal that of the 48 cases 
investigated more than 80% of the vessels were under the 
Panamanian flag. 
Tables 5.2b and 5.3b show that the majority of vessels involved 
in frauds have been over 15 years old. Kapoor (1986a) has shown 
that for ships of 500 G. R. T. and above the loss record of the 
Greek and Panamanian flag vessels is not very good (see Appendix 
5). 
During the course of personal interviews with fraud 
investigators it was suggested that in the majority of frauds 
the same people have been involved. Support for this view was 
found in the 70 cases of known/suspicious sinkings where 31 
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vessels which sank were under the agency of 5 companies and 4 
companies were found to be involved with 6 or more vessels which 
sank, see table 5.3c. The findings of the FERIT Report (1979) 
also substantiate this view. 
Figure 5.6 shows the analysis of 101 cases of maritime fraud by 
classification of fraud. over 62% of the cases were of 
docunentary fraud where the buyer was deceived by forged and/or 
fraudulent documents. However, in the insurance fraud cases the 
documents used contained false or fraudulent information, 
indicating the difficulty in classifaction due to overlap. 
However, of the 101 cases of maritime fraud,, drawn from the 
period 1974-1983, only 72 cases could be analysed in value 
terms in U. S. dollars (values ranging between $ 30,000 and $ 56 
million), see figure 5.7. The difficulties in this type of 
analysis were found to be : 
a) The length of time between the actual perpetration of fraud 
and the discovery of the losses involved, 
b) In some cases the values are not quoted in dollar terms, 
c) Values are not quoted in all cases, and 
d) In some cases the total loss suffered by the victims of fraud 
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Figure 5.6 - Analysis of 101 Cases of Maritime Fraud 
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Figure 5.7 - Analysis of 72 Cases of Maritime Fraud 
for the period 1974 - 1983 
Total value of Losses =$ 646.46 million 
Average Loss per case =$8.98 million 
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over a number of years is given. In such cases, for figure 
5.7, the total value has been apportioned on a pro rata basis 
over the tine involved. 
Figure 5.7 shows that over the ten year period the average loss 
per case was about $9 million. 
5.6.1 Loss due to Maritime Fraud 
Mat is the total annual loss attributable to maritime fraud ? 
In order to attempt to answer the question certain basic 
assumptions are made. They are : 
a) It is estimated that 30% of the cases are not reported 
entirely due to the commercial attitude of the victims. The 
reason for not reporting is that the victim is unlikely to 
get his money back. Therefore it does not make economic sense 
to incur extra expenditure - especially in view of the fact 
that the alleged fraudster may not be convicted, or if he is 
convicted he usually has no assets. 
b) An estimated 40% of the cases are not reported due to other 
reasons, e. g. to avoid adverse publicity, or the victims 
negotiate with the perpetrators to re-purchase their own 
go S. 
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c) Only about 30% of the cases are reported. It can be argued 
that this figure is too high, but the author feels it is 
better to err on the side of caution and not to exaggerate 
the issues. 
d) The total number of cases reported per annum'(allowing for 
overlap, i. e. same case is being investigated by more than 
one investigator) can be broken down as follows : 
In the United Kingdom (U. K. ) 
- on average 100 cases per annum reported to IMB (see chapter 
2, table 2.1) 
- on average 150 cases per annum reported to Security 
Investigation Services (Wilson (1985)] 
- assune another 250 cases to all the other investigators and 
lawyers 
For the rest of the world 
- assume double the U. K. figure, i. e. 1000 cases. It can be 
argued that this figure is to small, but has been 
selected for the same reason as above, i. e. to avoid 
exaggeration. 
e) Of the estimated 1500 cases reported it is further assumed 
that only 70 percent actually represent fraud cases, i. e. 
1050 cases. 
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If the estimated total number of cases reported is 1050 and this 
represents 30% of the losses suffered, the actual number of 
cases per annum is given by : 
Number of cases per annum = (1050 x 100) / 30 = 3500 
If the average loss per case is $9 million (see figure 
5.7), the total loss suffered is 3500 x$9 million, i. e. 31.5 
billion dollars per annum. This figure increases dramatically 
if assumption (c) is incorrect and the cases reported are 
less than 30%, see table 5.4. 
Fran table 5.4 it-can be seen that losses due to maritime fraud 
are substantial. Therefore there is an urgent need for action 
at both national and international level and not for endless 
bureaucratic discussions over boundaries and jurisdictions. Any 
delay in arriving at a solution is to the benefit of the 
perpetrators of fraud for whom delay is a weapon in their 
armoury (see chapter 2) and also, for whom such boundaries do 
not exist, thus enabling them to exploit the weakness of the 
system to the fullest extent. 
5.6.2 Minor Shipboard Frauds 
The loss suffered by the shipping industry is not only due to 
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major frauds but also due to minor shipboard frauds. This type 
of fraud has not received any publicity because it does not 
make sensational headlines. However, it takes place on ships of 
virtually all nationalities. Examples of such frauds are : 
signing false receipts for stores/fuel/dunnage not received 
demanding inducement for preferential stowage 
- demanding inducement for accepting poor quality stores on 
board. 
Kapoor's (1986a) analysis shows that the minimum loss suffered 
by the industry due to minor shipboard frauds is nearly $7 
million per annum. He points out that in preliminary 
investigations he has found that practising seafarers quote 
figures in excess of $ 1500 per ship per annum representing a 
minimum loss of over $ 28 million per annum. (One seafarer 
quoted figures of the order of $ 12,000 per annum on his last 
ship). 
5.6.3 Indirect Losses due to Fraud 
It must be recognised that the minimum losses estimated in this 
analysis are the direct losses and do not take into account 
indirect losses such as : 
- Cost of buying back the goods which have been sold illegally 
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to third parties. 
- Transhipment and warehousing charges of goods discharged at a 
port other than the destination. 
- Loss in the value of goods due to delay in delivery of goods. 
- Damage to the goods. 
- Cost of putting up a guarantee to have the arrest order 
lifted. 
- Legal and ancillary expenses. 
- Loss of customer goodwill. 
- Loss of market. 
In view of the above, it can be envisaged that the indirect 
financial losses suffered by the individual traders can be far 
greater than the direct losses. In addition such losses have a 
"khock-on" effect on the economy of the victim country. Rider 
(1985b) is in agreement with this and says : 
The repercussions that the more serious 
commercial crimes can have on a national economy 
underlines the political significance of this 
sort of criminal activity. It can, and in some 
cases certainly does, have long-term detrimental 
effects on the political and economic stability 
of the country. 
These effects would be particularly noticeable in the case of 
developing countries who appear, to have been the primary targets 
of the fraudsters. 
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At numerous seminars and conferences it has been said that the 
losses due to fraud should not be exaggerated and that they are 
less than 1% of the total value of trade. It was stated in 
chapter 1 that in an attempt to quantify the scale of losses 
due to maritime fraud various figures have been quoted; these 
range in value from an amount in excess of $ 200 million in the 
middle-to-late seventies to about $ 13 billion in 1985. These 
values appear to have become widely accepted as estimates of the 
losses due to fraud. However, closer examination fails to 
uncover a sound basis for these estimates. 
The results of the analysis carried out do in fact show that the 
minimum direct losses due to maritime fraud are closer to the 1% 
figure, see table 5.4, than the industry has hitherto been led 
to believe. In value terms, the author believes that, such losses 
should be unacceptable to the industry. 
5.7 Conclusions 
Prevention is better than cure. Therefore, the main burden 
of preventing fraud rests with the victims. In order to 
protect himself the victim must have access to information which 
would be adequate for the prevention of fraud. Whilst most of 
this information is available, the author feels that the feature 
that has been particularly noticeable is the apparent lack of 
will or determination on the part of the victims to protect 
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thernselves. This can be attributed to either naivety/ignorance 
or laziness on their part, or the belief that information can be 
obtained free of charge. 
However, in the defence of the victims it must be said that 
whilst the information is available it is : 
a) not available to all the interested parties, due to the lack 
of co-operation between organisations representing different 
sectors of the industry, 
b) sometimes unreliable, and 
c) it is fragmented, i. e. there is no centralised databank, and 
therefore it can be too expensive to obtain, particularly for 
the smaller firms who would have to become members of several 
organisations to acquire all the relevant information. 
In view of the above there is an urgent need for concerted 
action on all fronts. This can only be achieved by positive 
co-operation between the various participants in international 
trade. This could take the form of a centralised databank, which 
would co-ordinate and collate statistics on fraud losses on a 
worldwide basis. This centralised pool of information would 
assist the investigators in the identification of emerging 
patterns and trends. The recent decision of the Baltic Exchange 
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and the Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO) to 
pool their information on malpractice and fraud (ICCP (1986)] is 
a step in the right direction. 
The UNCrAD Report (1983), submitted to the IGG, highlighted the 
inadequacy of relevant information for interested parties, and 
suggested that consideration should be given to means of 
improving the availability of ship-related information in order 
to facilitate trading parties' enquiries about the ship and its 
operations. As a result of this the UNCTAD Secretariat was asked 
to prepare a report on ship-related information. This 
preliminary study [UNCrAD Report (1985b)] was used as the basis 
for Section B of the first questionnaire sent to the Panel of 
Experts (see chapter 7). The final report [UNCTAD Report 
(1986b)] presents the problems which exist in relation to the 
present system of providing information and proposes the 
formation of a Maritime Fraud Prevention Exchange (MFPE) for 
improving the availability of shipping information as well as 
facilitating its dissemination. 
5.8 Wleak Links 
Frorn the analysis of the fraud case data-base it was found that 
in addition to the weak links within the international trade 
system itself, further weak links could be identified in the 
immediate environment of the system. It is hypothesised that 
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these weak links, i. e. both within the system and its immediate 
environment contribute to, and facilitate the occurrence of, 
actual and potential fraud. The occurrence of fraud is a failure 
of the system. 
The weak links identified will be tested using an international 
panel of experts to determine whether they are also considered 
to be the weaknesses of the system by the experts : their 
agreement would support the hypothesis. The weak links 
identified are given below and the number in the bracket refers 
to the statement number in the first questionnaire sent to the 
Panel of Experts. 
Examples of weak links identified in the environment of the 
system are : 
E. 1 Em with which name, ownership and port of registry of a 
vessel can be changed without proof of cancellation of the 
previous registry.. (Statement No. 6) 
For example, neither the deletion certificate nor a closed 
Transcript from the previous registry is asked for by the 
Registrar when a vessel is transferred fr(xn foreign flag to 
British Registry (Doraiswamy (1984)]. 
212 
E. 2 Ease with which a vesel can be registered in scme 
countries, particularly Panama, even when the vessel is 
unseaworthy. (Statement No. 7) 
Example of other countries are : 
A ship of any type over 25 years old may be registered in Cyprus 
provided : 
- the owner signs the Cyprus Collective Agreement for seamen, 
- the owner undertakes to engage a crew consisting of 51% 
Cypriot seamen, if available, 
- the vessel complies with the 1966 Loadline Convention 
(Doraiswamy (1984)]. 
In the Bahamas, Britain and Cyprus a vessel can be provisionally 
registered for a period of six months with ease. For example, 
for provisional registration in Britain the Convention 
Certificates are not called for; the vessel is expected to 
possess them and be seaworthy [Doraiswamy (1984)] (Eaphasis 
supplied). 
. 
E. 3 Ease with which companies can be registered with complete 
anonymity for the directors, either by the use of foreign 
nominees or otherwise. (Statement No. 8) 
For example, in the Bahamas and Cyprus anonymity can be achieved 
by using nominees as shareholders. Both countries provide 
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adequate safeguards to maintain anonymity. To maintain anonymity 
in Liberia all or part of the stock may be in the form of 
registered or bearer shares; after incorporation, any change of 
shareholders or officers or directors need not be recorded in 
the Public Register (Doraiswamy (1984)]. 
EA Lack of harmonization in international laws and procedures. 
(Statement No. 9) 
It was pointed out in chapter 2 that the Criminal Law when 
looked at from an international point of view does not have the 
ability to resolve actions against criminals where two or more 
jurisdictions are involved. 
E. 5 Unfamiliarity of the judiciary, in some cotmtries, with the 
concepts of maritime law. (Statement No. 10) 
E. 6 Inadequacy of the present system of the lay jury in 
commercial fraud cases. (Statement No. 11) 
This point was highlighted by Lord Justice Lawton (Lawton 
(1983)] at the conference on "Fraud & Evasion" (held in London 
on 14th. April 1983) and also at the Commonwealth Law Ministers 
meeting in Sri Lanka {Rider (1985)]. 
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E. 7 The difficulties faced by prosecuting authorities in 
obtaining extradition orders from different jurisdiction. 
(Statement No. 12) 
For example, there is reluctance on the part of many countries 
to enter into extradition agreements with those countries who 
they believe adhere to different ideologies [Akinjide (1984)]. 
E. 8 Lack of control over ports due to political strife, 
particularly in the Middle East. 
statenent No. 36 (see section 5.9) is a recommendation to 
combat this weakness. 
Examples of the weak links identified within the system are : 
S. 1 The B/L has outlived its usefulness as a document of title 
and provides little or no security. (Statement No. 2) 
As the B/L is a document of title it represents the goods and 
delivery of the document implies constructive delivery of the 
goods (see chapter 4- section 4.3.6). Therefore, a person 
intending to commit fraud knows that all participants in the 
international trade system will accept the B/L at face value and 
will implicitly rely upon its contents. 
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S. 2 The Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits 
1983 Revision does not provide adequate protection for the 
buyer agaist the unscrupulous seller. (Statement Nos. 4 
5). 
In chapter 4 (section 4.5) it was established that the UCP does 
not provide adequate protection for the buyer as the banks are 
not required to check the authenticity of the documents. 
Furthermore, in most frauds the payment is arranged under 
irrevocable documentary credits. 
S. 3 Lack of proper checks carried out by the parties involved 
in international trade transaction, including lack of 
independent checks. (Statement No. 13) 
There have been a nmber of cases where checks into the 
existence, creditworthiness and track record of their trading 
partners would have prevented the subsequent frauds. 
SA Shipowner's "track record" not checked either by the 
charterers and shippers before entering into a contract of 
carriage, or by the insurers before entering into a 
contract of insurance. (Statement No. 14) 
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S. 5 Secrecy of operations. (Statement No. 15) 
For example, referring to the Kaare Gilboe case (see Appendix 1) 
Tudball (1981) says "If the fixtures with the Chinese had been 
fully reported on The Baltic then I am convinced that the 
subsequent fraud would not have taken place". 
S. 6 Ease with which B/L can be obtained on the open market or 
sometimes from the shipowners or their agents. 
As this is a fact it was not tested. Prentis (1981) and Kapoor & 
Gray (1985) have pointed out that blank B/L forms can be 
obtained with ease. 
S. 7 Else of THREE original B/L in a set and delivering cargo 
on the production of only one. (Statement No. 16) 
In chapter 4 it was established that this practice weakens the 
position of the holder of only one original of a set 
consisting of more than one original. 
S. 8 Lack of conmrcial expertise on the part of the victims of 
developing cotmtries. (Statement No. 17) 
For example, the Angolans, and the Nigerians have been the 
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victims of a number of frauds (see Appendix 1). 
S. 9 The need to cut cost has made buyers and shippers 
targets of unscrupulous brokers, sellers, shipowners and 
forwarding agents. (Statement No. 18) 
For examplej, the Cubans were the victims of buying coffee below 
the market rates (see section 5.5 (a)]. 
S. 10 Payment under documentary credits by the banks without 
proper checks. (Statement No. 19) 
For example,, it has been acknowledged by bankers that certain 
checks prior to payment would have prevented some frauds (see 
chapter 4, section 4.5.8). Abhyankar (1980) points out that in 
the case of M. V. "Delwind" the banks paid out $ 5.9 million 17 
days after presentation of documents; if they had checked on the 
vessel's position when she apparently loaded the cargo they 
would have found that she was in dry-dock in Japan, and the 
company which issued the B/L was non-existent. 
S-11 Acceptance of commercial malpractices and at tines 
fraudulent practices as custm of the trade in some 
countries for commercial expediency. (Statement No. 20) 
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It was shown in chapter 4 that comnercial malpractices had 
developed in international trade, particularly in relation to 
the use of letters of indemnity, to simplify some of the 
difficulties which arose as a result of using archaic practices. 
In an interview with Mr. Freebury, Director, Documentation and 
Procedures, SITPRO, the author- asked Mr. Freebury if 
simplification of documentation could have contributed to the 
increase in fraud. Mr. Freebury said that he did not think so 
but he would certainly like to confirm it. As a result Statement 
No. 21 was included to determine whether simplification of 
documentation had contributed to fraud. 
The weak links identified within the systern are shown in figure 
5.8. 
5.9 Reconmendations to Ccmbat Fraud/Conmercial Crime 
As pointed out in chapter 3, when using the systems approach the 
feasibility and desirability of the changes recommended can be 
tested. Therefore taking into account the weaknesses outlined 
above some recomnendations are put forward. Statement numbers 23 
to 31 and 34 are recommendations put forward by the author (see 
Appendix 3). 
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In addition, one of the resolutions adopted at the Bombay 
Seminar on "International Maritime and Commercial Frauds" 
(March 1985) and the resolution adopted at the first session of 
the IGG (UNCrAD Report (1984)] were included in this section to 
verify their feasibility in combating fraud. 
Statenent numbers 22,32 and 33 (see Appendix 3) were introduced 
as recorwendations based on the IGG resolutions. Statement Nos. 
37 and 38 were introduced as recommendations b4sed on the 
resolution adopted at the Bombay Seminar. 
Statement number 36 is a recommendation put forward by the 
collaborating establishment, ICC - International Maritime 
Bureau and statement number 35 is based on a proposal put 
forward by the UNCrAD [UNCTAD (1982)]. 
Having identified the weak links both within the system and its 
imediated environment the next chapter examines the methodology 
to be used to verify the validity of the hypothesised weak 
links. 
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Table 5.1 : Analysis of 93 Cases of Fraud 
Source : Adapted from Ellen & Campbell (1981) 
Country cases Percentage 
Greece 46 49.5 
Panama 24 25.8 
Cyprus 16 17.2 
Spain 2 2.5 
India 1 1.0 
Liberia 1 1.0 
Sharjah 1 1.0 
Singapore 1 1.0 
South Korea 1 1.0 
Total 93 100.0 
Table 5.2 : Analysis of 52 cases of Non or Misdelivery of Cargo 
Source : Adapted from Perry (1979). 
a) 
b) 
Flag of Vessel Number Percentage 
Greek 24 46.2 
Panamanian 15 28.8 
Cypriot 11 21.2 
Liberian 2 3.8 
Total 52 100.0 
Age of Vessel Number Percentage 
0- 15 years 9 17.3 
16 - 20 years 14 27.0 
21 - 25 years 17 32.7 
26 - 30 years 10 19.2 
31 - 35 years 2 3.8 
Total 52 100.0 
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I. 
Table 5.2 Continued 
c) 
G. R. T. of Vessel Nwher Percentage 
501 - 2500 tons 5 9.6 
2501 - 5000 tons 10 19.2 
5001 - 7500 tons 15 28.8 
7501 - 10000 tons 16 30.8 
Over 10000 tons 6 11.6 
Total 52 100.0 
Table 5.3 : Analysis of 70 cases of Known/Suspicious Sinkings 
Source : Adapted frm Marine Insurance Bulletin, July 1980. 
a) 
b) 
Flag of Vessel Number Percentage 
Panamanian 44 62.9 
Spanish 2 2.9 
Cypriot 1 1.4 
Greek 1. 1.4 
Japanese 1 1.4 
Korean 1 1.4 
Unknown 20 28.6 
Total 70 100.0 
Age of Vessel Nunber Percentage 
0- 15 years 7 10.0 
16 - 20 years 17 24.3 
21 - 25 years 17 24.3 
26 - 30 years 5 7.1 
31 - 35 years 1 1.4 
45 years & over 2 2.9 
Unknown 21 30.0 
I 
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Table 5.3 Continued 
C) 
Agents of Vessels 
2uz bteamsnip uompany (-) 
Goodwill Ltd. M 
Tr Steamships Ltd. M 
Willing & Co. M 
ABC Shipping Co. Ltd. (*) 
16 Companies with 1 ship each 
Names of 23 ships agents not known 
No. of ships 
I yj 
(*) - Names of the companies have been changed. 
Table 5.4 : Amual Losses due to Maritime Fraud 
Reported Total Losses Total value 
Losses suffered due of 
due to to Maritime International 
Fraud Fraud Trade in 1983 
billion) 
30% 31.5 
20% 47.25 
3690 
10% 94.5 billion 
. 5% 189.0 
Loss as percent 
of value of 
International 
Trade 
* Values of Export (f. o. b. ) and Import (c. i. f. ) 
Source : Shipping Statistics Yearbook, 1984, 
Institute of Shipping Economics, Bremen. 
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CHAPTER 6- RESEMCH METHODOLOGY 
6.1 Introduction 
The foregoing chapters have outlined the problem faced by the 
system of international trade. Systems theory was then employed 
to develop conceptual models of the three contractual 
sub-systems of international trade transactions, i. e. carriage, 
insurance and payment. This served to illustrate the various 
institutions involved and the flow of information, documents, 
goods. and money, and thus focus attention on areas which can be 
seen as potential weak links. Having examined these areas in 
detail, a conceptual model of the total system was developed. 
This was used in conjunction with the fraud case database to 
identify the weak links which have contributed to failures of 
the system. 
It is hypothesised that maritime fraud is a failure of the 
international trade system caused by the weak links identified 
in the last chapter. In order to test this hypothesis it is 
necessary to seek the opinions of potential victims (i. e. 
shippers, buyers, agents, freight forwarders, bankers, insurers, 
shipbrokers, etc. ) and the investigating/prosecuting 
authorities. This empirical approach of data gathering is used 
because of a dearth of information and the constraints and 
limitations imposed upon researchers investigating criminal 
activities. 
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This is in keeping with Croft's (1978) findings. When 
investigating the criminal justice system in the United Kingdom 
(UK) he observed that regard should be paid to the limitations 
and constraints imposed on researchers and, that research on 
crime involves piecing together information and identifying the 
gaps in knowledge to be filled by empirical investigation. 
He went on to say that whilst the research programTe should 
challenge the assumptions and values in the system, 
confrontation should be avoided, and special efforts have to be 
made to ensure consensus about objectives. The reason for this 
is to remove possible dissatisfaction with the outcome of the 
inquiry and thus assist the acceptance of the findings of the 
research in question. 
Since the primary objective of a systems study is to increase 
the effectiveness of the system during the planning horizon, 
forecasting has an important part to play. This chapter 
therefore investigates the research methodology which will 
fulfill this role. 
6.2 Enlarged Concept of a Model 
When trying to deal with the question of fraud, few 
organisations are prepared to talk about their experiences. As a 
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result, there is a considerable lack of statistical data on 
which to draw. Norman (1976) is of the same view and writes 
Where fraud is detected by management, police are 
seldom called in; even partial restitution is 
usually cheaper than the cost of investigation, 
litigation and damage to morale. 
The fact that several parties have an interest in international 
trade transactions results in a working environment where 
conflicting goals and overlapping authority are complicating 
factors. International trade documentation has evolved to meet 
the needs of the industry, although always being based on past 
experience it has lagged behind the changes which have 
revolutionised the shipping industry during the past thirty 
years (see chapter 2): in other words, the volme and structure 
have grown without conscious design. 
Quade (1971) points out that the systems approach is considered 
to be the panacea. for many of the challenges of modern 
society, and that while it can be applied to specific well- 
defined problems and sub-systems it is not likely to be 
spectacularly successful in total problems. He goes on to say : 
We way be able to design an efficient system but 
as yet we have no algorithms for finding ways to 
overcome the resistance offered by tradition, 
legal restrictions and a host of privileged 
interests that inhibit radical or even 
morphological change. 
For example, the shipping industry was reluctant to undertake 
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the examination and revision of long-established procedures made 
necessary by the dramatic changes to the shipping industry 
referred to in chapter 2. Rider (1984) attempts to draw 
attention to what he refers to as the "blinkered and general 
parochial attitude" of many of those concerned with fighting 
serious international crime and goes on to saY : 
*000 colleagues in the legal profession can 
occasionally be accused of being far more 
interested in the sterile and arid minutiae of 
jurisprudential conceptualisation than with 
actually taking the sort of steps through the 
legal system which would protect their societies 
from these evils. ... To confine ourselves to traditional and outdated procedures of Empire and 
the past will almost certainly result in defeat. 
The systems approach may be described as a "divergent thinking" 
approach, that is, it does not view the problem in isolation but 
attempts to consider all aspects of it, recognising the 
importance of interactions among the various components of the 
system. In this approach models representing the system are used 
to assist the designer to understand the system and to explain 
to others how he perceives the system. Conceptual rwdels were 
found to be best suited to the study of soft systems problems, 
particularly where reliance is placed on intuitive judgements of 
experts in the field. 
Quade (1971) points out that when working with problems where 
goals are obscure and conflicting, where the authority is 
diffuse and overlapping, and where the structure has grown 
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without conscious design, the act of collection of data to 
discover the underlying model, may even bias the data collected. 
This is particularly true in the international trade system 
where the various sub-systems are separate industries in their 
own right. In addition the sub-systems are affected not only by 
the politico-econ(xnic environment but also by the legislation of 
the various countries involved. 
While traditional models are very useful in providing detailed 
knowledge of the system interrelationships, their use would not 
be satisfactory in systerns problems where international policy 
issues are involved because, as Quade (1971) points out : 
The policymaking environment is such that there 
are likely to be many participants in any given 
decision, most of whom can counter any 
recommendation but none with the authority to 
implement it alone. 
For example, Rider (1984) points out that 
... any international initiative against serious 
cormnercial crime will to a material extent depend 
for its success or failure on the adequacy and 
effectiveness of the mechanisms that exist and 
can be effectively and efficiently employed in 
the relevant national jurisdictions. 
To overcome the problem of fraud one has to consider alternative 
courses of action and attempt, with the aid of experts, to 
forecast the outcomes of those actions and possibly indicate 
which of them would be preferable, acceptable and feasible. In 
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other words, the =del on which the decision is based relies 
largely on the judgements and intuition of the experts. 
In situations like this, Quade (1971) suggests that it may be 
possible to look for an unconventional scheme to fulfill the 
really essential functions of the traditional model. He goes on 
to say 
A model, by introducing a precise framework and 
terminology, serves as an effective means of 
communication, enabling analysts and various 
experts to exercise their judgement and 
intuition in a well-defined context and in 
proper relation to each other. In addition, it 
provides feedback to guide the participants in 
the revision of their ea lier judgements. It is 
these features of the rm>del that are 
essential to its role in supplying a route 
from hypotheses to prediction, not- how 
explicitly it simulates the real world or 
whether or not it provides a formal or 
quantitative scheme for optimization. 
(Emphasis supplied]. 
In order to achieve the above mentioned features Quade (1971) 
suggests that "an enlarged concept of a model" be considered in 
order to escape from the traditional concept that it is simply a 
device to generate values of a "payoff" that can be used to 
determine preference. He goes on to say that : 
... we take a broad view of the traditional 
concept of a model, accepting in practice any 
device that provides a means to predict and 
canpare the outccmes of alternative actions, 
regardless of its representative features or how 
efficient it is at optimization. 
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The idea of moving away from the traditional model is not new; 
the introduction of business games was a first step in this 
direction. They have a predictive quality and allow for 
intuitive judgements to take into account intangibles which are 
often considered beyond analýsis. However, Quade (1971) points 
out that whilst games sacrifice optimization they still retain 
the representative features of a model, and recommends using 
approaches that sacrifice representation. 
From the above it can be seen that there is need for the use of 
a technique which would : 
a) Have a predictive quality, 
b) Take account of intangibles, 
c) Allow comparison of alternative actions, 
d) Provide feedback, and 
e) Consider feasibility of implementation of recomnendations. 
Jantsch (1972) has identified three most important contributions 
of special techniques related to forecasting, they : 
a) elucidate the role of individual input factors, compel a 
comprehensive consideration of such factors, and assure some 
hanogeneity in the results, 
b) tend to reduce prejudice and bias, and 
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c) permit the evaluation of vast amounts of data and complicated 
patterns of input information and facilitate systematic 
evaluation of alternatives. 
6.3 Group Techniques for Problem-solving 
The need for alternative ways of solving a problem is a major 
point in the philosophy of the systems approach, particularly 
when dealing with complex systems problems under conditions of 
uncertainty [Athey (1982)]. Increasingly, the use of new 
techniques is being sought to generate new ideas, increase 
creativity, understand complex problems and their solutions 
[Delbecq et al (1975)]. 
As the complexity of the problem increases so does the need for 
pooling of judgefflents and opinions of experts. Delbecq et al 
(1975) are in agreement with this and further point out: 
As the accumulation and specialization of 
knowledge increases, viable solutions to complex 
problems require the involvement of resource 
experts from heterogeneous disciplines or 
functions. 
They go on to say that this explains the proliferation of ad 
hoc problern-solving groups. One such group was set up by the 
UNCTAD Secretariat to consider the problem of maritime fraud 
(see chapter 2). This ad hoc group, known as the Ad hoc 
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Intergovernmental Group (IGG), consisted of members from 69 
countries and 11 International Organisations. The Chairman of 
the IGG in his opening statement [UNCrAD (1984)] pointed out 
that as maritime fraud had assumed international dimensions it 
should be dealt with on an international basis. At its first 
session it was pointed out that : 
... maritime fraud often succeeded because of its 
very complexity, so that no solution to the 
problem could be found without making the best 
use of all the available expertise. (Para 8] 
However in such situations, i. e. where interacting groups meet, 
with numerous individuals or groups having to review and approve 
the proposals put forward, a great number of ideas are proposed, 
but problems can arise in decision making because : 
a) the individuals have different values and conceptual 
orientation [Delbecq et al (1975)], 
b) lack of resources or other constraints may affect the 
implementation of the recomwndations 
c) the individuals may lack the authority to agree to implement 
the recamendations (Quade (1971)] 
d) the individuals may feel inhibited (Dunnette (1964), Campbell 
(1968), Culbert (1968), Ludlow (1971)] and this may result in 
the loss of new and creative ideas. 
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Taylor et, al (1958) have found that interacting groups are 
superior to individuals in problem-solving situations. 
However, Delbecq et al (1975) point out that research indicates 
that "nominal group technique" (i. e. where a number of people 
work-face-to-face but write ideas independently rather than talk 
about them] is superior to interacting groups as far as 
generating information relevant to a problem because the 
interacting groups inhibit creative thinking. 
In view of the above, to show the short-cornings of ad hoc 
groups the IGG's first meting is considered in detail. At the 
first meting of the IGG, hope was expressed that the Group 
would be able to resolve the problem of maritime fraud where, by 
implication, previous meetings- in other fora had not been 
successful [UNCTAD (1984) - para 11]. It is submitted that the 
recommendation, in the final resolution passed by UNCTAD 
Secretariat's IGG, is an example of the difficulties which 
arise when dealing with international policy issues, 
particularly in interacting groups. The recommendation was : 
... that States members of UNCTAD should examine 
and, if appropriate, tighten their respective 
legislations to ensure that effective measures 
are available to prevent maritime fraud .... 
[Emphasis supplied]. 
Parry (1984) points out that the final resolution was criticised 
by Third World countries because it largely followed the 
guidelines laid down by the developed countries in a draft 
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submitted midway through the conference. The treatment of 
forged/fraudulent bills of lading was also found to be 
particularly unsatisfactory [Parry (1984)]. Parry goes on to 
say : 
Western delegates pointed out that the inclusion 
of the phrase "and, if appropriate", in the 
resolution meant it could be ignored by any 
country which did not feel like complying. 
"A toothless tiger'!, one western delegate said of 
the resolution. 
Comwenting after the meeting an IMB source 
described it as "a unique example of goverment 
and non-goverment bodies working together". 
The report of the IGG's first meeting [UNCTAD (1984)] indicates 
that there was general agreement among the members of the group 
about the final recommendation. However, the above-mentioned 
comments indicate that the members of the group themselves were 
not satisfied with the outcome. This would be in agreement with 
Van de Ven's (1974) findings that in interacting groups the 
members of the group do not feel that they have achieved 
satisfactory results and as such there is a feeling of not 
having accomplished much. Van de Ven also found that this leads 
to a loss of interest in future phases of problem solving. 
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6.4 The Delphi Technique 
In keeping with the enlarged concept of a model and taking into 
account the need to consider the problem using the systerns 
approach it was decided to use the Delphi technique. 
The Delphi technique, in principle, lends itself to far reaching 
applications, particularly in the field of research - where 
Delphi surveys provide judgemental input data for use in cases 
where hard data are unavailable or too costly to obtain. Jantsch 
(1972) points out that the Delphi technique can be used for both 
exploratory (opportunity-oriented) and normative (need-oriented) 
forecasting. In normative forecasting it is used 
a) to generate new information about needs, desires, values, 
functional requirements and structural relationships, and 
b) for simulation of implications of overall objectives, goals 
and specific operational targets in various systemic 
contexts. 
Jantsch goes on to say that the use of Delphi in this normative 
mode exploits its best inherent potential because such a use of 
Delphi focusses in industry on questions of overall desirability 
and in societal context on values. As the system of 
international trade is a human activity system the problem 
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posed by maritime fraud affects both industry and society. 
Therefore, it is submitted that the Delphi technique would be 
the best approach to use for dealing with the problem of 
maritime fraud. 
Whilst Delphi was developed as a forecasting technique it has, 
during its short life, gained recognition in a variety of other 
application areas. Linstone & Turoff (1975) point out that the 
need for utilizing Delphi is not determined by the nature of 
application but by one or more of the following properties : 
a) The problem does not lend itself to precise analytical 
techniques but can benefit from subjective judgements on a 
collective basis. 
For example, when considering the problem of maritime fraud one 
cannot rely on precise analytical techniques because of the lack 
of statistical data of the number of crimes, monetary values 
involved, geographical/regional variations, etc. But the problem 
can be tackled by utilizing the subjective judgements of the 
potential and/or actual victims, and the investigating and 
prosecuting authorities. 
b) The individuals needed to contribute to the examination of 
a broad and complex problem represent diverse backgrounds 
with respect to experience and expertise. 
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As established earlier (see chapter 2), in order to combat fraud 
a systems approach is required due to the international and 
inter-industry nature of the crime. Therefore, the 
individuals required to examine the problem must be drawn not 
only from the different sectors of international trade but also 
from different countries. The need for diversity of experience 
and expertise is further justified by the fact that at the 
IGG's first meeting [UNCTAD (1984) - para 311 the representative 
of the Customs Co-operation Council (COC) criticised the UNCTAD 
Report on Maritime Fraud and Piracy [UNCTAD (1983)] in that the 
documentary fraud section was devoted mainly to B/L fraud, 
whereas he considered that documentary fraud was more often 
associated with false invoicing. 
c) More individuals are needed than can effectively interact in 
a face-to-face exchange, and time and cost make frequent 
group meetings infeasible. 
For example, the cost of the IGG meeting for a two week period 
was estimated to be $150,000 [UNCrAD (1984)]. Particularly in 
view of the fact that the participants are practising experts in 
their respective fields, it would be extremely difficult to 
arrange suitable regular meetings to satisfy all concerned. 
Dunnette's (1964) research suggests that group meetings do not 
use the participants, time effectively and that higher quality 
solutions can be obtained by individual work. Thus the value of 
the Delphi technique is highlighted : participants are able to 
give individual consideration to the questionnaire and complete 
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it at their own pace. 
d) Disagreement between the individuals are so severe or 
politically unpalatable that the communication process must 
be refereed and/or anonymity assured. 
For example, at the first session of the IGG (UNCrAD (1984) - 
paras 19-291 one day was wasted debating whether an observer 
from the Gulf Co-operation Council could be permitted to make a 
statement : the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran 
objected to an observer participating in the discussion of the 
IGG, and he also objected to the name of the Council as, in his 
view, it was contrary to the guideline issued by the Secretary 
General of the United Nations. This point highlights the 
limitations of interacting groups. Van de Ven (1974) found this 
to be one of the major negative characteristics of interacting 
groups. Furthermore, the anonymity of the participants is of 
particular importance in this research because of the laws of 
defamation. 
Delphi has been described in a number of ways (Dalkey & Helmer 
(1963),. Quade (1971), Salancik et al (1971), Delbecq et al 
(1975), Linstone & Turoff (1975)]. In the context of this 
dissertation, Delphi may be described as follows : 
Delphi is a "framework" which replaces the traditional concept 
of a model and enables the analyst/researcher to seek solutions 
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to complex problems, and the feasibility of implementation 
of the recommendations, by soliciting the opinions, through a 
series of questionnaires, of an inter-disciplinary group of 
experts. 
Figure 6.1 is a flow diagram of the Delphi technique. The 
technique is essentially a series of questionnaires sent to a 
panel of respondents of diverse experience and expertise. The 
questions in the first questionnaire focus on broad issues which 
might be problems, objectives, recommendations or forecasts. The 
responses to the questionnaire are analysed and based on this 
analysis subsequent questionnaires are designed. This would 
-be in keeping with the systems approach; Athey (1982) has 
pointed out that in a systems study the analyst/researcher makes 
a series of progress reports, and each report builds 
successively on the previous ones. This method assists the 
analyst/researcher to explore IEhe subject under discussion and 
to reach an understanding of the agreements and disagreements of 
the members of the panel. The disagreements can be explored to 
bring out reasons for the underlying differences so that they 
can be taken into account in the final evaluation. The final 
evaluation is then used to determine whether the system being 
examined requires modification or development. 
However, any modification or development of the system of 
international trade should be such that it will not place 
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additional burden or restrictions on the legitimate 
participants, will not hamper trade and will be commercially 
acceptable. Radical or revolutionary changes are more likely to 
be opposed than modification of the existing design. Sagan 
(1977) points out that fundamental change can be accomplished by 
the addition of new systems on top of old ones. Athey (1982) 
points out that generally the evolutionary approach to change is 
most effective, because with complex systems it is often, 
difficult to predict all the consequences of making changes to 
the system. 
Croft's (1978) findings [see page 2271 taken in conjunction with 
the foregoing discussion strengthen the case for the use of the 
Delphi technique as the most appropriate research method for the 
investigation of the problem of documentary maritime fraud. 
6.5 The inquiring Systems 
Mitroff & Turoff (1975) observe that the process of inquiry may 
be represented by a very general system known as the "Inquiring 
System", see figure 6.2, and identify five types of inquiring 
systems. Vermuri (1978), whilst using different terminology, is 
of the same opinion. 
The various types of Inquiring Systems (IS) are : 
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Figure 6.2 The Inquiring System 
Source After Mitroff & Turoff (1975) 
a) Leibnizian Is : is based on the premise that truth is 
analytic. Under this form of inquiry a system can be 
defined completely by a formal or symbolic procedure, i. e. 
the analyst/researcher will attempt to reduce any problem to 
a formal or symbolic representation. Mitroff & Turoff (1975) 
point out that in this approach it is assumed that the model 
of the IS is not based upon the raw data set (the input in 
figure 6.2) and that the formal model comes prior to the data 
input. They further state that in this form of inquiry 
empirical data is regarded as an inherently risky base upon 
which to found universal conclusions of any kind because one 
is never justified in inferring general propositions from a 
finite data set. In other words, this type of IS Emphasizes 
theory to the detriment of data. This approach is suitable 
for problems involving a simple and well-defined structure 
[Vermuri (1978)]. As this type of IS is best suited for 
well structured problems it cannot be used in dealing with 
the problem of maritinie fraud because it involves policy 
issues which are not well structured, and also because of the 
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canplex interdisciplinary and international nature of the 
problem. 
b) Lockean IS : assumes that truth is experimental. Under 
this form of inquiry the model of a system is not 
based upon theoretical considerations, i. e. it is an 
empirically-derived model. Mitroff & Turoff (1975) point out 
that in this approach the model of the IS is built up from 
the raw data set (the input in figure 6.2). In this approach 
statistical analysis (the transformation model in figure 6.2) 
is used to attempt to forecast future trends (the output in 
figure 6.2). As this IS is based on statistiýal analysis 
some form of correlation is being sought in the data, i. e. 
consensus/agreement among the participants. 
The Delphi technique in its original form, as developed at the 
Rand Corporation, is a very good example of this approach. 
However, in its original form Delphi sought consensus of the 
subjective opinions of the experts and as a result the 
information obtained (the output in figure 6.2) may not be the 
best but, rather, a compromise position. Therefore, this type of 
IS is best suited to well-structured problem situations 
(Mitroff & Turoff (1975)]. As the problem of maritime fraud is 
not well- structured (see (a) above) this approach was not 
used. 
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c) Hegelian or Dialectical IS : is based on the premise that 
truth is conflictual, i. e. that the raw data set (the input 
in figure 6.2) can be transformed by two different models to 
produce diametrically opposing points of view (the output in 
figure 6.2). Mitroff & Turoff (1975) point out that in this 
approach it is presumed that conflict will expose the 
assumptions underlying an expert's point of view that are 
often obscured precisely because of disagreement among 
them. A very good example of this approach is the "Policy 
Delphi" introduced by Turoff (1970). This approach is best 
suited to problems where there is intense debate over the 
true nature of the problem. This approach was not used 
because there is general agreement as to the nature of the 
problem of maritime fraud [Ellen (1979a), Kerr (1979), 
Prakash (1981), Schultsz & Thomas (1983), & personal 
interviews with people working in the industry]. 
d) Singerian IS : assumes that truth is pragmatic, i. e. 
the model of a system is explicitly goal- or objective-, 
orientated. Mitroff & Turoff (1975) point out that this 
approach is the epitorne of synthetic multimodel 
interdisciplinary systems, i. e. ideal for the system of 
international trade. This approach has not been selected 
because it considers several different ways to achieve the 
objectives and at the end specifies new goals for further 
inquiry, i. e. it is non-terminating [Mitroff & Turoff (1975)] 
and is thus a never ending exercise. It would be extremely 
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difficult to get participants to co-operate in such a 
protracted exercise. 
e) Kantian IS : assumes that truth is synthetic, i. e. the 
empirical data (the input in figure 6.2) and the theoretical 
base (the model in figure 6.2) are inseparable. This means 
that the model is based on the empirical data and that the 
collection of the empirical data is based on some theoretical 
consideration. In other words, this approach requires a 
conceptual model of the system on which to work. An important 
feature of this approach is that it requires at least 
two alternative representations or models from which the 
most suitable one is then chosen [Mitroff & Turoff (1975), 
Vermuri (1978)]. The Kantian approach to Delphi attempts to 
elicit as many alternatives to the problem as possible in 
order to obtain a comprehensive overview of the problem and 
thus recommend the solutions to it. In order to achieve that 
it utilizes as many interdisciplinary specialists as are 
required by the nature of the system under consideration. 
This approach is best suited to ill-structured problems, i. e. 
those which defy formal or simple analytic attack,, for 
example, social problems. 
This approach was selected as the most suitable to study the 
problem maritime fraud because of 
i) the complexity of the problem, 
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ii) the international nature of the crime, 
iii) the canplex socio-political and economic aspects, and 
iv) the involvement of several disciplines. 
Ludlow (1971) points out that one of the most important benefits 
of using a multi-disciplinary group in Delphi exercises is a 
comprehensive coverage of a complex issue even though each 
respondent contributes a small part of the overall picture. 
6.6 screening Criteria for the Questionnaires 
in any survey which produces a wealth of data, sane screening 
criteria have to be adopted in order to reduce the data set to 
manageable proportions, to draw conclusions and to make 
recommendations. 
The Delphi technique seeks solutions to complex problems by 
soliciting the opinions of a group of interdisciplinary experts. 
In order to draw conclusions, one of the methods used is to seek 
consensus among the experts. To determine whether or not a 
consensus has been achieved any arbitrary figure could be used. 
For the purposes of the analysis of the first questionnaire an 
arbitrary figure of 80% was chosen as the "cut-off" point to 
determine consensus among the experts. This figure, i. e. 80%, 
was chosen because it represents a reasonably high proportion of 
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consensus among the members, taking into account the diversity 
of their experience and expertise. 
Confirmation of this arbitrary figure can never be fully 
justified. However, some justification can be achieved if the 
consensus of the majority votes for all the statements 
represents 80% of the total opinions expressed. This 
confirmation is sought in the analysis. 
Weisberg & Bowen (1977) point out that the no opinion category 
could be treated as 'hissing data" and excluded from analysis, 
provided it would not lead to misleading results, e. g. when this 
category is significantly large in comparison with the 
substantive categories. 
Due to the fact that the experience and expertise of the 
participants was so diverse, it was decided, for the first 
round to consider only those responses where the participants 
had expressed an opinion, i. e. agreement or disagreement. 
On the second and final round, more stringent criteria were used 
for screening of responses because the respondents were, on this 
occasion, comenting on the feedback from other experts. The 
screening criteria used on the second round are discussed fully 
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in chapter 8. 
6.7 Questionnaire Design 
The conceptual model developed in the last chapter was used to 
identify areas where modifications can be made to reduce the 
potential for fraud. The feasibility of these modifications and 
their capacity for reducing fraud had to be investigated by 
seeking the opinions of the legitimate participants of the 
system. 
To achieve this, the Delphi technique was used to solicit the 
opinions of a group of experts from different areas associated 
with international trade. The Delphi technique is e ssentially a 
series of structured questionnaires sent to a panel of 
respondents of diverse experience and expertise. 
Whilst questionnaires provide a structured approach, flexibility 
is built into the technique insofar as it is possible to contact 
the panelists should any of their responses require 
clarification, or resolution of problems caused by 
misunderstandings. This further consultation can be conducted by 
telephone, telex or personal interviews. 
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The first questionnaire was designed to focus on broad issues, 
such as : 
a) Has the Bill of Lading outlived its usefulness as a document 
of title 
b) Is there a case for banks to look into their practices for 
checking documents before payment ? 
c) Should the insurance industry be more stringent in their 
checks before accepting insurance 
Considering that the respondents were extreimely busy in their 
respective fields, and would not be prepared to respond if the 
questionnaire was too time consurning, it was decided that 
instead of answering questions, the panel would be asked to 
respond to a series of statements. A similar approach was used 
by Davies (1985). 
The respondents were asked to consider each statement. If they 
agreed with the statement or were unable to coment on it, they 
were asked to indicate this. If they disagreed with the 
statement, they were requested to make any alterations to the 
statements or add comments to indicate their view. The following 
format was used : 
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Qn. By 1995 the conventional Bill of AGREE 
Lading will be replaced by the 
"Electronic Bill of Lading" by DISAGREE 
the use of data interchange via 
computers. UNABLE TO COMMENT 
*0************0**00**0*****0*****0***0*******'0***'*****0 : *COMMENTS (if you disagree) 
.......................................................... 
once. the questionnaire was designed, a pilot study was carried 
out to test the questionnaire. Students on shipping postgraduate 
courses at the Plymuth Polytechnic were used as respondents for 
the pilot study. On the basis of their responses and subsequent 
coments the structure and layout of the questionnaire was 
altered and some questions were- deleted. It was decided to 
divide the questionnaire into three sections as follows : 
a) Section A- for testing the hypothesis, consisting of 
38 statements, and 
b) Sections B&C- for seeking information, consisting of 5 
statements. The reason for dividing the 
information seeking sections into two parts 
was that a different 'formatý was used in the 
two sections. 
The second draft of the questionnaire was prepared and sent to 
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Mr. E. Ellen, Director of the ICC - International Maritime 
Bureau (the collaborating establishmnt), for his comments. In 
subsequent discussions with Mr. Ellen, every statement was 
considered and alterations were made to simplify the wording of 
same statements. See Appendix 3 for the final draft of the 
questionnaire. 
6.8 Selection of the Panel 
It was pointed out in chapter 3 that when using the systems 
approach a system should not be examined in isolation. The 
reason for this is that the system interacts with other systems 
within its imnediate environment but outside the system's own 
boundaries. Therefore, to test the hypothesis that the weak 
links identified contribute to fraud (see chapter 5), the 
opinions of potential victims (i. e. elements within the 
boundaries of the system of international trade) and the 
investigating/prosecuting authorities (i. e. elements of other 
systems within the immediate environment of the system of 
international trade) was sought. 
Although developed sane 30 years ago, the Delphi technique is 
still in its infancy and Linstone & Turoff (1975) point out that 
"much still needs to be learned". one of the areas where there 
is still disagreement is on the number of panelists, e. g. Jain 
(1974) used 11, Davies (1985) used 38, and Ludlow (1971) had 
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three panels each with a different number - 33,16 & 22. 
To get a representative sample for this study, it was decided to 
use at least two experts from each component or sub-systern of 
the system of international trade, and at least one from each of 
the systems within the imrediate environment of the system. In 
addition, owing to the international nature of the system, the 
members of the panel were selected from as many countries as 
possible. 
61 letters were written to experts in the different areas 
associated with international trade, inviting them to take part 
in the research and assist in an in-depth study of the problem 
of Documentary maritime Fraud. It was stressed that anonymity of 
the panelists is of paramount importance and that the responses 
of the panelists would remain strictly confidential. See 
Appendix 2 for a copy of the letter. 
Favourable responses were received from the majority of the 
recipients. However, no responses were received from the experts 
chosen in the following countries : France, Greece, Japanj 
Switzerland, West Germany and the United States of krerica. In 
some cases, where the recipient felt that there was another 
person who would be better qualified to respond, either the 
letter was passed on to that person or the author was requested 
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to contact that person. 
one of the recipients established a panel of experts to 
formulate the responses to the questionnaire, himself acting as 
the chairman. In one case the recipient agreed to answer the 
questionnaire but not as a member of the panel. In another case 
the recipient felt that due to time constraints and the pressure 
of work he could not respond. 
When the minimum requirements for each category were fulfilled, 
the number of members who had agreed to participate was to 40, 
but 44 questionnaires were sent out as the remaining four had 
requested to see the questionnaire before agreeing to 
participate; in the end they declined to participate. 
Thus the panel was formed of 40 experts, representing 15 
categories and 11 countries. The countries represented were - 
Australia, Denmark, Deutsche Demokratische Republik (MR), Hong 
Kong, India, Malta, The Netherlands, People's Republic of China, 
Saudi Arabia, Singapore and the United Kingdom. Table 6.1 shows 
the 15 categories represented on the Panel and also the number 
of menbers selected for each category. 
A high response rate was expected as the participants had 
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formally agreed to co-operate by answering the questionnaires 
over -a period of some six to eight months. 
Table 6.1 : Categories and Number of Participants 
NO. LW=WLa NU* UY FAIMUIVANTS 
1 Academics 2 
2 Ancillary Services 4 
3 Banking Specialists 2 
4 Documentation 2 
5 Freight Forwarders 2 
6 Insurance Interests 5 
7 International Organisations 2 
8 Judiciary 1 
9 Lawyers 2 
10 Protection & Indemnity 2 
11 Security Forces 2 
12 Shipbrokers 4 
13 Shipowners 4 
14 Shippers 3 
15 Ship's Agents 3 
7KYrAL 40 
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Imagine a Cuisinart of human nature : toss in 
equal measures of knaves and fools, season to 
taste with avarice, gullibility, trust and 
inattention; stir and pour; you have a recipe for 
business fraud,, and the cooks are never idle. 
[Haight (1980)] 
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MMTER 7- ANALYSIS OF THE FIRST QUESTIONNAIRE 
7.1 Introduction 
The first round of questionnaires was posted in December 1985 to 
the members of the Expert Panel. See Appendix 3 for the 
questionnaire and the letter which accompanied it. To maintain 
anonymity the Panelists were given code numbers for 
identification purposes. 
Some of the responses to the questionnaire were not received by 
the deadline specified, necessitating follow up telephone calls 
and telex messages to reduce the number of non-responses to a 
minimum. Two members had to be sent another questionnaire as : 
a) in one case the response was lost in the post. The response 
was subsequently received from the member, and 
b) in the other case the member -did not receive the 
questionnaire. when no response was forthcoming after the 
second despatch, it was decided to delete this member from 
the Panel. 
As a result the size of the sample was reduced frorn 40 to 39, 
i. e. a response rate of 97.5%. The Panel size at the end of the 
first round is shown in table 7.1. All the tables for this 
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chapter have been placed at the end of this chapter. 
Upon receipt of the completed questionnaires, the data were 
analysed in two parts. The hypothesis testing section was 
analysed separately from the information seeking sections. Table 
7.2 shows the responses received to the 38 statements in Section 
A. As pointed out in the last chapter, due to the fact that the 
experience and expertise of the participants was so diverse, 
only those responses were considered where the participants had 
expressed an opinion, i. e. agreement or disagreement. Table 7.3 
shows the percentage in terms of opinions expressed. 
on the basis of the screening criteria discussed in the last 
chapter, the first questionnaire was analysed using 80% as the 
"cut-off" point to determine whether the replies of the Panel 
supported the hypothesis or did not support it. As mentioned in 
the last chapter, choice of an arbitrary figure can never be 
fully justified but some- justification of the choice can be 
achieved if the consensus of the majority opinions for all 
statements represents 80%. For Section A this justification was 
carried out as follows 
The number of responses which represented a majority opinion for 
each statement in table 7.3, whether agreeing or disagreeing, 
were added together for all the statements in the section, and 
the total number of opinions expressed for each statement was 
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also calculated. Then the average percentage of the majority 
opinions was worked out as follows : 
Average percent Majority Agreements + Majority Disagreements 
of majority 
opinions Total opinions expressed 
The breakdown of the figures for table 7.3 is given below : 
Number of majority opinions agreeing 933 
Number of majority opinions disagreeing = 101 
Total number of majority opinions = 1,034 
Total number of opinions expressed = 1,293 
Therefore, 
Average percent 1,034 
of majority =-= 7§. 97% 
opinions 1,293 
It is submitted that the choice of 80% as the cut-off point was 
therefore justified. Thus any statement which had a majority 
opinion of 80% or over was said to have either supported or not 
supported the hypothesis. Statements on which the consensus 
among the experts was less than 80% were to be included in the 
second questionnaire to determine the importance of the 
disagreements between the experts, see figure 7.1. 
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USE ANALYSIS OF FRAUD CASE 
DATABASE TO FORM HYPOTHESIS 
I 
DEVELOP FIRST QUESTIONNAIRE 
REPLIES 
AGREE DISAGREE UNABLE TO COMMENT 
END 
> 
to% ih 
> 80% 
11 
CONSIDER CONSIDER 
HYPOTHESIS HYPOTHESIS 
SUPPORTED NOT SUPPORTED, 
II 
END END 
TO SEEK CLARIFICATION 
DEVELOP SECOND QUESTIONNAIRE 
Figure 7.1 - Flow Diagram Explaining Analysis of the First 
Questionnaire 
7.2 Analyids of Section A 
Some important points were raised by the experts on the 
statements where 80% or more consensus was reached. Their 
comments are given below and the percentage of consensus reached 
is stated after the statement. 
1. Considering the known and/or suspected cases of maritime 
fraud over the last decý-e (1975 - 1985) the pattern 
which has emerged indicates a considerable increase in 
the number of cases with an increase in the sums of 
money involved per case. (80.56% agree with the statement) 
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0 it r ived frcm the Panel 
overall profitability and stability of the 
market prior to 1975 resulted in many cases not 
being reported, hence it is impossible to assess 
any increase. 
Factors which could account for changes in the 
number of cases reported and their monetary value 
include : increase in trade, increase in prices, 
increase in reporting and increase in publicity 
given to the subject. 
Reported cases have decreased in number since 
their height in 1979 - 80. 
Where containerised cargo is involved fraud is 
rare. In the few cases we have experienced the 
sums involved per case have increased during the 
last decade. 
Increase is perhaps due to improved methods of 
detection. 
While one member of the Panel believes that growing awareness 
has held the positfon static, another member is of the opinion 
that growing awareness and action taken with the help of the 
ICC-International Maritime Bureau and the Commonwealth 
Commercial Crime Unit has resulted in the increase in the number 
of cases coming to light. 
6. It is too easy to change the name, ownership and port of 
registry of a vessel without proof of cancellation of the 
previous registry. (88.89% agree with the statement) 
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Comments received fran the Panel 
In those countries where "proof of cancellation" 
is not required, other safeguards are taken. 
Nowadays you need to cancel one Register 
(deletion certificate) before the 
Re-registration certificate will be issued 
elsewhere. This has not always been so, but 
presently all countries are very particular about 
this point. 
7. It is too easy to register sub-standard vessels, the 
so-called "rust bucketsul, in some countries without 
surveys for seaworthiness. (93.55% agree with the statement) 
Ccmrjents received from the Panel 
National standards regarding ships surveys vary 
from state to state as do the requirements to be 
fulfilled prior to registration of the vessel in 
the state concerned. It is easier in sorne 
countries than others to register vessels. So far 
as I am aware it is not the deliberate policy of 
any state to allow so-called "unseaworthy 
vessels" on their registry. 
In view of the above comment it is interesting to note that 
one member of the Panel has named Honduras and Panama as the 
countries where it is easy to register. 
8. In some countries it is too easy to register a conpany with 
complete anonymity for the directors, either by the use of 
foreign nominees or otherwise. (93.75 agree with the 
statement) 
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Camments received from the Panel 
One member said that it is also too easy to move 
around and open new companies after bankruptcy. 
9. The lack of harmonisation in international laws and 
procedures is exploited by ccnaercial criminals. (97.22% 
agree with the statement) 
rA -its received from the Panel 
Cannot accept what you are leading to i. e. 
complete standardisation, will reduce cormercial 
crime. 
10. In some trading countries the judiciary is not sufficiently 
familiar with the concepts of maritime laws. (96.55% agree 
with the statement) 
Ccments received from the Panel 
Especially the Arab countries and the Third 
World. 
11. The present system of a lay jury is inadequate in ccrmnercial 
fraud cases. (87.5% agree with the statement) 
Comments received from the Panel 
A jury can deal adequately with commercial fraud, 
provided that the case is competently presented 
and explained to them. 
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I believe a lay jury is adequate but they should 
select jurymen/wanen who have a corwercial 
background from the normal jury panel. 
Although I agree it is surprising that complex 
commercial frauds tried before the 7 mmber jury 
in the Hong Kong jurisdiction during recent years 
have resulted in verdicts of guilty. 
It was reported that there was no jury system in India and 
Singapore. 
12. The international nature of shipping and the lack of 
jurisdiction outside national boundaries assist the 
perpetrators of fraud to flourish. (97.44% agree with the 
statement) 
Ccmnents r ived fran the Panel 
In practical terms it is possible to achieve 
jurisdiction in almost all cases. Whether the 
place of jurisdiction is then effective is 
another matter. 
1-3. The majority of frauds are caused by the lack of proper 
checks carried out by the parties involved in international 
trade transactions. (91.89% agree with the statement) 
Comments received from the Panel 
I doubt if fraud can be wholly prevented no 
matter how much checking is carried out 
beforehand. 
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Some frauds are so well done that even the 
"experts" are taken in. 
Ignorance of and disregard for the basic 
principles and precautions is the root of many 
frauds. 
Most victims of fraud are the needy and the 
greedy. The first are naive, the latter blind in 
sight of a fast buck. 
14b. The ship owner/operator details are not checked properly by 
the Shipper/Freight Forwarder before entering into a 
contract of carriage. (88.46% agree with the statement) 
Comments received fran the Panel 
Sorm forwarders are better than others ! Also 
size of transactions is a determining factor. 
The shipper is often far away from the port and 
depends on the forwarder to protect his 
interests. 
17. The lack of coomercial expertise on the part of the State 
Trading Organisations of developing countries has made them 
targets of the fraudsters. (96.55% agree with the 
statement) 
Comments received from the Panel 
Is it the lack of or the disregard of ccmmrcial 
expertise ? 
In addition to the above (i. e. the original 
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statement), all too often governmental 
requirements of inviting tenders and automatic 
acceptance of the lowest tender. 
18. The need to cut costs has made buyers & shippers targets of 
the unscrupulous brokers, sellers, shipowners & forwarding 
agents. (90.00% agree with the statement) 
Ccments received fran the Panel 
The merchants' search for the louest prices has 
encouraged the trend to "cut price" services and 
thus opened the door to the unscrupulous. 
All organisations need to cut costs and this 
requirement does not make one party in the trade 
transaction more vulnerable to fraud. It should 
be appreciated, however, that cut price services 
may result in a higher risk. As in all aspects of 
trade people, generally, get what they are 
prepared to pay for. Too low a price, perhaps, 
equals too high a risk. 
If you deal with third class operators it will be 
anyhow more expensive in the long run. 
Sheer greed is another factor which must be 
taken into account. 
20. The acceptance of commercial malpractices and,, at times, 
fraudulent practices as custom of the trade, in sane 
c0untrieS. has contributed to the growth in doctinentary 
fraud. (96.43% agree with the statement) 
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Cconents received frm the Panel 
I know of few countries that accept this. 
officials within countries, yes. 
This practice is prevalent especially in India 
and saw third world countries. 
Examples of this practice include : 
- Issuing of an indemnity for not clausing 
transport documents 
- Delivery of cargo without presentation of 
suitable documentation of identification 
- Insistence by certain shippers on signing 
documents on behalf of the ship's master. 
26. The carrying out of the following checks, before payment is 
made under docm-mentary credits, would provide adequate 
protection against fraud (the cost of these services would 
be borne by the applicant requesting them at the time of 
opening the credit; the bank will carry out the checks 
without incurring any additional liability) : 
a) Check the vessel's particulars, i. e. name, port of 
registry, ownership, and axnpare the deadweight with the 
quantity of cargo stated in the Bill of Lading. 
(85.29% agree with the statement) 
b) Check the vessel's geographical position at the time of 
loading. (88.24% agree with the statement) 
Comments received fran the Panel 
These checks would make fraud more difficult but 
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would not provide adequate protection. 
Banks are neither willing nor canpetent enough to 
provide this service. 
The cost of the service will also be a prime 
consideration. 
Name, ownership and deadweight may all be 
irrelevant to the supporting documents, e. g. 
name changed as requirement of Time Charter, 
documents issued by operator or space/slot 
charterer, and part cargo loaded. 
In many cases the bank is too late in the chain. 
It is the shipper's responsibility to do this as 
soon as possible. If he cannot do this himself, 
he will have to consider who best can help, e. g. 
bank, his forwarder, etc. What detail of 
information is required will depend on the type 
and value of transaction, and newness of the 
parties.. 
27. rcial crime, including conspiracy to comit fraud, 
should be created as a universal crime by an international 
convention and should be made an extraditable offence. 
(91.67% agree with the statement) 
mnents received from the Panel 
I't would take too long to achieve an 
international convention. Instead why not form 
closer and less formal links between police, 
fraud investigation units and prosecutors. 
Ccmnercial crime is not so serious that it should 
be treated like piracy, so that any State has 
jurisdiction. 
Will never be supported by national legal bodies. 
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Conspiracy to defraud, if fraud is carried out 
wholly overseas, is not an offence in this 
country (. i. e. U. K. ). 
Many countries do include the offence of fraud as 
an extraditable offence. Britain is one of the 9 countries that excludes an offence of conspiracy 
to defraud as an extraditable offence. U. S. A. and 
Japan in their treaty include conspiracy to 
defraud as extraditable. 
28. In the event of a conviction in commercial crime, a policy 
of much heavier sentences should be adopted. (83.33% agree 
with the statement) 
Coments received frcn the Panel 
Comvercial criminals should not be subject to 
any greater or lesser rule of law than other 
classes of criminals. 
The penalty should be a matter for the judge to 
decide taking into consideration ALL the 
circumstances related to the offence(s) and 
background etc. of the convicted person(s). 
Length of prison sentence does little or nothing 
to dissuade criminals - it is the prospects of 
being caught and convicted which matter. 
30. The penalty for conmercial, criminals should be seizure of 
all assets frcxn the proceeds of the crime. The burden of 
proving that some of his assets are not frcm the crime 
should rest with the criminal. (97.22% agree with the 
statement) 
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Cbmuents received frm the Panel 
This concept has been introduced in respect of 
drug offences in some countries. Although I agree 
with the statement, it would be difficult to 
convince the legislature that commercial 
criminals should be treated differently from 
other criminals. 
It nmst be remembered that this will not work 
unless all the countries concerned are prepared 
to co-operate. 
34. Procedures for changing a ship's name should be more heavily 
supervised as a quick change of name suggests fraudulent 
intent. (81.82% agree with the statement) 
Comnents received frm the Panel 
Too sweeping a statement, but agree procedures 
should be more stringent. 
In liner trades names are frequently changed in 
order to maintain fleet identity on chartered 
ships -a legitimate marketing tool. 
A series of quick changes suggest sharp practice 
somewhere but not necessarily fraud. Bureaucracy 
involved in name change may slow down 
confirmations and make things worse. 
35. Every ship should be issued with a unique international ship 
identification number which will remain the same throughout 
the life of a vessel regardless of changes of name, 
ownership or nationality. (87.88% agree with the 
statement) 
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Oxwoents received fran the Panel 
Each ship already has a unique identification 
number, issued by Lloyd's Register. The wider 
utilisation of this could prove useful. 
36. The introduction of a system of port classification in 
accordance with levels of cargo losses will increase port 
security, and will also highlight high security risk ports. 
(87.5% agree with the statement) 
Ccauents received from the Panel 
Insurers already know high security risk ports. 
They are the only ones who can apply sanctions in 
the form of loaded premiums. Any other system 
would certainly upset countries, since security 
is largely common sense and therefore a matter of 
opinion. 
Underwriters should be pressured to apply 
punitive ratings to bad ports. 
The classification system would become impossible 
to maintain and lead to extensive problems. 
7.2.1 Statement Deleted 
32. The introduction of a difficult-to-forge Bill of Lading, 
with unique serial numbers, will provide a secure means of 
preventing fraud. 
Over 50% of the experts disagreed with the statement, and one of 
the experts pointed out that the ICC - IMB working group working 
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on this topic have recommended dropping the idea. In view of 
this it was decided to delete the question and not to consider 
it on the second round. The objections raised by the Panel 
were : 
Some excellent forged banknotes are regularly 
produced by expert forgers. I see no reason why 
any B/L could not be reproduced if the stakes 
were high enough. 
This would certainly increase costs for those not 
directly responsible and also cause delays. 
Theft of blank copies can still occur. 
Some carriers have already introduced facets 
within their transport documents which make them 
impossible to photocopy. To this extent 
"difficult-to-forgell docuimnts are already with 
us. The unique numbering scheme would add nothing 
to this in reducing or preventing fraud. 
It is too dif f icult 
. and 
too costly and no one 
will be willing to fund. 
it might lead buyers to neglect essential 
precautions including pre-contract stage checks. 
Would leave everyone putting too mch trust in 
documents. 
7.3 Analysis of Sections B&C 
Table 7.4 shows the responses received to the statements in 
sections B ad C. As these were information seeking sections and 
the format of sections B and C was different each section was 
analysed separately. As pointed out in the last chapter, due to 
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the fact that the experience and expertise of the participants 
was so diverse, only those responses were considered where the 
participants had expressed an opinion, i. e agreement or 
disagreement. The only exceptions to this rule were statement 
numbers 41 and 43 because of their different format. Table 7.5 
shows the percentage in terms of opinions expressed for all the 
statements except statement numbers 41 and 43. 
Justification for the 80% "cut-off" figure was again confirmed 
for Sections B and C. The number of responses which represented 
a majority opinion in table 7.5, whether agreeing or disagreeing 
were added together for all the statements and in the two 
sections, and the total number of opinions expressed for each 
statement was also calculated. Then the average percentage of 
the majority opinions expressed was worked out. The breakdown of 
the figures for table 7.5 is given below 
Number of majority opinions agreeing 193 
Number of majority opinions disagreeing 16 
Total number of majority opinions 209 
Total number of opinions expressed 279 
Therefore, 
Average percent 209 
of majority -- = 74.9% 
opinions 278 
It is submitted that this calculation again justifies the 
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choice of 80% as the "cut-off" point. However, as the format of 
the statements in Section B and C was different, this*screening 
criterion was applied to every substatement in these sections. 
7.3.1 Section B 
Statement 39 was designed to seek details of information which, 
the experts felt, would assist in combating fraud. Information 
was considered under the following headings : 
a) 
b) 
C) 
d) 
e) 
f) 
Ship Details 
Ownership Details 
Charterer's Details (including sub-charterers) 
Shipper's Details 
Broker/Agent Details 
Company Details 
CcnTnercial Details 
The experts were asked to indicate which iterns under each . 
heading would be required to combat fraud. They were also asked 
to indicate any other items which they felt should be included 
under the different headings. 
Tables 7.6a - 7.6g show the analysis of the responses for each 
item under the various headings. It was pointed out in the last 
section that the screening criterion of 80% was applied to each 
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sub-statement in this section. From tables 7.6a - 7.6g it can be 
seen that there was a consensus of 80% or more for every item. 
Some of the comments received from the experts are disagreeing 
are given below because they raise some important points : 
Details of Ship Insurance 
Shipowner's protection is his own affair. Some of 
the larger companies are self-insured. 
Such disclosure infringes Shipowner's rights to 
privacy and confidentiality. 
Creditworthiness/Reputation/Track Record 
Extremely difficult to make a true, unbiased 
opinion. Also errors would lead to peoples' 
characters being besmirched, for which one could 
be sued for defamation. 
This will set dangerous precedent. 
Who decided these factors and how are they 
measured ? 
Creditworthiness can vary-from day to day. 
Track record does not necessarily indicate 
owner's reliability as master's and manager's 
personal attitude affects this point. 
Good but question practicability, and from 
experience would question the validity of 
creditworthiness/reputation information. 
Subjective judgements. Strongly agree with the 
need to obtain credit opinions but those opinions 
are not facts. 
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P&I Cover for Shippers 
P&I is a carriers/charterers cover, not a 
shipper's. 
In view of this, this item was deleted. However, as quite a few 
experts agreed with the item, it indicates that there is a 
general lack of knowledge on this point. 
Conpany Details 
Knowledge of share capital does not help much as 
current asset value may be totally different. 
Knowledge of the names and addresses of 
shareholders does not help much unless a known 
dubious individual appears. 
Comercial Details 
All these items can be secret information which 
if disclosed, could affect shipper's selling or 
buying ability. 
Sane of these points could destroy 
confidentiality which is important in many cases. 
On the positive side, some of the points that the experts felt 
should be included under the various headings are listed below : 
Ship Details 
Last fixture and name of charterer; bale capacity; voyage 
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route; last drydock - wben and where; main bunker supplier; 
the ship's position in port to also include berth name/number; 
insurance details to include underwriter's name. 
Charterer's Details 
Bunker suppliers; length of time in present business; credit 
analysis. 
Shipper's Details 
Length of time in present business. 
Broker/Agent Details 
Length of time in present business; reference fran principals; 
liability cover if not entered in CISBA/TIM; check that annual 
returns lodged in accordance with Companies Act. 
COnPany Details 
Authorised and paid up share capital; last balance sheet; 
details of directors; name and address of legal advisors. 
277 
Ccnuercial Details 
Governing law; who endorses Bill of Lading; letter of credit and 
bank details. 
7.3.2 Section C 
This section consisted of 4 statements seeking information on : 
a) Causes of increase in maritime fraud; 
b) Mich type of maritime crime has caused the greatest 
financial loss; 
c) Reasons why fraud cases are not reported; and 
d) Adequacy of available information. 
Statenent 40 
Table 7.7 analyses the responses relating to the increase in 
maritime fraud during the period 1975 - 85 due to a combination 
of causes. Whilst nearly 20% disagreed with statement g, it must 
be pointed out that some insurers agreed with it. 
In the request for additional causes the following comments were 
received : 
In the case of the United Kingdom, the repeal of 
the Exchange Control legislation, which makes it 
easy to transfer funds. 
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Fraudsters getting more imaginitive, better 
educated and understanding the opportunities, 
whilst victims remaining naive, not sufficiently 
trained and not cautious. 
Fraudsters fully aware of the inadequacies or 
absence of extradition treaties between even 
major trading countries, and also of the problems 
of jurisdiction. 
Lack of law enforcement activity and failure to 
apply penal restrictions. 
Same countries not prepared to bear the sometimes 
expensive cost of an investigation and 
prosecution. 
Ease and cheapness of air travel. 
We are trying to operate space age systems with 
the laws of wooden ships and iron men. 
Adherence to a "my word is my bond" philosophy 
in a trading environment where this can no longer 
be true. 
Increased involvement of State Trading 
Organisations with no traditions and little 
experience in seaborne trade. 
Ease of entry by unscrupulous practitioners in 
the market place. 
Statenent 41 
The responses to this statement are shown in table 7.8. This 
table shows that the subject of this research, documentary 
fraud, has caused the greatest financial loss. 
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However, two experts pointed out that in their opinion 
cube-cutting/tariff manipulation caused the greatest financial 
loss, because it is going on all the tim, so that the sheer 
magnitude of incidents outstrips the few larger cases of other 
types of fraud. They also pointed out that it continues because 
it gets little attention. 
One of the experts quite rightly pointed out that Arson, 
Insurance Fraud and Scuttling were all connected. However, they 
were kept separate to identify the importance that could be 
attached to these specific cases of insurance fraud. From the 
analysis it appears that scuttling cases have not caused any 
greater losses than other types of insurance frauds. 
Statenent 42 
Table 7.9 shows the analysis of the responses relating to the 
reasons why fraud cases are not reported by the victims. From 
the analysis it will be seen that statements c and d should be 
deleted as the consensus among the experts was less than 80%. 
Some of the other reasons 
reporting fraud cases are : 
- Loss of face or pride. 
given by the experts for not 
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- Cost of pursuing a claim. 
- To hide the fact that one was so naive as to be defrauded. 
- Fear of being sued for defamation unless the facts are clear 
cut. 
One of the experts said that : 
The most important consideration for the victim 
in over 90% of the cases is whether reporting to 
the authorities will result in their recovering 
either all or part of their financial 
losses. They are not usually concerned about 
apprehension and prosecution of the offenders 
except when they think it will assist in such 
recovery. 
Statement 43 
The analysis of statements relating to the adequacy of the 
information is shown in table 7.9. In the "Others, please specify" 
category about 18% of the experts claimed that all the necessary 
information is available but is not taken up or investigated 
because of naivety, ignorance, and laziness. 
Some of the other coments received frcxn the Panel are : 
Bankers tend to give references on clients who 
may be heavily involved already, which protects 
their viability without divulging the extent of 
their existing commitments. 
There is lack of real, deep co-operation between 
the various organisations disseminating 
information. 
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The naive belief that such comprehensive 
information service can be provided at no cost, 
to anyone who cared to ask. Such information is a 
strong incentive attracting membership and hence 
each organisation serves its own members only. 
Up-to-date flag registration details are not 
readily available, thus widely published 
information may not be reliable. 
The information is not designed to be or could be 
designed to prevent fraud. 
Information takes too long to obtain in a trading 
environment where deals are finalised within a 
very short time scale. 
The statements on which 80% consensus was not achieved were used 
to develop the second questionnaire. The design and analysis of 
the second questionnaire is considered in the next chapter. 
Table 7.1 : Categories and Number of Participants at the end 
of the first round 
No. CATEGORY NO. OF PARTICIPANTS 
1 Academics 2 
2 Ancillary Services 4 
3 Banking Specialists 2 
4 Documentation 2 
5 Freight Forwarders 2 
6 Insurance Interests 5 
7 International Organisations 2 
8 Judiciary 1 
9 Lawyers 2 
10 Protection & Indemnity 2 
11 Security Forces 2 
12 Shipbrokers 4 
13 Shipowners 4 
14 Shippers 3 
15 Ship's Agents (- 1) 2 
TOTAL 39 
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TABLE 7.2 - ANALYSIS OF QUESTIONNAIRE NO. 1- SECTION A 
STATE, - 
MENT No. 
A 
No. 
GREE 
% 
DISAGREE 
No. % 
UNABLE TO COMMENT 
No. % 
1 29 (74.36) 7 (17.95) 3 ( 7.69) 
2 9 (23.08) 23 (58.97) 7 (17.95) 
3 7 (17.95) 19 (48.72) 13 (33.33) 
4 18 (46.15)- 5 (12.82) 16 (41.03) 
5 15 (38.46) 4 (10.26) 20 (51.28) 
6 24 (61.54) 3 ( 7.69) 12 (30.77) 
7 29 (74.36) 2 ( 5.13) 8 (20.51) 
8 30 (76.92) 2 ( 5.13) 7 (17.95) 
9 35 (89.74) 1 ( 2.56) 3 ( 7.69) 
10 28 (71.79) 1 ( 2.56) 10 (25.64) 
11 28 (71.79) 4 (10.26) 7 (17.95) 
12 38 (97.44) 1 ( 2.56) 0 ( 0.00) 
13 34 (87.18) 3 ( 7.69) 2 ( 5.13) 
14a 17 (43.59) 6 (15.38) 16 (41.03) 
14b 23 (58.97) 3 ( 7.69) 13 (33.33) 
14c 12 (30.77) 6 (15.38) 21 (53.85) 
14d 18 (46.15) 5 (12.82) 16 (41.03) 
15 14 (35.90) 9 (23.08) 16 (41.03) 
16 26 (66.66) 9 (23.08) 4 (10.26) 
17 28 (71.79) 1 ( 2.56) 10 (25.64) 
18 27 (69.23) 3 ( 7.69) 9 (23.08) 
1-9 25 (64.10) 9 (23.08) 5 (12.82) 
20 27 (69.23) 1 ( 2.56) 11 (28.21) 
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TABLE 7.2 CONTINUED 
STATE- 
MENT No. 
A 
No. 
GREE 
% 
DISAGREE 
No. % 
UNABLE TO COMMENT 
No. % 
21 7 (17.95) 14 (35.90) 18 (46.15) 
22 11 (28.20) 14 (35.90) 14 (35.90) 
23 22 (56.41) 12 (30.77) 5 (12.82) 
24 20 (51.28) 8 (20.51) 11 (28.21) 
25 26 (66.66) 10 (25.64) 3 ( 7.69) 
26a 29 (74.36) 5 (12.82) 5 (12.82) 
26b 30 (76.92) 4 (10.26) 5 (12.82) 
26c 26 (66.67) 7 (17.95) 6 (15.38) 
27 33 (84.62) 3 ( 7.69) 3 ( 7.69) 
28 25 (64.10) 5 (12.82) 9 (23.08) 
29 13 (33.33) 15 (38.46) 11 (28.21) 
30 35 (89.74) 1 ( 2.56) 3 ( 7.69) 
31 20 (51.28) 12 (30.77) 7 (17.95) 
32 15 (38.46) 16 (41.03) 8 (20.51) 
33 17 (43.59) 8 (20.51) 14 (35.90) 
34 27 (69.23) 6 (15.38) 6 (15.38) 
35 29 (74.36) 4 (10.26) 6 (15.38) 
36 28 (69.23) 4 (10.26) 7 (17.95) 
37 
- 
24 (61.54) 9 (23.08) 6 (15.38) 
T8- 17 (43.59) 14 (35.90) 8 (20.51) 
aý"I ý)' -, 11,77 
284 
TABLE 7.3 - ANALYSIS OF OPINIONS EXPRESSED IN SECTION A 
STATE- 
MENT No. 
AGREE 
No. % 
DISAGREE 
No. % 
OPINIONS EXPRESSED 
No. % 
1 29*(80.56) 7 (19.44) 36 (92.31) 
2 9 (28.13) 23*(71.87) 32 (82.05) 
3 7 (26.92) 19*(73.08) 26 (66.67) 
4 18*(78.26) 5 (21.74) 23 (58.97) 
5 15*(78.95) 4 (21.05) 19 (48.72) 
6 24*(88.89) 3 (11.11) 27 (69.23) 
7 29*(93.55) 2 ( 6.45) 31 (79.49) 
8 30*(93.75) 2 ( 6.25) 32 (82.05) 
9 35*(97.22) 1 ( 2.78) 36 (92.31) 
10 28*(96.55) 1 ( 3.45) 29 (74.36) 
1.1 28*(87.50) 4 (12.50) 32 (82.05) 
12 38*(97.44) 1 ( 2.56) 39 (100.0) 
13 34*01.0-) 3 ( 8.11) 37 ( 94.87) 
14a 17*(73.91) 6 (26.09) 23 (58.97) 
14b 23*(88.46) 3 (11.54) 26 (66.67) 
14c 12*(66.67) 6 (33.33) 18 (46.15) 
Ad 18*(78.26) 5 (21.74) 23 (58.97) 
15 14*(60.87) 9 (39.13) 23 (58.97) 
16 26*(74.29) 9 (25.71) 35 (89.74) 
17 28*(96.55) 1 ( 3.45) 29 (74.36) 
18 27*(90.00) 3 (10.00) 30 (76.92) 
19 25*(73.53) 9 (26.47) 34 (87.18) 
20 27*(96.43) 1 ( 3.57) 28 (71.79) 
MAJORITY 
1- 20 525 42 668 
OPINIONS 
EXPRESSED 
*- Majority opinions for each statement 
285 
TABLE 7.3 CONTINUED 
STATE- 
MENT No. 
AGREE 
No. % 
DISAGREE 
No. % 
OPINIONS EXPRESSED 
No. % 
21 7 (33.33) 14*(66.67) 21 (53.85) 
22 11 (44.00) 14* (56.00) 25 (64.10) 
23 22*(64.71) 12 (35.29) 34 (87.18) 
24 20*(71.43) 8 (28.57) 28 . (71.79) 
25 26*(72.22) 10 (27.78) 36 (92.31) 
26a 29*(85.29) 5 (14.71) 34 (87.18) 
26b 30*(88.24) 4 (11.76) 34 (87.18) 
26c 26*(78.79) 7 (21.21) 33 (84.62) 
27 33*(91.67) 3 ( 8.33) 36 (92.31) 
28 25*(83.33) 5 (16.67) 30 (76.92) 
29 13 (46.43) 15*(53.57) 28 (71.79) 
30 35*(97.22) 1 ( 2.78) 36 (92.31) 
31 20*(62.50) 12 (37.50) 32 (82.05) 
32 15 (48.39-) 16*(51.61) 31 (79.49) 
33 17*(68.00) 8 (32.00) 25 (64.10) 
34 27*(81.82) 6 (18.18) 33 (84.62) 
35 29*(87.88) 4 (12.12) 33 (84.62) 
36 28*(87.50) 4 (12.50) 32 (82.05) 
37 24*(72.73) 9 (27.27) 33 (84.62) 
38 17*(54.84) 14 (45.16) 31 (79.49) 
MAJORITY 
21 - 38 408 59 
OPINIONS 
625 EXPRESSED 
MAJORITY 
1- 20 525 42 
OPINIONS 
668 EXPRESSED 
TOTAL 
MAJORITY 
1- 38 
933 101 
70TAL 
1,293 OPINIONS 
EXPRESSED 
*- Majority opinions for each statement 
286 
TABLE 7.4 - ANALYSIS OF QUESTIONNAIRE NO. 1- SECTIONS B&C 
STATFr- 
MENT No. 
A 
No. 
GREE 
% 
DISAGREE 
No. % 
UWU3LE TO CX144ENT 
No. % 
39a 27 (69.23) 4 (10.26) 8 (20.51) 
39b 22 (56.41) 8 (20.51) 9 (23.08) 
39c 23 (58.97) 8 (20.51) 8 (20.51) 
39d 24 (61.54) 9 (23.08) 6 (15.38) 
39e 24 (61.54) 7 (17.95) 8 (20.51) 
39f 24 (61.54) 3 ( 7.69) 12 (30.77) 
39g 26 (66.66) 3 ( 7.69) 10 (25.64) 
40 23 (58.97) 13 (33.33) 3 ( 7.69) 
41 CP2; CC2; DL1; DE3; Dl3; I3; S3 12 (30.77) 
42 15 (38.46) 1 16 (41.03) 8 (20.51) 
43 1-9; 2-3; 3-7; 4-10; 5-19; 6-10 5 (12.82) 
Key to Statements 41 & 43 in Table 7.4 
Statement 41 * 
CP - Charter Party Fraud 
CC - Cube-cutting/Tariff manipulation 
DL - Deliberate Liquidation 
DE - Deviation/Illegal Sale of Cargo 
D- Documentary Fraud 
I- Insurance Fraud 
S- Ship Scuttling 
Statonent 43 ** 
I- Information not readily available 
2- Information is not reliable 
3- Information is too expensive to obtain 
4- Information is not available to all interested parties 
5- Information is not adequate for preventing fraud 
6- Others, please specify 
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TABLE 7.5 - ANALYSIS OF OPINIONS EXPRESSED IN SECTIONS B&C 
STATE- 
MENr No. 
AGRE 
No. 
E 
% 
DISAGREE 
No. % 
OPINIONS EXPRESSED 
No. % 
39a 27*(87 . 10) 
4 (12.90) 31 (79.49) 
39b 22*(73 . 33) 8 (26.67) 
30 (76.92) 
39c 23*(73 . 19) 8 (25.81) 
31 (79.49) 
39d 24*(72 . 73) 9 (27.27) 
33 (84.62) 
39e 24*(77 . 42) 7 (22.58) 
31 (79.49) 
39f 24*(88 . 89) 3 (11.11) 
27 (69.23) 
39g 26*(89 . 66) 3 (10.34) 29 (74.36) 
40 23*(63 . 89) 13 (36.11) 
36 (92.31) 
42 15 (48.39) 16*(51.61) 31 (79.49) 
TOTAL 
MWORITY 193 16 279 
TOTAL OPINIONS 
IR SED 
*- Majority opinions for each statement 
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TABLE 7.6a - ANALYSIS OF STATEMENT NO. 39a 
STATE- A GREE DISAGREE OPINIONS EXPRESSED 
MENT' 39a No. % No. % No. 31 = 79.49% 
1 31 (100.0) - (-) Ship's Name 
2 31 (100.0) - (-) Former Name(s) 
3 31 (100.0) - (-) official Number 
4 31 (100.0) - (-) Call Sign 
5 31 (100.0) - (-) Port of Registry 
6 31 (100.0) - (-) Type of Ship 
7 30 (96.77) 1 ( 3.23) Age 
8 31 (100.0) - (-) G. F. T. 
9 31 (100.0) - (-) Deadweight 
10 31 (100.0) - (-) Classification Details 
11 27 (87.10) 4 (12.90) Details of Insurance 
12 28 (90.32) 3 9.68) Details of P&I Cover 
13 31 (100.0)- - Position of Ship at 
the time of loading 
14 30 (96.77) 1 3.23) Details of Agent 
TABLE 7.6b - ANALYSIS OF STATEMENT NO. 39b 
STATE- A GREE DISAGREE OPINIONS EXPRESSED 
MENT 39b No. % No. % No. 30 = 76.92% 
1 28 (93.33) 2 ( 6.67) Name, Address, Tel. & 
Telex Nos. of : 
- Registered Owner 
- Beneficial owner 
- Operator/Manager 
2 27 (90.00) 3 (10.00) Names of vessels owned 
3 25 (83.33) 5 (16.67) Creditworthiness 
4 25 (83.33) 5 (16.67) Reputation 
5 24 (80.00) 6 (20.00) Track/Claims Record 
6 27 (90.00) 3 (10.00) P&I Cover Details 
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TABLE 7.6c - ANALYSIS OF STATEMENT NO. 39c 
STATE- 
MEW 39c 
AGREE 
No. % 
DISAGREE 
No. % 
OPINIONS EXPRESSED 
No. 31 = 79.49% 
1 30 (96.77) 1 ( 3.23) Name, Address, Tel. & 
Telex Nos. of the 
Charterer 
2 26 (83.87) 5 (16.13) Creditworthiness 
3 27 (87.10) 4 (12.90) Reputation 
4 26 (83.87) 5 (16.13) Track/Claims Record 
5 27 (87.10) 4 (12.90) Names of chartered 
ships 
6 29 (93.55) 2 6.45) P&I Cover Details 
7 31 (100.0) Charterer's Agent 
TABLE 7.6d - ANALYSIS OF STATEMENT NO. 39d 
STATE- 
MENT 39d 
AGREE 
bb. % 
DISAGREE 
No. % 
OPINIONS EXPRESSED 
No. 33 = 84.62% 
1 33 (100.0) - Name-, Address, Tel. & 
Telex Nos. of the 
Shipper 
2 29 (87.88) 4 (12.12) Creditworthiness 
3 29 (87e88) 4 (12.12) Reputation 
4 29 (87.88) 4 (12.12) Track Record 
5 29 (87.89-) 4 (12.12) P&I Cover Details 
6 31 (93.94) 2 ( 6.06) Shipper's Agent 
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TABLE 7.6e - ANALYSIS OF STATEMENT NO. 39e 
STATE- A GREE DISAGREE OPINIONS EXPRESSED 
MENT 39e No. % No. % No. 31 = 79.49% 
1 31 (100.0) - Name, Address, Tel. & 
Telex Nos. of the 
Broker/Agent 
2 25 (80.65) 6 (19.35) Creditworthiness 
3 27 (87.10) 4 (12.90) Reputation 
4 26 (83.87) 5 (16.13) Track Record 
5 29 (93.55) 2 6.45) P&I Cover Details 
6 31 (100.0) - Membership of National 
or International 
Association 
TABLE 7.6f - ANALYSIS OF STATEMENT NO. 39f 
STATE- A GREE DISAGREE OPINIONS EXPRESSED 
MENT 39f No. % No. % No. 27 = 69.23% 
1 26 (96.30) 1 ( 3.70) Name, Address, Tel & 
Telex Nos. of the 
Registered Office 
2 26 (96.30) 3 ( 3.70) Name, Address, Tel. & 
Telex Nos. of the Head 
office if different 
3 26 (96.30) 5 ( 3.70) Date & Place of 
Incorporation 
4 26 (96.30) 5 ( 3.70) Share Capital 
5 24 (88.89) 3 (11.11) Names & Addresses of 
-1 
major share holders 
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TABLE 7.6g - ANALYSIS OF STATEMENT NO. 39g 
STATE- A GREE DISAGREE OPINIONS EXPRESSED 
HEM 39g No. % No. % No. 29 = 74.36% 
1 26 (89.66) 3 (10.34) Name & Type of Charter 
Party 
2 26 (89.66) 3 (10.34) Period of Charter 
3 27 (93.10) 2 ( 6.90) Details of Charter, 
Owner, and Broker or 
Agent arranging the 
Charter (as above) 
4 27 (93.10) 2 ( 6.90) Rio issues Bills of 
Lading ? 
TABLE 7.7 - ANALYSIS OF STATEMENT NO. 40 
STATE- 
MENT 40 
AGREE 
No. % 
DISAGREE 
No. % 
OPINIONS EXPRESSED 
No. % 
a 35 (97.22) 1 ( 2.78) 36 (92.31) 
b 33 (91.67) 3 ( 8.33) 36 (92.31) 
c 32 (88.89) 4 (11.11) 36 (92.31) 
d 35 (97.22) 1 ( 2.78) 36 (92.31) 
e 33 (91.67) 3 ( 8.33) 36 (92.31) 
f 34 (94.45) 2 ( 5.55) 36 (92.31) 
9 29 (80.56) 7 (19.44) 36 (92.31) 
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TABLE 7.8 - ANALYSIS OF STATEMENT NO. 41 
STATE- 
MENT 41 
CATEGORY OF MARITIME 
FRAUD 
OPINIONS EXPRESSED 
No. = 27 (69.23%) 
1 ARSON NIL 
2 CHARTER PARTY FRAUD 2(7.41%) 
3 CUBE-C! UTTING/TARIFF 
MANIPULATION 2(7.41%) 
4 DELIBERATE LIQUIDATION 1(3.70%) 
5 DEVIATION/ILLEGAL SALE 
OF CARGO 3 (11.11%) 
6 DOCUMENTARY FRAUD 13 (48.15%) 
7 INSURANCE FRAUD 3 (11.11%) 
8 SHIP SCUTTLING 3 (11.11%) 
9 OTHER (PLEASE SPECIFY) NIL 
TABLE 7.9 - ANALYSIS OF STATEMENT NO. 42 
STATE- AGREE DISAGREE OPINIONS EXPRESSED 
MEW 42 No. % No. % No. 31 = 79.49% 
a 29 (93.55) 2 ( 6.45) Adverse publicity 
b 27 (87.10) 4 (12.90) Lack of response by 
the authorities 
c 22 (71.00) 9 (29.00) Desire to protect 
and ensure future 
business with same 
person/company who/ 
which comitted fraud 
d 28 (90.32) 3 ( 9.68) Naivety of the victims 
e 24 (77.42) 7 (22.58) Losses are set off 
against profits 
f 27 (87.10) 4 (12.90) Perpetrators are not 
likely to be 
apprehended 
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TABLE 7.10 - ANALYSIS STATEMENT NO. 43 
STATE- INFORMATION OPINIONS EXPRESSED 
MENT 43 AVAILABILITY No. = 34 (87.18) 
1 Information not re7d--ily 
available 26.47% 
2 Information is not 
reliable 8.82% 
3 Information is too 
expensive to obtain 20.59% 
4 Information is not 
available to all 29.41% 
interested parties 
5 Information is not 
adequate for preventing 55.88% 
fraud 
6 Others, please specify See below 
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CHAPTER 8- ANALYSIS OF THE SECOND QUESTIONNAIRE 
8.1 Introduction 
From the analysis of the first questionnaire the statements 
supporting the hypothesis were obtained. on the statements where 
there was less than 80% consensus among the experts, it was 
decided to test the importance of the objections raised by 
individual experts. For this purpose the second questionnaire 
was designed to ask the Panel to consider each objection and, 
if they agreed with the objection raised, to rate it on an 
importance scale of 1 to 3. The information seeking sections 
were excluded from the second round. 
8.2 Design oý Second Questionnaire 
Where the consensus among the members of the Panel was less than 
80%, comments received from the respondents disagreeing with the 
original statement were used to formulate the second 
questionnaire. The object of this was to determine the 
importance of these disagreements. 
However, it was not sufficient to classify the disagreements 
solely according to the level of importance allocated by the 
respondents. In order to make reconTnendations, a Delphi Index 
for the classification of responses was devised. This would take 
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into account the following factors : 
a) Importance of the disagreements,, 
b) Unanimity among the respondents, 
c) Agreements among the respondents, and 
d) Certainty of the responses. 
The reason for excluding the "Unable to Comment" (UTC) on the 
first round, as explained in the last chapter, was the diversity 
of experience and expertise of the respondents. on the second 
round, however, as the menihers of the Panel were commenting on 
the disagreements raised by the experts in their fields, and the 
outcome of these comments would affect the system, certainty of 
the responses on the second round became an important 
consideration. Therefore, it was decided to use the "Unable to 
Comment" as a criterion for this, because if the Panel are 
unable to comment on the reasons given for the disagreements on 
the first round, the reason given has less certainty as an 
objection. 
On the first round the experts were asked to give reasons for 
disagreeing with the statements. On the second round the Panel 
were asked to consider the reasons given by the experts 
disagreeing with the statements on the first round and indicate 
whether they agreed or disagreed with the reasons put forward, 
or felt that they were unable to comment on the views expressed. 
The respondents were also asked to indicate the importance of a 
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comment only if they agreed with it. 
The members of the Panel were advised that : 
a) only those statements were being considered where the 
consensus among the experts was less than 80%, and 
b) they were not bound by their previous answers and were free 
to change their opinion, in the light of subsequent events. 
Once the second questionnaire was designed a pilot test was 
conducted using postgraduate students on shipping-related 
courses at the Plymouth Polytechnic. After slight modifications 
the f inal draf t was prepared and posted to the experts in July 
1986, again allowing six weeks for the responses. See Appendix 4 
for the second questionnaire and the accompanying letter. 
One of the respondents declined to answer the questionnaire 
because of the formal structure. On receipt of the responses 
to the second round the size of the sample had reduced from 39 
to 38, i. e. a response rate of 97.44%. Table 8.1 shows the Panel 
size at the end of this round. 
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8.3 Analysis of Second Questionnaire 
When the responses to the second round were received one 
questionnaire had to be sent back to the respondent as he had 
misunderstood the instructions. Another respondent was 
interviewed personally to clarify his responses. 
Table 8.1 s, - Categories and Number of Participants at the end 
of the second round. 
No. CATEGORY NO. OF PARTICIPANTS 
1 Academics 2 
2 Ancillary Services 4 
3 Banking Specialists 2 
4 Docurrentation 2 
5 Freight Forwarders 2 
6 Insurance Interests 5 
7 International Organisations 2 
8 Judiciary 1 
9 Lawyers 2 
10 Protection & Indemnity (-1) 1 
11 Security Forces 2 
12 Shipbrokers 4 
13 Shipowners 4 
14 Shippers 3 
15 Ship's Agents 2 
TOTAL 38 
Table 8.2, which shows the responses received to the statements 
on the second round, is placed at the end of the chapter. The 
comments of the experts were analysed individually for each 
statement as follows : 
The total number who agreed with the statement n 
The mean of importance scale 'R 
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The standard deviation (S. D. ) of agreements 
on the importance scale Cn- 
The number of disagreements 
The number of unable to comments replies 
The importance of the objection raised by the members of the 
Panel to the original statement was worked out. The statement 
which had the highest mean value (2) was ranked 1 and the others 
were ranked in descending order according to the value X, e. g. 
table 8.3a shows the ranking of the importance in table 8.4. 
Table 8.3a - Explanation of Importance Scale 
Statement No. mean value rx) Ranking 
1.2 2.615 1 
1.1 2.518 2 
1.3 2.280 3 
1.4 2.167 4 
1.5 2.161 5 
The unanimity among the respondents was worked out by the lowest 
value of the standard deviation (S. D. ) of the sample (<r, -,. 
e. g. table 8.3b shows the ranking of unanimity in table 8.4. 
As mentioned above, the respondents were asked to indicate the 
importance of an objection only if they agreed with it; a 
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three level importance scale was used : 
1= Not Important 
2= Important 
3= Very Important 
Table 8.3b - Explanation of Unanimity Scale 
Statement No. 
1.2 
1.4 
1.3 
1.5 
S. D. (-T;, 
-: L 
) 
0.509 
0.571 
0.583 
0.614 
0.718 
1 
2 
3 
4 1-5 
The total number of respondents who agree with a sub-statment is 
added to give the value n, see table 8.3c. The agreement (n) 
among the respondents was determined by the value of n. The 
highest value being ranked 1, e. g. table 8.3d shows the ranking 
of the agreements in table 8.4. 
Table 8.3c - Calculation of Agreement (n) for each sub-statement 
STATE- 
MENT NO. 
1-1 
1-2 
2 3 
13 14 
8 17 
n 
27 
26 
The certainty of a sub-statement was worked out by determining 
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the nun-Lber of "unable to coment" replies. The lowest number of 
"unable to coment" being ranked 1, e. g. table 8.3e shows the 
ranking of certainty in table 8.4. 
Table 8.3d - Explanation of Agreement Scale 
Statement No. 
1.4 
1.1 
1.2 
1.3 
1.5 
Agreement tn) 
31 
27 
26 
25 
----------------- 
12 
Ranicing 
2 
3 
4 
5 
The certainty of a sub-statement was worked out by determining 
the number of "unable to comment" replies. The lowest number of 
"unable to comment" being ranked 1, e. g. table 8.3e shows the 
ranking of certainty in table 8.4. 
Table 8.3e - Explanation of Certainty Scale 
Statement No. 
1.4 
1.1 
1.3 
1.2 
1.5 
Unable to Cormnent 
2 
4 
6 
7 
7 
1 
2 
3 
4 
If the values of two sub-statements were the same then both 
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statements will be ranked the same, see table 8.3e. The Delphi 
Index (D. I. ) was then calculated as follows : 
D. I 
Sum of Rankings of Importance, Unanimity, 
Agreement and Certainty Scales 
4 
For example, the D. I. of statement 1.1 in tables 8.3a - 8.3e 
will be : 
(2 +1+2+ 2) /4 
1.75 
Table 8.3f shows the D. I's for the staternents 1.1 to 1.5. The 
statement which has a D. I. closest to 1 would be a statement : 
a) which is important, 
b) on which majority of the experts agree,. 
c) on which majority of the experts are unanimous in their 
choice of its importance, and 
d) on which there is certainty. 
Table 8.3f - Calculation of Delphi Index 
Statement No. I U A C D. I. 
1.1 2 1 2 2 1.75 
1.2 1 2 3 4 2.50 
1.4 5 3 1 1 2.50 
1.3 3 4 4 3 3.50 
1.5 4 5 5 4 4.50 
Mean of D. I. = 2.95 
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8.4 Screening Criteria 
It was mentioned in chapter 6 that more stringent screening 
criteria were used in the analysis of the second questionnaire. 
The reason for this approach was to ensure that only those 
statements would be selected : 
a) which the majority of experts thought were important, 
b) on which there was certainty in the opinions expressed, and 
c) which did not have a high Delphi Index. 
Several sub-statements were dropped from consideration on the 
second round using the screening criteria based on importance 
and certainty scales, and on the mean value of the Delphi Index 
for each statement. A similar approach was used by Ludlow (1971) 
in his Delphi study, where he had used screening criteria based 
on importance, panel competence and consensus. 
Any sub-statement which had a mean value FX) of less than 2 
(important) -was dropped from consideration on this round 
because, the consensus of opinion was that the objection raised 
was not important [1 = not important; 2= important; 3= very 
important]. For example, in table 8.3g sub-statement 13.2 is 
dropped because its is less than 2. 
If 50% or more (i. e. > 19) experts were "Unable to Comment" 
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(UTC) on a particular sub-statement it was dropped from 
consideration as its certainty was in doubt. For example, in 
table 8.3g sub-statement 13.4 is dropped because its UTC is 
greater than 19; if sub-statement 13.2 had not been dropped due 
to the importance criterion it would have been dropped because 
its UTC is greater than 19. 
If any sub-statement was dropped from consideration due to 
either of the above criteria, its Delphi Index was not 
calculated, see table 8.3g. 
Table 8.3g - Examplo 
statement 
Number 
Agree (n) 
Mean 
S. D. 
Disagree 
Unable to 
Comnent 
In-portance 
Unanimity 
Agreement 
Certainty 
Delphi Index 
a of Screening Criteria 
13.1 13.2 13.3 13.4 
16 14 9 
2.429 1.875 2.357 2.000 
0.598 
4 
13 
1 
2 
1 
2 
1.5 
0.500 
2 
20 
<2 
& 
UTC 
>19 
0.633 
13 
11 
2 
3 
3 
2.25 
Mean of Delphi IrxJex = 1.875 
0.707 
9 
20 
UTC 
19 
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The mean value of the Delphi Index was calculated for each 
statement. If the D. I. for any sub-statement was less than the 
mean of the D. I., it was dropped from consideration. For 
example, sub-statement 13.3 is dropped because its D. I. (2.25) 
is greater than the mean of the D. I's (1.875) for statement 13. 
Thus after screening only sub-statement 13.1 is considered to be 
an objection which meets the all criteria specified above. 
Figure 8.1 is a flow diagram showing the design and analysis of 
the second questionnaire. Figure 8.2, which is a combination of 
figures 7.1 and 8.1, presents an overview of the analysis on the 
two rounds. 
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FIRST QUESTIONNAIRE OPINIONS 
4 
AGREE DISAGREE 
< 
io% 
I 
TO SEEK CLARIFICATION 
DEVELOP SECOND QUESTIONNAIRE 
IES 
AGREE DISAGREE UNP COMMENT 
I 
ANALYSE RESPONSES TO DETERMINE 
IMPOATANCE UNANIMITY AGRIENT CERTAIINTY 
. 
OF * AMONG AMONG OF 
DISAGREEMENTS RESPONDENTS RESPONDENTS RESPONSES 
X<2X>2 Uý UTC 
< 50% > 50% 11 
END END 
USE TO CALCULATE 
THE DELPHI INDEX 
I 
CALCULATE MEAN OF DELPHI INDEX 
I 
CONSIDER ONLY THOSE RESPONSES WHICH HAVE A D. I. 
OF LESS THAN THE D. I. MEAN FOR THE STATEMENT 
Figure 8.1 - Flow Diagram Explaining the Analysis of the Second 
Questionnaire 
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USE ANALYSIS OF FRAUD CASE 
DATABASE TO FORM HYPOTHESIS 
DEVELOP FIRST 
I 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
RE4IES 
AGLE DISA REE UNABLE TO COMMENT 
> 
to% io% END 
I 
CONSIDER CONSIDER 
HYPOTHESIS HYPOTHESIS 
SUPPORTED NOT SUPPORTED 
iI 
END END 
TO SEEK 
4ARIFICATION 
DEVELOP SECOND QUESTIONNAIRE 
REPLIES 
AGREE DISLREE UNABLE TO MMENT 
4 
ANALYSE RESPONSES TO DETERMINE 
IMPORTANCE UNANIMITY AGREEMENT INTY 
OF AMONG AMONG OF 
DISAGREEMENTS RESPONDENTS RESPONDENTS RESPONSES 
X<2X>2 urc UTC 
< 50% > 50% 11 
END END 
USE TO CALCULATE THE DELPHI INDEX (D. I. ) 
I 
CALCULATE MEAN OF DELPHI INDEX 
I 
CONSIDER ONLY THOSE RESPONSES WHICH HAVE A D. I. 
OF LESS THAN THE D. I. MEAN FOR THE STATEMENT 
Figure 8.2 - Overview of the Analysis of the First & Second 
Questionnaires 
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8.5 Analysis of Statements 
Original Statement 
The Bill of Lading has outlived its usefulness as a document of 
title as there is very little or no security in it. 
The following comments were received froin experts disagreeing 
with the above statenent : 
1.1 The Bill of Lading is still secure if properly used. 
1.2 The Bill of Lading is not at fault but the people handling 
the document are at fault. 
1.3 People handling the Bill of Lading are not aware of its 
importance. 
1.4 The Bill of Lading is still very useful and flexible. 
1.5 There is no viable alternative for the traditional Bill of 
Lading. 
Table 8.4 - Analysis of Statement No. 1 
Statement 
Number 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 
Agree (n) 27 26 25 31 12 
Mean (X) 2.518 2.615 2.280 2.161 2.167 
S. D. 0.509 0.571 0.614 0.583 0.718 
Disagree 7 5 7 5 19 
Unable to 
Comment 
Importance 
4 
2 
7 
1 
6 
.3 
2 
5 
7 
4 
Unanimity 1 2 4 3 5 
Agreement 2 3 4 1 5 
Certainty 2 4 3 1 4 
Delphi Index 1.75 2.50 3.50 2.50 4.50 
Mean of Delphi Index = 2.95 
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Statements 1.3 and 1.5 were dropped because their D. I. was 
greater than the man D. I. '(2.95). Therefore, from the analysis 
it appears that : 
a) the B/L is still secure if properly used, 
b) the people handling the document are at fault, and 
c) the B/L is still very useful and flexible. 
Comments received from the Panel 
The B/L is likely to be phased out in some areas 
by reason of speedier transport, leading to the 
use of the non-negotiable sea waybill, or by 
Electronic Data Processing (EDP). 
Security is only part of the reason why the B/L 
should be replaced, the associated procedures are 
the other. 
There are several undesirable practices in use at 
the moment from what appear to be respectable 
shipping lines. These include pre- and post-dated 
B/L and the acceptance of bulk cargoes subject 
only to a quantity specified by the loading 
terminal. 
Because of the lack of control on B/L stationery 
and the impossibility of checking the validity of 
signatures a B/L can never be entirely secure. 
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Original Statement 
By 1995 the conventional Bill of Lading will be replaced by 
the "Electronic Bill of Lading" by the use of data 
interchange via ccmputers. 
The following comments were received from experts disagreeing 
with the above statement. 
2.1 The shipping industry is too diverse and fragmented for 
universal application. 
2.2 Computer compatibility will be a problem. 
2.3 There will be legal problems regarding the place of issuance 
of the Bill of Lading 
2.4 The "Electronic Bill 
ýf Lading" will only be used in some 
sophisticated trades but not world-wide. 
2.5 The TEN year time span is too short for total replacement. 
2.6 Computer fraud will make the "Electronic Bill of Lading" as 
insecure as the traditional one. 
Table 8.5 - Analysis of Statement No. 2 
Statement 
Number 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 
Agree (n) 29 17 21 26 20 18 
Mean 2.103 2.353 2.190 1.885 2.150 2.611 
S. D. 0.772 0.606 0.750 0.766 0.745 0.502 
Disagree 5 13 6 4 8 12 
Unable to 
Comment 
Importance 
4 
5 
8 
2 
11 
3 
8 
X 
10 
4 
--- 
8 
1 
--- 
Unanimity 5 2 4 <2 3 1 
Agreement 1 5 2 3 4 
Certainty 1 2 5 4 2 
Delphi Index 3.00 2.75 
-1 
3.50 3.50 2.00 
Mean of Delphi Index = 2.95 
Statement 2.4 was dropped because its was less than 2, i. e. it 
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was not considered to be inportant. Statements 2.1,2.3 and 2.5 
were dropped because their D. I. was greater than the mean D. I. 
(2.95). In the opinion of the Panel, it appears that : 
a) coqmter fraud is a factor which causes the greatest concern 
to the use of an Electronic Bill of Lading, and 
b) Ccuputer ccxupatibility will be a problem to data interchange 
via computers. 
Comments received frcxn the Panel 
Problems with implementation will be due to the 
logistics rather than security of the computer 
systems. 
The greater the scope of computer use, the 
larger the possibility of fraud becomes. As few 
bank managers outside the main financial 
centres of the world are familiar with the 
workings of computers, the ability as exists now 
of top management controlling and checking the 
operations of junior "hands-on" staff ceases, 
leaving the system at risk of infidelity of the 
staff as well as external "hacking". 
The problems regarding computer compatibility and 
the place of issuance of the B/L can be easily 
overcome by prior organisation respectively of 
the hardware and software or of the terms shown 
on the B/L. 
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Original Statement 
The EIniform Custcms & Practice for Documentary Credits 1983 
Revision (MP) does not provide adequate protection for the 
applicant (the buyer) against the unscrupulous beneficiary 
(the seller). 
The following comments were received from experts disagreeing 
with the above statewnt. 
3.1 The buyer gets what he pays for. Any additional checks would 
result in an additional charge to him. 
3.2 The UCP give less responsibility to the banks, thereby 
giving opportunity for relaxation from the banker's side. 
3.3 There is certainly room for improvement of the UCP. 
3.4 Provided docunentary credit properly drafted with proper 
precautionst UCP provides adequate security. 
Table 8.6 - Analysis of Statement No. 3 
Statement 
Number 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 
Agree (n) 24 15 24 15 
Mean (X) 2.042 2.400 2.167 2.400 
S. D. 0.690 0.632 0.761 0.737 
Disagree 7. 4 4 8 
Unable to 
Comment 
Importance 
6 
4 
17 
1 
13 
3 
14 
1 
Unanimity 2 1 4 3 
Agreement 1 3 1 3 
Certainty 1 4 2 3 
Delphi Index 2.0 2.25 
- 
2.5 
1- 
2.5 
1 
Mean of Delphi Index - 2.3 
Statements 3.3 and 3.4 were dropped because their D. I. was 
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greater than the man D. I. (2.3). Therefore, from the analysis 
it appears that : 
a) the buyer gets what he pays fors, and that any additional 
checks he may want would result in an additional charge to 
him, and 
b) the UCP gives less responsibility to banks, thereby giving 
opportunity for relaxation from the banker's side. 
Conments received from the Panel 
a) greater advice to the applicants in filling 
the form, and 
b) a checking service when documents are 
received, *and charge for this service. 
Whilst I agree that the UCP gives a measure 
of security if strictly c(xnplied with, the 
potential for fraud still exists and is 
perpetrated because of the inadequacies of the 
checks required by the banks. 
However, one member of the Panel said that whilst he agrees with 
statement 3.2, he felt that it does not seem to be a 
qualification of the original statement but one of the reasons 
for it, i. e. that the UCP does not provide adequate protection. 
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Original Statement 
In documentary credit operations, the relationship which 
exists between the Issuing Bank and the Advising/Confirming Bank 
is that of a Principal (Issuing Bank) and an Agent 
(Confirming/Advising Bank). 
The following cormnents were received from experts disagreeing 
with the above statement : 
4.1 In law,, they contract as principals with each other, and 
with the buyer and seller. 
4.2 Under the Uniform Customs & Practice the characteristics of 
agency between the banks are in a large measure obliterated. 
4.3 As the advising/confirming bank only makes a superficial 
documentary check without factual check, therefore it does 
not qualify as an agent for the issuing bank. 
Table 8.7 - Analysis of Statement No. 4 
Number 1 4.1 1 4.2 
Agree (n) 
2.556 
0.527 
8 
21 
1.857 
0.690 
5 
26 
4.3 
2.571 
0.535 
9 
22 
mean (X) 
S. D. 
Disagree 
Unable to 
Ccmnent 
Importance 
Unanimity 
Agreement 
Certainty 
Delphi Index 
<2 
In all UrC 
> 19 
All three statements were dropped after the application of the 
screening criteria. In view of the fact that the responses to 
all the sub-statements to statement 4 failed the certainty 
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criterion,. i. e. the UTC is more than 19, this area requires 
further analysis. Re-examination of the statements 3 and 4 of 
this round showed that for : 
Statement 3- on the first round 41% of the members of the 
Panel were unable to comment on this statement and 
on average 38 % were unable to comment on the 
second round. 
Statement 4- on both the first and second round over 50% of the 
members were unable to coment on this statement. 
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Original Statement 
The ship owner/operator details are not checked properly by the 
Charterer before entering into a charter. 
The following coments were received from experts disagreeing 
with the above statment : 
5.1 Checking is not always easy. 
5.2 Depends very much on the quality of broker used. 
5.3 Reputable charterers are very particular and make full 
enquiries. 
Table 8.8 - Analysis of Statement No. 5 
Statement 
Number 
Agree (n) 
Mean FX) 
S. D. 
Disagree 
Unable to 
Cannent 
Importance 
Unanimity 
Agreement 
Certainty 
Delphi Index 
5.1 5.2 5.3 
22 26 24 
2.091 2.577 2.520 
0.750 0.504 0.510 
944 
789 
3 
3 
3 
1 
2.5 
1 
2 
1.25 
2 
2 
2 
3 
2.25 
Mean of Delphi Index = 2.0 
Statements 5.1 and 5.3 were dropped because their D. I. was 
greater than the mean D. I. (2.0). Therefore, from the analysis 
it appears that it depends very much on the quality of the 
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broker whether proper checks are carried out before entering 
into a contract of carriage under a charter party. 
rým-ts received frcm the Panel 
It is up to the charterer to ensure that his 
broker does make the necessary checks. 
When a vessel is being chartered for a single 
voyage at short notice, it is very difficult to 
carry out the checks. There is no problem with 
time charters and/or with single voyage ships 
offered by large companies well known to the 
charterers. 
317 
Original Statement 
The ship owner/operator details are not checked properly by the 
Insurance brokers/underwriters before entering into a contract 
of insurance. 
The following comnents were received frorn experts disagreeing 
with the above staternent. 
6.1 The modern market certainly checks owner/operator details. 
6.2 So far as the contract of insurance is concerned I do not 
consider this necessary. 
6.3 It is the broker who should check details and decide whether 
to represent the owner/operator who approaches him. 
Table 8.9 - Analysis of Statement No. 6 
Statement 
Number 
1 
6.1 
1 
6.2 
1 
6.3 
Agree (n) 15 5 20 
Mean 2.200 1.800 2.800 
S. D. 0.676 0.837 0.410 
Disagree 8 21 7 
Unable to is 12 11 
Coment 
Importance 21 
Unanimity 2<21 
Agreement 21 
Certainty 21 
Delphi Index 2.00 1 
mean of Delphi Index = 1.5 
Statement 6.2 was dropped because its X was less than 2, and 
statement 6.1 was dropped because its D. I was greater than the 
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mean D. I. (1.5). Therefore, from the analysis it appears that in 
a contract of insurance it is the broker who should check 
details and decide whether to represent the owner/operator who 
approaches him. 
Comments received fran the Panel 
The broker has a legal duty to check details as 
far as is possible. If he does not he could be a 
party to fraud. 
We must be circumspect regarding some brokers' 
attitudes, especially where there is high 
brokerage in prospect. 
Any change of management, ownership, flag or 
class is a material fact and failure to disclose 
renders void any English market policy. There are 
means of checking the record, and underwriters 
anyway would ask about this as a matter of 
course. As with many business transactions the 
man on the spot can assess the character and 
reputation of the potential clients. This vital 
filtering operation tended to be overlooked in 
the immediate past couple of years. 
The broker is not working for the underwriter and 
thus will give him only the information he asks 
to receive or which the broker is at liberty or 
forced to give him. Further, the checks which 
each broker may carry out on each potential 
Principal would be merely aimed at ascertaining 
his premium payment capacity, not his business 
acumen. 
319 
Original Statement 
The ship owner/operator details are not checked properly by the 
Agents/Preight Forwarders before entering into a contract of 
agency, 
The following comments were received from experts disagreeing 
with the above statement : 
7.1 Most agents are careful about owner/operator status. 
7.2 Responsible Agents/Freight Forwarders make full enquiries. 
Table 8.10 - Analysis of Statement No. 
Statement 
Number 7.1 7.2 
Agree (n) 10 17 
Me-an CX) 2.400 2.706 
S. D. (T-v%-jL 0.699 0.406 
Disagree 15 6 
Unable to 
Comment 
13 15 
Importance 2 1 
Unanimity 2 1 
Agreement 2 1 
Certainty 1 2 
Delphi Index 1.75 1.25 
Mean of Delphi index = 1.5 
Statement 7.1 was dropped because its D. I. was greater than the 
mean D. I. (1.5). Therefore, from the analysis it would appear 
that responsible Agentp/Preight Forwarders make full 
inquiries. 
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Comsents received from the Panel 
The Agent's status is as important as the 
owner/operator status, e. g. check whether they 
are members of their national or international 
association. 
It is correct to say 
Agents/Forwarders make full 
experience has shown that 
responsible Agents/Forwarders 
because both operators and 
the Mediterranean/ Mid East i 
the cheapest service and 
quality/ responsibility. 
that responsible 
enquiries, however 
the number of 
is declining mainly 
shippers, mainly in 
area, tend to go for 
forget about the 
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Original Statement 
A few frauds are caused by the secrecy of operations, i. e. 
all ships fixed for hire are not reported in the press. 
The following coments were received from experts disagreeing 
with the above statement. 
8.1 Secrecy of operations and unreported fixtures are unrelated 
vis-a-vis fraud. 
8.1 Secrecy is necessary for other reasons, e. g. to protect 
commercial advantage, to breach sanctions. 
8.3 Secrecy is voluntarily undertaken by both parties. 
8.4 Secrecy is used to protect/assist development of market 
rates. 
Table 7.11 - Analysis of Statement No. 8 
Statement 
Number 8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4 
Agree (n) 177- 23 18 13 
Mean 2.059 2.043 2.222 1.769 
S. D. 0.827 0.706 0.732 0.725 
Disagree 8 2 6 7 
Unable to 13 13 14 18 
Connient 
Importance 2 3 1 
Unanimity 3 1 2 <2 
Agreement 3 1 2 
Certainty 1 1 3 
Delphi Index 2.25 1.5 2.00 
mean of Delphi Index = 1.9 
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Statement 8.4 was dropped because its R was less than 2, i. e. 
the statement was not important. Statements 8.1 and 8.3 were 
dropped because their D. I. was greater than the mean D. I. (1.9). 
Therefore, from the analysis it appears that secrecy is 
necessary for other reasons, for example to protect commercial 
advantage and to breach sanctions. 
Comments received fran the Panel 
once proper checking is done internally prior to 
fixture and operation is continuously kept under 
control it is irrelevant whether fixture is kept 
secret or not. 
"To breach sanctions" implies illegal trading 
and as such should neither be condoned nor 
helped. 
Secrecy also assists the demolition of market 
rates. 
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Original Statement 
The use of TWO or THREE original Bills of Lading in a set and 
the delivery of cargo on production of ONLY ONE has 
facilitated documentary frauds. 
The following comments were received from experts disagreeing 
with the above statement. 
9.1 Possibly in a few cases, but payrrent/negotiation is 
normally conducted only against presentation of the full 
set. 
9.2 True, but should a system be changed because a very few 
dishonest people abuse it ? 
9.3 Have no personal knowledge that this has facilitated fraud. 
9.4 Disagree. However, the practice is outdated and needs 
revision. 
9.5 Use of copies is one of the big problems. 
Table 8.12 - Analysis of Statement No. 9 
Statement 
Number 9.1 9.2 9.3 9.4 9.5 
Agree (n) 20 14 14 
S S 
Mean (X) 2.200 1.643 T 2.143 T 
A A - 
S. D. 0.768 0.633 T 0.535 T 
E E - 
Disagree 11 15 M 11 M 
E -- E 
Unable to 7 9 N 13 N 
Comment T T 
Importance 1 2 
X D -- D 
Unanimity 2 <2 E 1 E 
L --- L 
Agreement 1 E 2 E 
T --- T 
Certainty 1 E 2 E 
D D -- 
Delphi Index 1.25 1.75 
Mean of Delphi Index = 1.5 
Statements 9.3 and 9.5 have been deleted. This is due to the 
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fact that the author made a mistake in including them. on 
statement 9.3 no one else 66dhd comment as it refers to the 
Panelist's personal knowledge; and as the use of copies of B/L 
has nothing to do with the original statenrent, the inclusion of 
statement 9.5 was inappropriate. 
Statement 9.2 was dropped because its X was less than 2, i. e. it 
was not important, and statement 9.4 was dropped because its 
D. I. was greater than the mean of the D. I. (1.5). Therefore, 
from the analysis it appears that the practice of issuing TWO or 
THREE original B/L in a set and the delivery of cargo on 
production of ONLY ONE, has possibly facilitated documentary 
fraud in a few cases, however payment, /negotiation is normally 
conducted only against presentation of the full set. 
Omonents received from the Panel 
The system should not be changed just because a 
very few frauds have been facilitated by the 
improper use of the system. 
The practice should be discontinued unless 
advantages can be indicated which outweigh the 
undoubted risks. 
So long as the negotiability of the B/L is 
retained in trades where negotiability is no 
longer necessary, B/L fraud is inevitable. 
Issue of two or three original is outdated. only 
one original should be issued. If the practice 
has facilitated the increase of fraud, even more 
reason to scrap the practice. 
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Original Statement 
Payment under documentary credits by the banks without proper 
checks before payment has led the fraudsters to exploit the 
system. 
The following comnents were received from experts disagreeing 
with the above statement : 
10.1 Banks make all the checks required of them under the UCP. 
10.2 Lack of checks carried out by the importer is exploited by 
the fraudster. 
10.3 Documentary credit is drafted with insufficient care. 
10.4 Additional checks by banks would greatly increase the cost 
of the service to the customer. 
Table 8.13 - Analysis of Statement No. 10 
Statement 
Nurrber 10.1 10.2 10.3 10.4 
Agree (n) 16 21 is 
S ! -- 
Mean (X) 2.250 T 2.524 2.267 
A 
S. D. 0.775 T 0.612 0.799 
E 
Disagree 10 M 1 11 
E -- - 
Unable to 12 N 16 12 
Canment T 
Importance 3 1 2 
D 
Unanimity 2 E 1 3 
L 
Agreement 2 E 1 3 
T 
Certainty 1 E 3 1 
D 
Delphi Index 2.0 1.5 2.25 
Mean of Delphi Index = 1.9 
Statement 10.2 was deleted because the comment is not a 
qualification of the original statement, and was included on 
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this round by mistake. 
Statements 10.1 and 10.4 were dropped because their D. I. was 
greater than the mean D. I. (1.9). Therefore, from the analysis 
it appears that the reason that the fraudsters exploit the 
system is not because the banks pay without proper checks but 
because the applicant does not draft the credit with sufficient 
care. 
Cmuents received fran the Panel 
The banking system seems obsessed with correct 
paperwork without any comprehension of its 
implications. There have been instances when 
banks have been told of potential frauds but have 
processed the transaction as the documentation 
was correct. 
Banks should be required to check the beneficiary 
when the credit is valuable, say over $ 0.5 
million. 
Fran the comments in statement 10.1 and 10.4 it 
appears that the panelists have taken a short 
sighted view of the problern. 
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Original Statement 
The simplification of documentation bas contributed to the 
increase in documentary fraud. 
The following comnents were received from experts disagreeing 
with the above statement : 
11.1 Simplification is an aid to prevention of fraud. 
11.2 Criminals are -becorning more professional and the inter- 
national trading community are becoming more careless. 
11.3 Simplification should not mean reduction in protective 
clauses. 
11.4 Requirement for more documentation will not reduce 
documentary fraud. 
Table 8.14 - Analysis of Statement No. 11 
Statement 
Number 11.1 11.2 11.3 11.4 
Agree (n) 18 21 32 27 
Mean CX) 2.111 2.423 2.406 2.222 
S. D. 0.583 0.598 0.560 0.641 
Disagree 11 7 1 4 
Unable to 
ConTnent 
Importance 
9L 
4 
10 
1 
5 
2 
7 
3 
Unanimity 2 3 1 4 
Agreement 4 3 1 2 
Certainty 3 4 1 2 
Delphi Index 3.25 2.75 1.25 2.75 
Mean of Delphi Index = 2.5 
Statements 11.1,11.2 and 11.4 were dropped because their D. I. 
was greater than the mean D. I. (2.5). Therefore, from the 
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analysis it appears that sinplification should not mean 
reduction in protective clauses. 
Comments received from the Panel 
The simpler the documentation the less time spent 
on bureaucracy and the more time should be 
available to check the integrity of the deal. 
Criminals are becoming more professional but in 
my view the international trading comnunity is 
becoming more careful. 
Simplification does not preclude the need for 
appropriate precautions. 
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Original Statement 
Some documentary frauds would be prevented if the cargo 
carrying capacity of the vessel was inserted on the Bill of 
Lading. 
The following comments were received frm experts disagreeing 
with the above statement. 
12.1 This is believed to have only a marginal effect. 
12.2 The vessel's carrying capacity can be checked in the 
Lloyd's Register. 
12.3 In liner trades knowledge of capacity without full details 
of entire cargo to be carried would be worthless. 
12.4 Fraudsters will then select vessels with the correct 
capacity to justify the tonnage entered in the Bill of 
Lading. 
Table 8.15 - Analysis of Statement No. 12 
Statement 
Number 12.1 12.2 12.3 12.4 
Agree (n) 27 30 33 
. 
25 
Mean 1.630 1.930 2.333 2.320ý 
S. D. 0.742 0.828 0.816 0.690ý 
Disagree 5415 
Unable to 6448 
Comment 
Importance 12 
-- XX 
Unanimity <2<221 
Agreement 12 
Certainty 12 
Delphi Index 1.25 1.75 
Mean of Delphi Index = 1.5 
Statements 12.1 and 12.2 were dropped because their Twas less 
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than 2, i. e. they were not considered to be important. Statement 
12.4 was dropped because its D. I. was greater than the mean D. I. 
(1.5). Therefore, frorn the analysis it appears that inserting 
the ship's ca xying capacity in the B/L will be of no use in the 
liner trades unless full details of the entire cargo to be 
carried were knowin. 
Ccmments received from the Panel 
Even this- simple check makes the task of the 
fraudster more difficult. 
Carrying capacity alone is no use without details 
of fuel, water, etc.. 
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Original Statement 
Underwriters should demand surveyors' reports together with 
certified valuers' reports prior to accepting Hull and 
Machinery risks. 
The following camients were received from experts disagreeing 
with the above statement : 
13.1 It would be better for underwriters to appoint their own 
surveyors and valuers as do certain Scandinavian insurers. 
13.2 Premium calculations contain an element of value 
assessment. 
13.3 Surveys should only be demanded on ships of unknown 
management regardless of age,, and on ships classed with 
other than acceptable registers. 
13.4 The insurance contract has sufficient safeguards to deal 
with any problems that would become evident from these 
reports. 
Table 8.16 - Analysis of Statement No. 13 
Statement 
Number 13.1 13.2 13.3 13.4 
Agree (n) 21 16 
- 
14 
I --- 
9 
---- --- 
mean (R) 
-- 
2.429 1.875 2.357 2.000 
S. D. 0.598 0.500 0.633 0.707 
Disagree 4 2 13 9 
Unable to 13 20 11 20 
Ccm, nent 
Importance 1 2 
7 UTC - -- 
unanimity 1 <2 2 > 
- 19 
Agreement I & 2 
Certainty 2 UTC 1 
Delphi Index 
I 
1.25 
- 
19 1.75 
- 
Mean of Delphi Index = 1.5 
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Statement 13.2 was dropped because it failed the screening 
criteria on two grounds, i. e. its Z was less than 2 and its UTC 
was greater than 19. Statement 13.4 was dropped because its UTC 
was greater than 19. Statement 13.3 was dropped because its D. I. 
was greater than the mean D. I. (1.5). Therefore from the 
analysis it appears that it would be better for underwriters to 
appoint their own surveyors and valuers, as do certain 
Scandinavian insurers. 
Ccmmnts received from the Panel 
From experience surveyor's reports are often 
couched in terms to please the party who gave the 
survey instructions. 
Owners survey reports should be acceptable if 
from an approved source. 
Surveys should be demanded on all ships 
irrespective of owner, age or class. 
Underwriters in the London market deal with many 
thousands of vessels each year, even before 
counting those which are sold to new owners or 
are brand new. They rely on Classification 
Societies to inspect and maintain the vessels to 
an approved standard and have recently instigated 
some steps to prevent the switching of ships 
between classifications without enforcement of 
repairsAnaintenance deemed required under the 
previous rules. Surveyors are likely to be used 
for ocean tows, reactivation and laying up 
procedures. Experienced underwriters are quite 
capable of assessing ship values and have made 
efforts to eliminate a principal cause of erratic 
sums insured by ascertaining what bank mortgages 
are outstanding. 
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Original Statement 
If some sort of delay is built into the documentary credit 
system (perhaps a maxinum of 7 days), to allow for checks to 
be carried out by the bank before payment is made,, it will 
reduce the incidence of fraud. 
The following comnents were received from experts disagreeing 
with the above statement : 
14.1 It would increase the pressure for fraudulent dating or 
issue of documents before goods are loaded. 
14.2 Commerce would come to a standstill and thefts after 
discharge would increase. 
14.3 The cost to international trade would be enormous. 
14.4 Not practical and banks have refused to do this. 
14.5 Checks should be made earlier than lodging of documentary 
credit or quicker, e. g. by using computerised data bases. 
Table 8.17 - Analysis of Statement No. 14 
Statement 
Number 14.1 14.2 14.3 14.4 14.5 
Agree (n) 22 10 16 10 21 
Mean (X) 1.909 2.700 2ý, 500 2.500 2.571 
S. D. 0.750 0.675 0.632 0.707 0.676 
Disagree 7 22 14 10 3 
Unable to 
Cannent 
Importance 
9 6 
1 
8 
3 
18 
3 
14 
2 
Unanimity <2 2 1 4 3 
Agreement 3 2 3 1 
Certainty 1 2 4 3 
Delphi Index 1.75 2.00 
- 
3.50 
1 
2.25 
mean of Delphi Index = 2.38 
Statement 14.1 has been dropped because its 7 was less than 2, 
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i. e. it was not considered to be important. Statement 14.3 has 
been dropped because its D. I. was greater than the mean D. I. 
(2.38). Therefore frorn the analysis it appears that the 
following objections are justified : 
a) ccacerce would ccme to a standstill and thefts after 
discharge would increase, 
b) the cost to international trade would be enormous, and 
c) checks should be made earlier than lodging of documentary 
credit or quicker, e. g. by using computerised data bases. 
Ccmments received frcm the Panel 
In view of the time allouied in contracts anyway, 
such as sight plus 60 days, a few days of checks 
should be little problem. 
Each trader would lose value x (7 / 365) x 11% 
interest on each transaction plus increased 
demurrage. 
Counenting on statements 14.1 - 14.3 one member of the Panel 
said "This should be applied only to large credits; then the 
disruption (and cost) would not be excessive". Whilst one member 
of the Panel said that statement 14.5 was "not practical in the 
'real' world" another said that it "seems to be worthy of 
support". 
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Original Statement 
The carrying out of the following check, before payment is made 
under documentary credits, would provide adequate protection 
against fraud (the cost of these services would be borne by the 
applicant requesting them at the time of opening the credit; the 
bank will carry out the checks without incurring any additional 
liability) : 
Check with the Port Authority or Custom that they have a cargo 
manifest lodged for the said vessel and that the Bills of 
Lading issued are mentioned in the manifest. 
The following comments were received from the experts 
disagreeing with the above statement : 
15.1 Port Authority requirements are variable. In the U. K. 
Customs check of Bill of Lading is post shipmnt. 
15.2 Nice idea but I fear impractical. 
15.3 Manifest is a ship's paper and hence easy to manipulate. 
15.4 Port Authority/Customs may well not have the manifest at 
the tirre payment needs to be made. 
15.5 Who will pay Customs and Port Authority for extra staff 
necessary to answer enquiries ? 
Table 8.18 - Analysis of Statement No. 15 
Statement 
Number 15.1 15.2 15.3 15.4 15.5 
Agree (n) 22 22 18 23 
S 
Mean CX) 2.000 2.045 2.056 1.957 T 
A 
S. D. 0.617 0.844 0.725 0.562 T 
E 
Disagree 7 9 4 M 
E 
Unable to 16 9 11 11 N 
Camment T 
Importance 3 2 1 
X D 
Unanimity 1 3 2 < E 
L 
Agreement 1 1 3 E 
T 
Certainty 3 1 2 E 
D 
Delphi Index 2.00 1.72 2.00 
Mean of Delphi Index = 1.92 
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Statement 15.5 was deleted because it was a rhetorical question 
which could not effectively be answered by the Panel. Statement 
15.4 was dropped because its Twas less than 2, i. e. it was not 
considered to be important. Statements 15.1 and 15.3 were 
dropped because their D. I. was greater than the mean D. I. 
(1.92). Therefore, in the opinion of the Panel, checking with 
the Port Authority/Custans about Bills of Lading from the 
manifest is a nice idea but impractical. 
one of the experts said that this would be possible "only for 
bulk trades". 
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Original Statement 
If you feel there are other checks which should also be 
included (to prevent fraud under documentary credits) , please 
specify below and give the reason for introducing them. 
The following additional points were mentioned by the experts : 
16.1 Check beneficiary if the credit exceeds E 0.5 million. 
16.2 Banks should check with a "specially set up organisation" 
whether Bill of Lading is correct and gives a true picture. 
16.3 Check type of vessel, if you cannot check with Port 
Authority or Customs. 
16.4 Initiate loading surveys on quality and quantity of goods 
by reputable cargo surveyors. 
16.5 Check that the cargo quantity is as per the Bill of Lading. 
16.6 Check the vessel's route and ports of call by master's 
declaration. 
16.7 Lodge route or voyage plan with appropriate authority. 
Table 8.19 - Analysis of Statement No. 16 
Statement 
Number 16.1 16.2 16.3 16.4 16.5 16.6 16.7 
Agree (n) 19 24 32 30 25 16 
Mean (X) 2.136 2.368 1.66-7 2.334 2.467 2.080 1.750 
S. D. 0.640 0.597 0.761 0.787 0.730 0.812 0.775 
Disagree 8 13 8 4 4 9 17 
Unable to 
Cament 
Importance 
8 
4 
6 
2 
6 
X 
2 
3 
4 
1 
4 
5 
5 
X 
Unanimity 2 1 <2 4 3 5 <2 
Agreement 4 5 1 2 3 
Certainty 5 4 1 2 2 
Delphi Index 3.75 3.00 2.25 2.0 3.75 
Mean of Delphi Irx3ex = 2.95 
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Statements 16.3 and 16.7 were dropped because their T was less 
than 2,, i. e. they were not considered to be important. 
Statements 16.1,16.2 and 16.6 were dropped because their D. I. 
was greater than the mean D. I. (2.95). Therefore from the 
analysis it appears that the additional checks would be : 
a) check that the cargo quantity is as per the Bill of Lading, 
and 
b) initiate loading surveys on quality and quantity of goods by 
reputable cargo surveyors. 
Comnents received fran the Panel 
Organisations such as the IMB can track a vessel 
to ensure that no unusual courses are taken. 
Items 4 and 6 appear the best options at a cheap 
practical level. 
We have seen fraudulent documents purporting to 
have been issued by a named cargo surveyor. 
Which bank in the chain arranges check ? How is 
fact of "check evidenced" ? It must be by a 
"document" - and the "document" must be specified 
in the credit. Reliance will have to be placed on 
a "document" - and forging a document does not 
worry a fraudster. 
Three members of the panel said that the creditworthiness of the 
beneficiary should always be checked irrespective of the amount 
of the credit. one expert said that loading surveys could be 
carried out in certain circumstances, but generally not in 
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liner trades. Referring to Bill of Lading checks (statement 
16.5) one of the experts said that he saw no reliable checks 
possible in practice. 
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Original Statenent 
Camiercial criminals should not be granted bail. 
The following comments were received fr= the experts 
disagreeing with the above statement : 
17.1 Bail could be set very high. 
17.2 Seize all assets and give a court allowance until trial, 
and withdraw the passport. 
17.3 Bail should generally not be granted. 
17.4 Each case must be judged on its merits. 
17.5 Length of time taken for cases to come to trial will impose 
severe hardships. 
Table 8.20 - Analysis of Statement No. 17 
Statement 
Number 17.1 17.2 17.3 17.4 17.5 
Agree (n) 22 21 7 25 20 
Mean (X) 2.364 2.667 2.000 2.800 2.200 
S. D. 0.790 0.658 0.816 0.408 0.768 
Disagree 5 9 22 5 6 
Unable to 
CoTrmnt 
11 8 9 8 12 
Importance 3 2 5 1 4 
Unanimity 4 2 5 1 3 
Agreement 2 3 5 1 4 
Certainty 4 1 3 1 5 
Delphi Index 3.25 2.0 4.5 1.0 4.0 
Mean of Delphi index = 2.95 
Statements 17.1,17.3 and 17.5 were dropped because their D. I. 
was greater than the mean D. I. (2.95). Therefore fran the 
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analysis the Panel raised the following objections to the 
original statement : 
a) each case must be judged on its merits, and 
b) Seize all assets and give a court allowance until trial,, and 
withdraw the passport. 
Counents received fran the Panel 
most investigations into commercial crime are 
of necessity lengthy. If early arrest is 
required and no bail, impossible pressures would 
be put on investigators. Overseas police 
enquiries can take up to 18 months due to the 
slow reaction by some governments and police 
forces. In most cases there is little real 
alternative for realistic bail being set in order 
to allow for full investigation and preparation. 
If this is not done more acquittals would result. 
Certainly passports should be impounded but I 
doubt if the courts would be permitted to seize 
all assets until a case had been proved. 
The major problem as I see it is that there is a 
tendency for "criminals" to settle out of court. 
The dilemma for the plaintiff is should he settle 
out of court and get some money back quickly but 
thereby let the 'criminal' buy his way out of 
trouble or should he let the case come to trial 
with all the delay, legal costs (and risk of 
losing) inherent in this. The tendency is for 
most cases to be settled out of court. If a case 
is not reported and the details of the crime not 
promulgated, then it makes easier for the 
'criminal' to repeat the crime on the next 
unsuspecting party. 
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Original Statement 
When a conmercial criminal is convicted on more than one count, 
the sentences should not run concurrently. 
The following coments were received from the experts 
disagreeing with the above statement : 
18.1 This would be contrary to the basic principles of justice 
and an interference with judicial independence. 
18.2 Why should this crime be different from others ? 
18.3 It depends on whether there was more than one episode of 
criminal behaviour. 
18.4 The maximum sentence available is high enough for a 
sufficient penalty to be imposed by concurrent sentences. 
Table 8.21 - Analysis of Statement No. 18 
Statement 
Number 18.1 18.2 18.3 18.4 
Agree (n) 25 14 10 
Mean (X) 2.778 2.640 2.357 2.900 
S. D. 0.548 0.700 0.842 0.316 
Disagree 6 2 13 5 
Unable to 
Ccm, nent 
Importance 
14 
1 
11 
2 
11 
3 
- 
23 
UTC 
Unanimity 
--- 
1 
-- 
2 
--- 
3 > 
19 
Agreement 
--- 
2 
--- 
1 
-- 
3 
Certainty 3 1 1 
Delphi Index 1.75 
I- 
1.50 2.50 
Mean of Delphi Index = 1.92 
Statement 18.4 was dropped because its UTC was greater than 19, 
i. e. there was doubt on its certainty, as this is a coment 
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which requires very specialised knowledge of the subject. 
Statement 18.3 was dropped because its D. I. was greater than the 
mean D. I. (1.92). Therefore from the analysis it appears that 
the main objections to the original statement are : 
a) wtry should this crime be different from others ?,, and 
b) this would be contrary to the basic principles of justice and 
an interference with judicial independence. 
ConTents received from the Panel 
In view of the "international" nature of these 
crimes the level of sentences available in say 
Pakistan may be somewhat different from Brazil 
and thus item 4 is impossible to answer. 
Additionally four years in a Mexican prison may 
"equal" ten in a British one. 
If there is more than one episode of criminal 
behaviour, the other case or cases must be of a 
similar nature if they are to be considered. 
Whatever penalty is decided upon will depend on 
the details of the cases involved. 
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Original Statement 
The centralised registry for Bills of Lading would be an 
effective instrument against documentary fraud in the oil and 
dry bulk trade but not in the dry cargo trade. 
The following comments were received from the experts 
disagreeing with the above statement. 
19.1 It way be a partial deterrent only, even in oil and dry 
bulk trades. 
19.2 It is more a trade facilitation measure; 
Table 8.22 - Analysis of Statement No. 19 
Statement 
Number 19.1 19.2 
Agree (n) 23 18 
Mean 1.913 1.833 
S. D. 0.668 0.857 
Disagree 4 9 
Unable to 11 11 
Comment 
Importance 
X X 
Unanimity <2 <2 
Agreement 
Certainty 
Delphi Index 
As statements 19.1 and 19.2 were dropped because their was 
less than 2, i. e. they were not considered important. 
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Ccxments received from the Panel 
How would such a registry have stopped the 
"Salein" fraud ? 
Ineffective in either trade. Centralised registry 
may speed sale/transfer of title but cannot 
personally identify consignee. Indeed speed of 
sale/transfer exacerbates consignee identifi- 
cation. When does barrier on trading fall ? on 
arrival, on confirmation of arrival ? Who pays 
dernurrage in the manwhile ? 
Even in the oil and dry bulk trades it is not, in 
my view, going to provide an effective instrument 
against fraud. It way be a partial deterrent, 
however. 
False information fed in at the start could 
create the fraud ? Basically it is a trade 
facilitation concept, not an anti-fraud one. 
346 
Original Statement 
All types of shipping intenrediaries (i. e. ship's agent,, freight 
forwarder, broker) whether acting for the ship or cargo 
interests should be registered and licenced and should 
undergo a solvency test every year. 
The following comments were received from the experts 
disagreeing with the above statement : 
20.1 only if supervised by a recognised international self- 
regulatory body, e. g. FIATA, FONASBA. 
20.2 All intermediaries should belong to a recognised trade body 
or association. 
20.3 Cumbersome and expensive. 
20.4 Difficult to justify greater control of this type of. 
intermediary than any other trader. 
20.5 Solvency is difficult to test. 
20.6 This will not prevent fraudsters from finding gullible 
shippers. 
Table 8.23 - Analysis of Statement No. 20 
Statemnt 
Number 20.1 20.2 20.3 20.4 20.5 20.6 
Agree (n) 20 22 19 . 19 24 30 
Mean (X) 2.200 2.318 2.105 2.211 2.333 2.367 
S. D. 0.768 0.716 0.875 0.631 0.702 0.669 
Disagree 12 12 16 13 10 2 
Unable to 
Cariment 
Importance 
6 
5 
4 
3 
3 
6 
6 
4 
4 
2 
6 
1 
Unanimity 5 4 6 1 3 2 
Agreeimnt 4 3 5 5 2 1 
Certainty 4 2 1 4 2 4 
Delphi Index 4.5 3.0 4.5 3.5 2.25 2.0 
Mean of Delphi Index = 3.29 
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Statements 20.1,20.3 and 20.4 were dropped because their D. I. 
was greater than the mean D. I. (3.29). Therefore from the 
analysis it appears that the objections raised to the original 
staternent are : 
a) this will not prevent fraudsters frcm finding gullible 
shippers, 
b) solvency is difficult to test, and 
c) all intennediaries should belong to a recognised trade body 
or association. 
Cooments received from the Panel 
Whilst I do not believe this would totally 
prevent fraud it would help. 
Still, those who are careful would have greater 
protection. Those who are gullible enough, should 
pay the price and learn from experience the hard 
way. 
Referring to statement 20.1 one expert said that on the Baltic 
Exchange shipping intermediaries are required to be registered 
now. Another expert said that statements 20.1 and 20.2 should be 
mandatory. one member said that statement 20.2 was a nice idea 
but would not be practical. 
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Original Statement 
All ship's agents and all other agencies concerned with booking 
space on a vessel should provide indemity bonds for the due 
perfommicce of the voyage by the ship or shipping company whose 
agents they are. 
The following comments were received from the experts 
disagreeing with the above statement : 
21.1 Possible when using chartered ships but not in liner 
trades. 
21.2 Committing agent to be responsible for master's actions 
destroys whole principle of agency. 
21.3 Cost would be prohibitive for large firms who represent 
several shipowners. 
21.4 Impossible, except for liner trades. 
21.5 Exporters who book direct will have to be included. 
Table 8.24 - Analysis of Statement No. 21 
Statement 
Number 21.1 21.2 21.3 21.4 21.5 
Agree (n) 11 ý 20 21 - 12 18 
Mean (X) 2.273 2.600 2.524 2.333 2.167 
S. D. 0.647 0.503 0.512 0.778 0.707 
Disagree 18 9 8 14 6 
Unable to 
Comment 
Importance 
9 
4 
9 
1 
9 
2 
12 
3 
14 
5 
Unanimity 3 1 2 5 4 
Agreement 5 2 1 4 3 
Certainty 1 1 1 4 5 
Delphi Index 3.25 1.25 1.5 4.0 4.25 
Mean of Delphi Index = 2.85 
Statements 21.1,21.4 and 21.5 were dropped because their D. I. 
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was greater than the mean D. I. (2.85). Therefore, in the 
opinion of the Panel : 
a) Ccmmitting agents to be responsible for the master's (i. e. 
principal's) actions destroys the whole principle of agency, 
and 
b) Cost would be prohibitive for large firms who represent 
several shipowners. 
Cmiments Received fran the Panel 
Agents should accept certain responsibility, and 
if they know who they are representing they 
should not disagree to such a proposal (i. e. as 
stated in the original statement). 
Agents should clearly state that they act in this 
capacity and should be careful whorn they 
represent. It is not sufficient say "I am only an 
agent" when the agent continues to represent 
unreliable principals. 
They can always make arrangements with their 
principal to share costs, and if the principals 
are serious and willing to co-operate in reducing 
fraud, see no difficulty in getting them to 
accept. 
Two experts pointed out that the costs would also be prohibitive 
for the smaller firms who represent one or two owners. One of 
the experts disagreed with this point and said that the cost 
would not be excessive if agents represent good owners. 
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Original Statement 
The non-negotiable sea waybill will prevent documentary 
maritime fraud. 
In view of the comments received from experts disagreeing with 
the above statement it has been changed to: 
The non-negotiable sea waybill will materially assist in the 
prevention of documentary maritime fraud. 
Table 8.25 - Analysis of Statement No. 22 
Respondents 
Replies 
No. Percentage 
of Replies 
Percentage 
Expressing 
opinions 
AGREE 19 50.0% 61.3% 
DISAGREE 12 31.6% 38.7% 
UNABLE TO COMMENT 7 18.4% - 
DID NOT REPLY 
on the first round the majority of opinion was against the 
statement that "the non-negotiable sea waybill will prevent 
documentary fraud". As a result of the responses on the first 
round the statement was amended to read "the non-negotiable sea 
waybill will Tmterially assist in the prevention of documentary 
fraud". 
Therefore, with this statement the 80% agreement criterion was 
maintained to determine acceptance by the Panel. On the second 
round, whilst the majority agreed with the statement, the 
required 80% consensus was not reached. 
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It is, therefore, proposed to draw conclusions based on the 
ccmments received from the experts on the two rounds. The 
Panel Is cormients are : 
It is not a panacea for all ills but it will 
substantially reduce the scope for fraud. 
It will prevent certain kinds of documentary 
maritime frauds such as those perpetrated by the 
presentation of a forged Bill of Lading at the 
port of discharge. It will not, of itself, 
prevent documentary maritime fraud. 
It will man a great hinderance to the smooth 
flow of international trade. 
I regard faith, unjustified, in the "security" of 
a non-negotiable sea waybill as dangerous and a 
possible encouragement to fraud. 
Without proper and foolproof evidence to identify 
consignee the non-negotiable waybill is likely to 
increase documentary maritime fraud. 
Nothing in documentary terms will prevent 
fraud. 
The next chapter reviews the analysis on the two round and draws 
conclusions and makes recomnendations based on the research 
f indings. 
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TABLE 8.2 - ANALYSIS OF QUESTIONNAIRE NO. 2 
STATE AGREE I DISAGREE UNABLE TO 
MENT No-. 
111213 
COMMENT 
-14 
17 
1-5 2 6 
2-1 7 12 
2-2 1 9 
2-3 4 9 
2-4 9 11 
2-5 4 9 
2-6 - 7 
3-1 5 13 
3-4 2 
4-1 
4-2 2 
4-1 
5-1 
5-2 
5-3 
10 
5 
8 
4 
7 
5 
7 
5 
19 
4 
7 
4 
4 
8 
12 
6-3 
7-1 
7-2 
4 
4 
8 
21 
7 
1 12 
5 
1 
4 
4 
7 
11 
8 
7 
8 
12 
15 
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TABLE 8.2 CONTINUED 
STATE- 
MENT No. 1 
AGREE 
2 3 
DISAGREE UNABLE TO 
COMMENT 
8-1 5 6 6 8 13 
8-2 5 12 6 2 13 
8-3 3 8 7 6 14 
8-4 5 6 2 7 18 
9-1 4 8 8 11 7 
9-2 6 7 1 15 9 
9-3 6 1 4 9 18 
9-4 1 10 3 
. 
11 13 
9-5 1 9 5 14 9 
10-1 3 6 7 10 12 
10-2 1 10 16 1 10 
10-3 1 8 12 1 16 
10-4 3 5 7 11 12 
11-1 2 12 4 11 9 
11-2 1 10 10 7 10 
11-3 1 17 14 1 5 
11-4 3 15 9 4 7 
12-1 14 9 4 5 6 
12-2 11 10 9 4 4 
12-3 7 8 18 1 4 
12-4 3 11 11 5 8 
13-1 1 10 4 13 
13-2 3 12 1 2 20 
13-3 1 7 6 13 11 
13-4 2 5 2 9 20 
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TABLE 8.2 CONTINUED 
STATE- 
MENT No. 1 
AGREE 
2 3 
DISAGREE UNABLE TO 
COMMENT 
14-1 7 10 5 7 9 
14-2 1 1 8 22 6 
14-3 1 6 9 14 8 
14-4 1 3 6 10 18 
14-5 2 5 14 3 14 
15-1 4 14 4 - 16 
15-2 7 7 8 7 9 
15-3 4 9 5 9 11 
15-4 4 16 3 4 11 
15-5 4 7 7 2 18 
16-1 3 13 6 8 8 
16-2 1 10 8 13 6 
16-3 12 8 4 8 6 
16-4 6 9 17 4 2 
16-5 4 8 18 4 4 
16-6 7 9 9 9 4 
16-7 7 6 3 17 5 
17-1 4 6 12 5 11 
17-2 2 3 16 9 8 
17-3 2 3 2 22 9 
17-4 - 5 20 5 8 
17-5 4 8 8 6 12 
18-1 1 2 15 6 14 
18-2 3 3 19 2 11 
18-3 3 3 8 13 11 
18-4 - 1 9 5 23 
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TABLE 8.2 CONTINUED 
STATE- AGPM DISAGPXE 
MM No. 2131 
-T3- 1 4-1 4 
5 5 9 
20-2 3 9 
20-3 6 5 
20-4 2 11 
20-5 3 10 
20-6 3 13 
21-1 1 6 
4. L-J 
21-4 
21-5 
22 
2 
10 
14 2 
4 18 
12 9 
11 8 
6 14 
12 
UNABLZ TV 
COMMENT 
3 
6 
4 
12 
14 
7 
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Mile wrong may be done, then, in either of two 
ways, that is, by force or by fraud, both are 
bestial : fraud seems to belong to the cunning 
fox, force to lion; both are wholly unworthy of 
man,, but fraud is the more contenptible. 
[Cicero (104-43 B. C. )] 
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CHAPrER 9- CONCWSIONS AND RHCOMMENDATIONS 
9.1 Introduction 
This research was an in-depth investigation of the system of 
international trade, using the systems approach, in order to 
identify the weak links which lead to the failure of the 
system - failure being defined as the occurrence of actual or 
potential documentary fraud. The Delphi technique, appropriately 
modified, was used to evaluate the hypothesis, determine the 
feasibility of recommendations, and to seek information which 
would assist in the development of long-term solutions to 
combat fraud. 
Using a database of 101 fraud cases the weak links were 
identified and verified using a multi-disciplinary international 
panel of forty experts. This chapter draws conclusions and makes 
recomnendations; based on the analysis and also makes 
recamendations for further research. 
9.2 Conclusions 
9.2.1 Analysis of Database 
The analysis of the database (see chapter 5) draws attention to 
the seriousness of the problem of maritime fraud. From the 
analysis carried out the following major points emerge: 
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- Greek and Panamanian ships have been involved in the majority 
of frauds. 
- majority of the vessels involved in frauds have been over 15 
years old. 
- Evidence of involvement of the same people in several cases 
has been found. 
- An estimated 70% of the cases of fraud are not reported by 
the victims. 
- An estimated 3,500 cases of maritime fraud occur each year. 
- Average loss per case is $9 million. In 1979 this figure 
was estimated to be $5 million and thought to be increasing 
(ICC Publication No. 370 (1980)]. 
- The minimum estimated loss due to maritime fraud is $ 31.5 
billion per annum. 
- Minimum estimated loss due to minor shipboard frauds is 
nearly $7 million per annum. 
- over 62% of the cases analysed were of documentary fraud, but 
it is difficult to classify frauds due to the overlap between 
the different classes of fraud. 
9.2.2 Synopsis of Main Findings 
9.2.2.1 General 
Whilst a few members of the Panel disagreed on certain 
points the general consensus of opinion of the international 
Panel of EXperts was that 
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During the period 1975 - 1985 there had been a considerable 
increase in the number of cases of maritime fraud with an 
increase in the surns involved per case. over the same period 
documntary fraud had caused the greatest financial loss. 
The factors which can be identified as having created an 
environment for fraud or which have contributed to its increase 
are : 
- Greed of the victims. 
- Naivety of the victims. 
%brld recession - which has forced people to cut costs. 
Surplus tonnage - which has reduced freight rates. 
- Severe port congestion - which has further reduced ship 
owner's and charterer's profit margins. 
- Absolute reliance on paper documents. 
- Insurers paying out on suspect claims. 
- Resistance to changes in archaic practices. 
- Inadequacies in or the absence of extradition treaties. 
- General lowering of ethical standards in business. 
- Improved conmnications, especially air travel. 
- Some countries not prepared to bear the very expensive cost 
of investigation and prosecution. 
- Increase in violent crime has put non-violent crimes, such as 
fraud, low in priority. 
359 
only a few fraud cases are reported because 
- of adverse publicity 
- of lack of response by the authorities. 
- of naivety of the victims. 
- perpetrators are not likely to be apprehended. 
- of loss of face/pride. 
- of cost of pursuing a claim. 
- of fear of being sued for defamation unless facts are clear 
cut. 
on the question of adequacy of the existing system of collection 
and-dissemination of ship-related information the findings are 
as follows : 
- Over 55% of the Experts said that the information is not 
adequate for preventing fraud. 
- Nearly 30% of the Experts were of the opinion that the 
information was not available to all the interested parties. 
- Over 25% of the Experts pointed out that the information was 
not readily available. 
- 20% of the Experts said that the information was too 
expensive to obtain. 
- However, 18% of the Experts claimed that all the necessary 
information is available but is not taken up or investigated 
because of naivety, ignorance and laziness. 
Whilst there was some disagreement on a few items there was 
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general agreement on the information required to combat fraud. 
The information required, given under various headings, is 
placed at the end of the chapter. The conclusion that can be 
drawn from the information required is that the participants 
must have as much knowledge of their contractual partners as 
possible. 
9.2.2.2 Identification of Weak Links 
Fran the analysis of the empirical data the conclusions drawn 
are presented under several headings : 
Bill of Lading 
Perhaps one of the most interesting, if unexpected, findings of 
this enquiry is that it is not in fact the B/L itself that forms 
the weak link : rather it is the people handling the document 
who contribute largely to failures in its effective utilisation. 
This would explain why all initiatives to find a replacement for 
the traditional B/L have not met with success. It also indicates 
that there is a general lack of awareness of the importance of 
this very important document. 
The research also shows that replacement of the conventional B/L 
by an Electronic Bill of Lading (EBL) would encounter resistance 
from all parties because the Panel consider that computer fraud 
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will make the EBL as insecure as the traditional one. 
The practice of issuing more than one original B/L in a set has 
facilitated documentary fraud in a few cases, however 
payment/negotiation is normally conducted only against 
presentation of the full set. 
A centralised registry for B/L would not be a deterrent against 
fraud. 
A difficult-to-forge B/L might lead buyers to neglect essential 
precautions including pre-contract stage checks. 
Whilst the use of a non-negotiable sea waybill in lieu of the 
traditional B/L will substantially reduce the scope for fraud, 
it must be recognised as a trade facilitation measure and should 
be treated as such. 
Documentary Credits 
A number of Experts were "unable to comment"on statements 
related to documentary credits. This highlights a disturbing 
aspect, i. e. that there is a general lack of awareness of this 
very important sub-system of the system of international trade. 
This would explain the reason for over 50% of documents tendered 
for payment under documentary credits being rejected on first 
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presentation (see chapter 4). The following are the major 
findings : 
The L)CP gives less responsibility to the banks, thereby giving 
opportunity for relaxation on the banker's side. Therefore, by 
implication, the UCP does not provide adequate protection 
against fraud. 
However, the applicant for the credit is also to blame for not 
drafting the credit with sufficient care, and he should be 
prepared to pay more for any additional checks he may wish the 
banks to undertake. 
Buyers and shippers should also initiate loading surveys on 
quality and quantity Of goods by reputable cargo surveyors 
for additional protection. 
The banks should carry out factual checks about the vessel's 
particulars and its geographical position at the time of 
loading. 
Delaying payment under documentary credits to allow banks to 
carry out checks would bring trade to a standstill and increase 
thefts after discharge. The use of computerised databases to 
carry out such checks would be welcome. 
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Shipping Intermediaries 
The registration, licensing and solvency testing of shipping 
intermediaries will not prevent fraud. However, all 
intermediaries should belong to a recognised trade body or 
organisation. 
The quality of the broker chosen determines whether proper 
checks are carried out before entering into charter agreements. 
Responsible agents/freight forwarders usually make full 
enquiries about their principals before entering into contracts 
of agency. 
It is the duty of the insurance broker to check the bonafides of 
the owner/operator before deciding to represent him. However, 
the underwriters should ask the broker about this as a matter of 
course. 
Miscellaneous 
The majority of frauds are caused by the lack of proper checks 
before entering into contracts. 
The need to cut costs and the lack of comercial expertise has 
made the State Trading Organisations of developing countries the 
target of fraudsters. 
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The acceptance of commercial malpractices as customary has 
contributed to the growth of documentary fraud. 
Simplification of documentation has not contributed to the 
increase in documentary fraud because simplification does not 
mean a reduction in protective clauses in the documents. 
The question of secrecy raises an interesting point, i. e., to 
what extent are some illegal practices considered commercially 
acceptable ? For example, 60% of the Experts agreed that 
secrecy is important to protect commercial advantage and to 
breach sanctions, etc. However, it must be pointed out that 34% 
were unable to coment. 
The registration of ships is not adequately supervised in a 
number of countries. This not only allows sub-standard ships to 
be registered with ease but also permits the unscrupulous 
operators to change the name, ownership and flag of the vessel, 
thereby assisting them in the perpetration of fraud. 
The ease with which a company can be registered with complete 
anonymity for the directors has permitted the criminals to hide 
behind foreign nominees. 
The following factors have contributed to the increase in 
maritime fraud : 
the international nature of shipping, 
lack of jurisdiction outside national boundaries, 
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- lack of harmonisation of international laws and 
- the unfamiliarity of the judiciary with the concepts of 
maritim laws 
The majority of frauds are caused by the lack of proper checks 
before entering into contracts. 
The need to cut costs and the lack of commrcial expertise has 
made the State Trading Organisations of developing countries the 
target of fraudsters. 
The acceptance of cornmercial malpractices as customary has 
contributed to the growth in documentary fraud. 
Recommendations to Combat Fraud/Commercial Crime 
Commercial crime, including conspiracy to commit fraud, should 
be created as a universal crime by an international convention 
and should be made an extraditable offence. 
In the event of a conviction in commercial crime, a policy of 
much heavier sentencing should be ad6pted. 
The penalty for commercial criminals should be seizure of all 
assets from the proceeds of the crime. The burden of proving 
that some of his assets are not from the crime should rest with 
the criminal. In addition, they should be given a court 
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allowance until trial and have their passports withdrawn. 
Procedures for changing a ship's name should be more heavily 
supervised. 
Every ship should be issued with a unique international ship 
identification number which will remain the same throughout the 
life of the vessel regardless of changes of name, ownership or 
nationality. 
The introduction of a system of port classification in 
accordance with levels of cargo losses will increase port 
security, and will also highli4ht high security risk ports. 
9.3 aeccmmend tions 
Some of the information required to combat fraud will be based 
on fact and some on subjective judgements. Therefore, it must 
be recognised that sane of the data would be difficult to 
obtain, particularly for parties from developing countries who 
may not know where to obtain such information. This problem 
could be overcome by the formation of an Information Centre 
which would answer queries by collating the information 
currently provided by the different organisations to their 
members. 
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Due to the difficulty experienced in obtaining factual data 
the establishment of a Cotmaercial Crime Research Unit is 
recommended. This Unit would collate statistics on fraud losses 
on a worldwide basis to assist investigators in the 
identification of emerging patterns and trends and conduct 
research on specific areas related to commercial crime with 
emphasis on international trade. In addition this Research 
Unit could also act as the Information Centre referred to above. 
There is an urgent need to develop an educational progranue 
not only on the importance, limitations and future prospects of 
the traditional B/L but also on what constitutes good and bad 
commercial practice. In addition, the programme should emphasize 
the procedures for carrying out the necessary pre-contractual 
checks and identify the* sources of information. Two such 
programmes have been developed within the last twelve months. 
They are : 
a) The ICC-IMB Course entitled "International Trading - Keeping 
afloat in a difficult market", and 
b) The Societe Generale de Surveillance SA Course entitled 
"International Trade, Contracts & Malpractices". 
However, both courses have a very limited audience. 
The ICC Comnission on Banking Technique and Practice should 
consider a change in their attitude and re-examine the role of 
banks in assisting international trade participants by : 
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a) a programme of education about the shortcomings of payment 
under documentary credits, and 
b) offering to provide factual checks on the vessel's 
particulars and geographical position at the time of loading 
For payment under documentary credits the Courts should be more 
liberal in their interpretation of the fraud exception rule to 
grant interlocutory relief against the beneficiary. However, to 
prevent unjustified allegations of fraud, the applicant should 
be required to pay into Court, not only the value of the credit 
but also any damages suffered by the seller while further 
investigation is carried out to verifY the allegations. 
Another solution to avoid the risk of fraud is to purchase goods 
on a delivered price basis, i. e. payment for the goods on 
delivery, thereby transferring all the risks on the seller. If 
this is not possible the buyer should not enter into a contract 
without carrying out detailed investigation into the bonafides 
of the seller. 
All Professional Associations of shipping intermediaries should 
introduce a system of annual or biennial checking of the 
financial accounts of their members. 
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It should be made a condition of 611 insurance policies to 
report losses due to fraud to the police before a claim can be 
f iled. 
In order to combat maritime fraud it is absolutely essential for 
the governments to co-operate to eliminate the major weaknesses 
in international criminal law. 
The Delphi technique has proved to be an extremely useful 
research methodology for research into sensitive subject areas. 
Ludlow (1971) points out its tremendous potential for bridging 
the information gap between researchers and decision makers 
should be given high priority. This technique should be used 
more extensively for generating information, testing hypotheses 
and the feasibility of recommendations to be implemented. As the 
technique is still in its infancy, problems can be encountered 
in quantification of the responses. For this study, however, 
these problems were overcome by adopting a methodological 
approach to develop screening criteria. 
9.3.1 Recommendations for Future Research 
International trade documentation will be replaced by "paperless 
trade" in the near future. Therefore, the concern expressed by 
the Panel over computer fraud is justified as the increasing use 
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of computers for storage and transmission of data implies a 
greater risk of exposure of sensitive information to 
unauthorised disclosure, addition, deletion and modification. 
Technology exists today to overcome the problem of security. 
Kapoor (1985a) points out that at present, cryptography is the 
only known method which can be used to protect information 
transmitted between computers through communications networks. 
There is, therefore, requirement for further research into the 
development and transmission of Encrypted Trade Documents, and 
in particular, the Encrypted Bill of Lading (see Appendix 7) 
which makes use of the strengths of both the traditional B/L and 
Electronic Data Interchange. 
If, despite the recommendations of this research and other 
initiatives, the Banks decide not to offer an additional 
checking service, it is recommended that further research should 
be conducted into the possibility of another participant in the 
trade, say the Shipping Company, taking on the role of providing 
finance along similar lines to that offered by a bank and offer 
the additional service of conducting detailed checks before 
payment. 
The development of a suitable systern of port classification 
would require further research to determine the factors to be 
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taken into account in the allocation of an equitable 
classification. 
Finally, for effective measures to be introduced to curb the 
increase in fraudulent activity, the nx)st important factors are 
awareness, co-ordination, co-operation and the need for 
openness for the good of the international trading community, 
i. e. the whole system. This research has attempted to adopt such 
an approach. 
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INFORM&TION REQUIRED TO COMBAT FRAUD 
SHIP DEMW 
Ship's Name, including former name(s) 
official Number, Call sign and Port of registry 
Type of Ship and Age 
G. R. T., Deadweight and Bale capacity 
Classification Detail 
Details of Insurance including underwriter's name 
Details of P&I Cover 
Position of Ship at the time of loading including berth 
Details of Agent 
Last Fixture and name of charterer 
Main bunker supplier 
Last dry-dock - when and where 
OWNERSHIP DETAILS 
Name, Address, Tel. & Telex Nos. of : Registered Owner 
Beneficial owner 
Names of vessels owned 
operator/Manager 
Creditworthiness 
Reputation 
Track/Claims Record 
P&I Cover Details 
CHARTERER'S DETAILS & SUB-CHARTERER 
Name, Address, Tel. & Telex Nos. of the Charterer 
Creditworthiness - to include credit analysis 
Reputation 
Track Record - to include length of time in present business 
Names of chartered ships 
P&I Cover Details 
Charterer's Agent 
Bunker suppliers 
SHIPPER'S MAILS 
Name, Address, Tel. & Telex Nos. of the Shipper 
Creditworthiness 
Reputation 
Track Record - to include length of time in present business 
Shipper's Agent 
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BROKER/AGENT DETAILS 
Name, Address, Tel. & Telex Nos. of the Broker/Agent 
Creditworthiness 
Reputation 
Track Record - to include length of time in present business 
P&I Cover Details - otherwise scope of liability cover 
Membership of National or International Association 
Reference from principals 
Check that annual returns lodged in accordance with Companies 
Act - (referring to the UK) 
COMPANY DETAILS 
If any of the above are a company the following additional 
information is required : 
Name, Address, Tel. & Telex Nos. of the Registered office 
Nameo, Address, Tel. & Telex Nos. of the Head Office if different 
Date & Place of Incorporation 
Share Capital - authorised and paid up 
Last Balance Sheet 
Names & Addresses of major share holders 
Details of Directors 
Name and Address of Legal Advisors 
COMMERCIAL DETAILS 
Name & Type Qf Charter Party 
Period of Charter 
Details of Charterer, 
Owner, and Broker or Agent arranging the Charter (as above) 
Who issues Bills of Lading ? 
Who endorses Bills of Lading ? 
Governing Law 
Name & Address of Bankers 
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APPENDIX- I 
$ 40 MILLION SHIPPING FRAUD : TWO HEED 
Two men believed to be part of a syndicate were arrested in a 
Singapore shipping office. The syndicate is believed to have 
claimed compensation from the insurance companies for two 
incidents where two foreign vessels, on a voyage from Singapore 
to India, purportedly sank in late 1979. The syndicate claimed 
that the vessels were fully loaded, and the claim came to $ 40 
million. 
However, two reports were received subsequently alleging that 
the vessels were sunk deliberately by the syndicate and that the 
syndicate was also alleged to have recovered the losses from the 
shippers. After three years of investigation it was found that 
the vessels were not loaded with any goods. 
SOURCE : New Straits Times, 15th. April 1982, Singapore. 
FOUR CHARGED WITH BID TO CHEAT BANKS OF S$ 17 MILLION 
Four men were charged for conspiring to cheat three banks of a 
total of S$ 17 million by presenting false shipping documnts. 
The banks were : European Asia Bank, 
Hong Kong & Shanghai Bank, and 
Banque Nationale de Paris. 
SOURCE : Straits Times, 17th. April 1982, Singapore. 
1 
SHARJAH CARGO PREY 70 PIRACY 
8,900 barrels of lube oil, worth $ 2.5 million, was shipped on 
the Singaporean vessel "Speed Success". The vessel sailed from 
Mina Khalid on 18th. August 1981 for Bandar Abbas. 
A month elapsed before the agents discovered that the cargo had 
not reached the destination. On inquiry the owners, Voyage 
Maritme Company, said that they were not aware of the vessel's 
whereabouts but appeared unconcerned about the vessel's fate. 
Subsequent investigations revealed that the cargo had been sold 
at a price much lower than its value and the vessel had been 
hidden at an obscure point off Singapore. A case was established 
against the owners and a court order was secured on 15th October 
to arrest the vessel. A sum of $ 240,000 received by the owners 
as advance payment was frozen in a Singapore bank. 
The owners, who are absconding, have indicated that they are 
prepared for a negotiated settlement of the case and would 
return the cargo to the consignees on another vessel at their 
expense, 
SOURCE : 
Nayar, K. P., Khaleej Times, 21st. October 1981. 
A2 
THE CUBAN COFFEE CAPER 
Knowing that the Cubans were in need of coffee,, Karl Fessler, 
approached the Goverment's trade representative with an offer 
to sell them 3,000 tonne of "Barahonall, an Arabic blend grown in 
the Dominican Republic, at $ 1.39 per pound,, 15 cents less than 
the world market price. Wben the Cubans asked to inspect the 
coffee, Fessler assured them that there was no need for it. The 
totalprice for the coffee was $ 8.7 million. 
Companies were set up and a "rust bucket" of Panamanian registry 
was purchased for $ 700,000. Fessler and his associates bribed 
anybody who might hinder the progress of the operation. 
Apparently, one of the port officials had not been bribed and he 
therefore, refused to let the "scuttling crew" board the vessel. 
As a result the vessel had to sail with the original crew, who 
were not aware of the plot. 
The vessel sailed from Santo Domingo in November 1978, with no 
cargo on board. Fessler presented the appropriate shipping 
documents - invoices, B/L, inspection certificates, telex from 
the ship's master to the Bank of Nova Scotia in Toronto. The 
bank disbursed the 8.7 million as per Fessler's instructions. 
En route, the crew suspected that something was amiss, so they 
A3 
diverted the vessel and sailed into Puerto Limon, Costa Rica, 
and left the ship. 
When the ship failed to arrive, the Cuban representative's fears 
were allayed by a telex explaining that due to nechanical 
problems the vessel was delayed. Eventually the brokers flew to 
Costa Rica to check the cause and found the vessel empty, and 
that the perpetrators of the fraud had vanished. However, 
Fessler turned up in Miami, and went on a spending spree, where 
he was arrested in December 1978. On him they found $ 40,000 in 
cash, travellers checks and around-the-world air tickets. 
Fessler lived so openly because he though that he not committed 
a crime liable to prosecution inthe United States, and he had 
not figured on the Canadian authorities pressing so vigorously 
for his extradition. 
SOUrCE : 
Time, 12th. February 1979, p. 36 
SHIPPING FRAUD EWATED ON PHANTOM FIRMS 
Millions of dollars were paid for the phantom services rendered 
by the fictitious companies, individuals and ships by Kaare 
Gilboe, a ship broker. 
A4 
"Mr. Gilboe bas been investigated by police in Hong Kong, Tokyo 
and London, but in each instance inquiries were dropped, 
possibly due to the complexity of his schemes and the difficulty 
of assembling witnesses. " 
Gilboe's Philippine Fraud 
In 1977 a goverment vessel-chartering unit, Philippine National 
Lines, asked Gilboe to fix three vessels to ship 100,000 tons of 
grain from the United States to the Philippines. Gilboe 
chartered three ships through a company called Maritime Shipping 
Investirent. 
dilboe was paid by the Philippine National Lines, but never 
paid the charter hire to the shipowners. As a result the 
Philippines lost $ 989,000 as they had to pay the real 
shipowners for the vessels. 
********** 
Gilboe's Chinese Frauds 
In 1979 Gilboe chartered three vessels for the Peoples Republic 
of China to carry 100,000 tons of grain from Argentina to China. 
He was paid $ 1.3 million by the Chinese for the deal. He did 
not pay the real shipowners as a result the Chinese had to pay 
A5 
an additional $1 million to the shipowners. 
In the second Chinese fraud Gilboe set up a company in Tokyo, 
called Gulf Pacific Chartering, with an Australian Richard 
Cunningham. Through a friend he obtained permission to use Tokyo 
Freighting's, a respected concern, telex for incoming messages. 
He then made it known that he represented Eddie Hsu, chairman of 
a reputable Taiwanese company Eddie Steamship. 
Gilboe then told a Tokyo Chartering broker that he represented 
Robina Shipping, a well known unit of the Ednasa Group of Hong 
Kong, and was looking for three ships to carry grain from New 
Orleans to China. Tokyo Chartering, working through legitimate 
brokers in London & Copenhagen charterea the three ships. 
Two weeks before the ships loaded, Gilboe - posing as Tokyo 
Freighting - telexed Howard Houlder in London, the broker 
representing the Chinese,, to send the service fee to Royal Bank 
& Trust Cornpany of New York on behalf of Maritime Brokers and 
not to their Japanese bank. 
After the ships had loaded in August 1980 the Chinese, 
following Gilboe's instructions, paid $ 2.9 million from the 
Bank of China in Peking through the Bank of Tokyo in New York to 
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the Royal Bank & Trust Cornpany in New York for the account of 
Maritime Brokers. The shipowners were not paid by Gilboe. 
When the real shipowners did not get paid they began to 
complain, and threatened to enforce their lien on the cargo for 
non-payment of hire. China had to pay $ 2.3 million to the 
legitimate shipowners to get their cargo of grain. 
SOURCE : 
Williams, J. D., International Herald Tribune, 28th. /29th. 
November 1981, New York. 
***************************************************************** 
FRAW/SUSPICIOUS SINKING 
A cargo ship of 8000 G. R. T. and 500 N. R. T. was sold to Hong 
Kong interests in March 1978 for $ 296,280. The ship was 
accepted on 30th. March without inspection for delivery to a 
breaking up berth at Junk Bay, Hong Kong. As the sales agreement 
called for demolition only an option to trade and sell the 
vessel for trading was obtained on payment of an additional 
$ 40,000. The next day the vessel was resold for $ 379,280 to a 
Panamanian company controlled by a resident in Hong Kong. No 
repairs had been carried out. 
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On 31st. March Nigeria imposed a ban on the import of all luxury 
goods, and many other items considered non-essential, unless 
they were shipped prior to lst. April, and arrived in Nigerian 
territorial waters on or before 30th. June 1978. 
The vessel sailed from Hong Kong on 3rd. April and arrived at 
Walvis Bay on 27th. June. on route she called at the following 
ports : Bangkok, Yokohama, Kobe and Hong Kong (again) and loaded 
general cargo including rice, clothing, canned fish and 
electrical goods. The cargo was insured for over $6 million. In 
all instances the Bills of Lading were back-dated to 28th. 
March, and the insurance policies were also back-dated, but the 
certificate of insurance was claused "Warranted no loss prior to 
13th. May 1978". 
Prior to the vessel's arrival at Walvis Bay a dispute arose 
between the owners of the canned fish and the consignees in 
Lagos. At the request of the cargo owners the shipowner 
instructed the vessel to put into Walvis Bay and discharge the 
fish. A cargo surveyor noted that the cargo of fish in No. 4 
tween deck was wet and reported the presence of half an inch of 
water in the after tween deck. 
The vessel eventually sailed from Walvis Bay on lst. July, i. e. 
when she should have been in Nigerian waters to comply with the 
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governmental order. The vessel sailed north for 24 hours, 
maintaining radio silence. Then water was reported leaking into 
holds 1 and 4. Pumping of water began but the vessel continued 
on her course at 10 knots, but the pumping could not keep up 
with the entry of water and the vessel developed a list. 
At 0600 on 3rd. July the rmster decided to divert the ship and 
return to Walvis Bay. At 0800 he gave the order to abandon the 
ship. At 0930 he instructed the Radio Off icer to send out an 
S. O. S. and at 1000 the crew abandoned the ship. 
The crew were picked up by a Russian Fishing Factory ship. Two 
days later the vessel was taken in tow by a Russian Salvage Tug, 
with a South African Tug in attendance. The towline broke and 
the South African Tug placed a line on board. 
The next day, with four crewmen from the South African Tug on 
board, the vessel took a sudden list and sank within minutes. 
The four crewmen were rescued. 
The circumstances were such as to make the sinking very 
suspicious. The vessel could not arrive in Lagos prior to the 
prohibition date. Much of the cargo on board was prohibited, and 
even the rice would have been subject to a higher import tariff. 
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The shippers and consignees were -members of two or three 
families with branches in the Far East and Nigeria. 
Whilst the vessel was still in Walvis Bay a meeting of the 
shippers was held in Hong Kong, which was attended by a 
shipowner's representative. one of the two main Hong Kong 
brokers telexed their London office on 4th. July, informing them 
that the vessel had sunk, i. e. 24 hours after the vessel had 
been abandoned but two days before the ship actually sank. 
Donovan, J. J. (1980) 
Legal Safeguards for the Cargo Owner, pp. 33-43, 
In seminar on "Prevention of Shipping Fraud", held in New York 
on 26/27th. June 1980. 
ARSON/SHIP SCUTMING 
Mr. X, the head of a notorious Hong Kong family contrived to 
meet an executive, Mr. Y, of a reputable plywood supply in 
Singapore. Y was invited to Hong Kong and after being given a 
taste of high living was persuaded to enter into a conspiracy to 
defraud which would make him an instant millionaire. 
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The scheme was that X would furnish Y with a ship and that Y 
would approach one of his customers in the U. K. and advise him 
that he had a vessel available to carry a large consignment of 
plywood. X proposed that they would not load any plywood on 
board the ship which will be scuttled in deep water after 
sailing fran Singapore. 
X appointed an agent in Singapore who prepared Bills of Lading 
and other shipping documents, which purportedly covered the 
shipmnt to the U. K. Payment was to be by irrevocable 
documentary credit. on presentation of documents Y obtained 
$ 2.5 million under the credit. The money was split equally 
between X and Y. 
The vessel sailed from Singapore with no cargo on board but 
returned several days later. The buyer became suspicious and 
advised Y that one of their directors was flying to Singapore 
to look into the situation. Y became anxious and implored X 
to get the ship out and sink her. X kept stalling and offered 
excuses - engine trouble, crew requiring more bribe money, etc. - 
and eventually persuaded Y to part with more than half of his 
share with the understanding that matters would be adjusted 
later on. 
The vessel f inally sailed from Singapore bound for Penang but en 
11 
route she broke down and was towed to Bangkok,, where she 
underwent repairs to her main engine and steering gear. After 
repairs the vessel's name was changed and she loaded a cargo of 
rice for Lagos, Nigeria. The cargo being loaded both at berth 
and at anchor mid-stream. The newly named vessel was insured to 
the maximum value. 
After loading was completed the vessel was delayed another week 
due to further engine repairs. on completion of the repairs she 
sailed out of port. The next day fire broke out and the crew 
abandoned the ship and were shortly picked up without fatality 
or injury. 
Informed sources and investigations have revealed : 
- The vessel was of 4000 G. R. T. which traded in the Far East and 
over the course of 14 years underwent 9 changes of naxne and 
ownership. The ship was owned by a notorious Hong Kong family 
and investigations revealed that various members of the family 
would appear as owners and agents of these companies and 
ships. 
- Milst the loading of rice was checked by a firm of cargo 
superintendents, there is a strong suspicion that a large 
quantity was short-shipped, because in some ports the tally 
clerks do not work hard at night, if at all. 
- The repairer's records show that the vessel took delivery of 
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200 gallons of gasoline, together with a pump and suction 
hose,, although there was no equipment on board where gasoline 
could be used. 
It is possible the original plan was to discharge the cargo at 
Penang and then scuttle the ship, but because of the engine 
breakdown the crew decided to scuttle the ship as quickly as 
possible. 
SOURCE 
Donovan, J. J. (1980) 
Legal Safeguards for the Cargo Owner, pp. 33-43, 
In seminar on "Prevention of Shipping Fraud", held in New York 
on 26/27th. June 1980. 
***************************************************************** 
M. V. "Betty" 
In 1979 a Greek company (Pero *Shipping Company) purchased a 24 
year old ship known as the M. V. "Black Eagle". It was renamed 
the "Betty" and registered in Limassol. 
The Betty was chartered by an Italian company (Andreaspray) and 
loaded a cargo of reinforcing steel (3,500 tons) and timber 
(5,000 cubic meters) at Rijeka (Yugoslavia) in August 1979 and 
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sailed for Jeddah (Saudi Arabia). 
on the l8th. of August the vessel made an unscheduled stop at 
Pylos (Greece), the rmster giving the cause as "taking on 
supplies". The master and crew were also replaced. The vessel 
also acquired a new name and new ownership. 
on the lst. of September the Betty sailed from Pylos as the 
"Five Star" under the Spanish flag and owned by Tanala Shipping 
Company of Limassol. However, investigations revealed that 
Tanala was a non-existent company. 
A few days after sailing the master informed the charterers that 
the vessel was delayed due to engine trouble. On 12th. September 
1979 the "Five Star" started discharging her cargo at Jounieh 
(De-banon), a port under the control of the Christian 
Phalangists, who paid $ 1.7 million for the cargo. 
The Five Star sailed from Jounieh as the "Aris" under the 
Spanish flag and arrived in Piraeus (Greece) on 10th. October 
1979, where she was placed under arrest. 
While the ship was still discharging cargo at Jounieh, the 
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Saudis started negotiation for its recovery and rmnaged to get 
most, but not all, of their cargo. 
As a result of this incident the Saudis took the 
unprecedented action of putting a unilateral order to ban entry 
to any vessel to a Saudi port which had first called at Lebanon. 
This was further extended to cover all ships under the same 
ownership. 
Conway, B. (1981) 
The Piracy Business, Hamlyn Paparbacks, (London), 1981. 
***************************************************************** 
The Angolan Frauds 
In late 1976 the Angolan Goverment was in the rmrket for 1,000 
tons of palm oil. A Portugese, Perez, and his partner Rigowski 
(operating from Spain) guaranteed delivery of the oil for 
$ 560,000, payment to be by documntary credit. The credit was 
opened with the Union Bank of Switzerland in Zurich. 
The bank paid out on presentation of documents, the B/L showing 
that the palm oil had been loaded aboard the "Cool Girl" for 
delivery to Angola. Investigations revealed that at the time of 
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loading the vessel was in drydock in Rotterdam. Until about two 
months later the oil had not arrived. 
In spite of this the Angolan Goverment used the services of 
Perez and Rigowski again. This time it was for 1,500 tons of 
beef for $ 1.6 million, payment to be by documentary credit at 
the Union Bank of Switzerland. 
Docun, ents showing that the cargo had been loaded aboard the 
"Maco Viking" (owned by a Dane - Maagefeldt) were presented to 
the bank. On finding the documnts in order the bank paid out. 
The documents presented were 
- Bill of lading 
- Certificate of origin and Packing 
- Attested certificate of the veterinary condition of the meat. 
Investigations revealed that at the time of loading the vessel 
was in a shipyard in Norway undergoing repairs. 
The Danish Shipowner eventually bought the palm oil and 
delivered it to the Angolans. 
In 1977 the Angolans were still waiting for the beef but having 
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received their oil, seemed satisfied with Perez's service and 
contracted with him for the supply of 13,420 tons of "dehulled 
groundnuts suitable for the extraction of oil", c. i. f. Luanda 
and Lobito for $ 6,844,200. As before, payment to be by 
documentary credit at the Union Bank of Switzerland. 
As the Danish Shipowner was put into bankruptcy, Perez had to 
look for another ship to obtain credible docurmnts. He 
sub-chartered two Greek vessels, "Pistis" and "Saronicus Gulf" 
from a Bermudan based company (Lima Navigation) which was 
controlled by a Brazilian. 
The bank was presented the documents showing that : 
- the Pistis had 57,401 bags of groundnuts weighing 4,420 tons 
loaded at Beira, Mozambique, on 17th. April for discharge at 
Luanda and Lobito in Angola. 
- the Saronicus Gulf had 116,885 bags of groundnuts; weighing 
9,000 tons, also loaded at Beira, bound for Luanda and Lobito. 
Investigations revealed that : 
- Pistis loaded a cargo of groundnut cake on 17th. June at 
Banjul, 
Saronicus; Gulf loaded 3,000 tons of groundnut cake in August 
at Banjul and a further 2,885 tons at Dakar, and 
the Saronicus Gulf could not carry 9,000 tons of cargo, as 
mentioned in the documents, but only 6,000 tons. 
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The Pistis reached Luanda on 30th. August and the Saronicus 
reached Lobito on 20th. September. The Angolan authorities 
arrested both vessels and in addition two more, namely "Elpis" 
and "Kalmar" which were also under charter to Lima Navigation. 
SOURCE : 
Ellen, E. & Campbell, D. (1981) 
International Maritime Fraud, Sweet & Maxwell, (London), 1981. 
Conway, B. (1981) 
The Piracy Business, Hamlyn Paperbacks, (London), 1981. 
THE ALEXANDROS K 
Alba Trading Ccrnpany of Barcelona, Spain, purchased 3200 tonne 
of steel from Irsheid Brothers (Overseas) of Cyprus for 
$ 1,007,860 and then sold it to Messrs. El Hawary Mohammed 
Abdel Kader Al Hawary of Cario, Egypt for $2 million. Payment 
on both deals was to be by irrevocable documentary credits. 
The steel was to have been shipped direct to Alexandria, Egypt 
from Ravena, Italy on board the Alexandros K. Irsheid Brothers 
were paid more than $1 million by the bank on presentation of 
docurrents. The B/L showed that the steel had been loaded at 
Ravena on 23rd. March 1979. Similarly, Alba Trading were paid 
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$2 million by the bank on presentation of the documents. 
Six weeks later both Egyptian purchaser and the Spanish 
intermediary started to get worried when the steel did not 
arrive, and the vessel could not be found. On contacting the 
Cypriot sellers they were told that the vessel had had to call 
into Piraeus, Greece for repairs and that due to the Easter 
holidays the repairs had been delayed. 
The Egyptian, still worried, went to Piraeus to check that all 
was in order, and was reassured when he was shown the ship 
Alexandros K with the cargo of steel on 19th. or 20th. May. On 
21st. May the ship sailed from Piraeus, apparently bound for 
Alexandria, without notifying the port authorities of its 
departure and failed to arrive at its destination, and 
apparently disappeared. 
Investigations revealed that no steel had been loaded on board 
the Alexandros K in Ravena on 23rd. March as the vessel was in 
Piraeus on that date. The Steel El Hawary saw had been loaded in 
Bourgas, Roumania in December 1978. 
The vessel was eventually traced by Lloyd's Shipping and 
Information Services to Zouk in Lebanon. It had changed its name 
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to Leila and discharged the cargo in late June. The ship 
disappeared again, this time without a trace. 
In addition to the loss of $2 million the Egyptian also 
incurred the cost of investigation, flight'to Greece, telex 
messages, and possibly also suffered the loss of a customer or 
even the market. 
SOURCE : 
Lost at Sea : The Billion dollar drain, 8 Days, llth. August, 
1979, pp. 6-9 & 22. 
DOCUMENTARY FRAUD 
A Brazilian seller, having exhausted his export quota for 
coffee, decided to disguise his coffee as Bolivian coffee. A 
European buyer was found who agreed to open a credit where 
payment would be made against documents which would relate to 
umarked bags. 
The Brazillian coffee was taken to Bolivia, loaded on to a barge 
at Lake Mandiore and then to Asuncion in Paraguay. There a 
through B/L was to be issued by the shipping company's agent - 
showing the coffee was on a barge, which was being taken down 
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river, and would be transhipped at Buenos Aires for the Ocean 
passage. 
on canpletion of loading at Lake Mandiore the barge had to wait 
for a few days until the water in the connecting channel rose 
sufficiently to allow her to get into the river. 
In the meanwhile the sellers flew to Asuncion in a private 
plane, owned and piloted by one of the conspirators. The showed 
the ship's agent another barge at Asuncion, one which was loaded 
with iron ore, and obtained the B/L. They then flew to Buenos 
Aires and presented the necessary documents to the bank and 
obtained payment under the credit. They then went back to Lake 
Mandiore and at gunpoint seized the 5,000 bags of coffee from 
the master of the barge. 
The Hon. M. Summerskill (1980) 
"Falsification of Documents to obtain Money under Letters of 
Credit", pp. 61-69, 
In Seminar on "Prevention of shipping Fraud", New York, 
26th. /27th. June, 1980. 
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SAVUNDRA'S CHINESE FRAUD 
In October 1949 Savundra formed a company in Ceylon (now Sri 
Lanka)-with a paid up capital of E 7. It was known as Trans- 
World Enterprises Ltd. Among the directors were respected 
personalities in Ceylon, including the son of the then Prime 
Minister of Ceylon. During his tour to Burma prornoting his 
company Savundra net Renfro, an American. Renfro told Savundra 
that he had strong business connections in China and, if 
Savundra could arrange for the supply and shipment discreetly, 
he would try to secure a firm order for oil from the Chinese. 
In May 1950 Savundra formed another company known as Eastern 
Traders. In August Savundra received the order for the supply of 
45,000 drums of lubricant of various specifications for direct 
shipment to Tsingtao. China, on c. i. f. terms at $ 1.23 million. 
On 23rd. October be accepted the order as director of Trans- 
World Enterprises Ltd. but asked for the payment to be made by 
documentary credit in favour of Eastern Enterprises Company, 
which he referred to as a subsidiary of Trans-World. 
The firm Eastern Enterprises Company was formed on 8th. 
November. In fact, the credit had been opened at the Eastern 
Bank in favour of Eastern Enterprises two days before the firm 
officially existed. 
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The oil was allegedly shipped in January 1951 aboard a Swedish 
vessel. The shippers were a French firm based in Marseilles. 
Savundra obtained payment from the Union Bank of Switzerland on 
presentation of the following documents 
a) Affidavit signed by the Agents 
b) Certificate of Lloyd's Survey 
C) Shipped Bill of Lading 
d) Export Licence 
e) Certificate of sailing 
f) Analysis report on the cargo, and 
g) Presumably a Certificate of Insurance. 
When the shipment had not arrived by March, Renfro, the buyer's 
agent, was getting impatient. His inquiries revealed that the 
shipowner and his agent in China had no knowledge of the ship. - 
The whole deal had been a fraud 
- There was no oil 
- No ship of the name given in the documents existed 
- The French company which allegedly shipped oil did not 
exist, and 
- All the documents presented to the Union Bank were forged. 
Savundra had realised from the very outset that as the shipment 
of oil to China was banned by Western countries, the Chinese 
would have no redress due to the illegality of the transaction. 
The internationality of the transaction can be seen by the 
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involvement of SEVEN countries : 
a) Chinese buyer 
b) American buyer's agent 
C) Ceylonese comodity broker 
d) French supplier/shipper 
e) Swedish shipowner 
f) Swiss bank, and 
g) British insurers (presumably) 
SOURCE : 
Connell, J. & Sutherland, D. (1978) 
Fraud : The Amazing Career of Dr. Savundra, Hodder & Stoughton, 
(London) 1978. 
NON-EXISTENT COMPANY 
A number of British and Indian companies arranged to buy seed 
oil, chemicals and copper wire from a Hong Kong merchant. Goods 
were to be shipped to Singapore for onward shipment from there 
by a conference line and payment was to be by documentary 
credit. 
B/L sinifying that cargo had been shipped were duly presented to 
the paying bank and the credit cashed. However, the ship named 
in the B/L never arrived in Singapore. 
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Subsequent police investigations revealed that the vessel never 
existed. Ironically it was later found that the name of the ship 
on the B/L was a result of a typographical error by one of the 
fraudsters and that the other documents had been amended to 
reflect the mistake. It was also discovered that the shipowning 
company had only been registered a as a company the day before 
the ship supposedly sailed. Furthermore, their address had been 
given as the fifth floor of a building which turned out to have 
only four floors. The principal identified as being the 
perpetrator was already well known in Hong Kong for his prior 
involvement in other incident of the same type. The consignees 
lost $ 1.2 million on the deal. 
SOURCE : 
ICC- International Maritime Bureau. 
***************************************************************** 
m. v. "Dandy" 
K entered into a contract with the M Co. of Nigeria for the 
delivery of 100,000 tons of cement to the port of Lagos. 70,000 
tons were delivered as per contract. For the remainder K 
presented fraudulent documents to show that 25,400 tons had been 
loaded on board three vessels : 
M. V. "Slow Coach" at Yarimca(Turkey) 
M. V. "Sea Prey" at Yarinica (Turkey) 
- M. V. "Bogus" at Barcelona (Spain) 
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In fact these vessels were laid-up in Greece. Freight pre-paid 
B/L were presented to the London branch of an African bank and 
the sum of $ 1.7 million collected. 
When the cement did not arrive M Co. contacted K and were 
told that it had become necessary to load the cargo from the 
three vesels to one vessel, namely M. V. "Dandy" which was 
en-route for Lagos. 
K then contacted another Nigerian company, E Ltd., and 
offered the same non-existent cargo and produced documents to 
show that cargo had been loaded on board the M. V. "Dandy" at 
Rostock (East Germany). In fact, at the time of the supposed 
loading M. V. "Dandy" was, in Poland. 
With the money K bought the cement and loaded it on board the 
M. V. "Dandy" and despatched it to Nigeria. on arrival the master 
was confronted with two sets of B/L for the same cargo. 
ICC - International Maritime Bureau. 
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NON-EXISTENT CIGARETTES V) SAUDI ARABIA 
P in U. S. A. approached Q in Saudi Arabia to sell cigarettes. 
Q agreed to buy them and opened a documentary credit in favour 
of P with the Arab National Bank in Saudi Arabia. 
P presented docurrents to the paying bank and collected 
$ 367,680 (the c&f value). The cargo did not arrive. 
Investigations revealed that the documents were 
forged/falsified. The details are :' 
- There was no number on the bill of lading. It showed that 
1920 cases were shipped in two 40 foot containers 
- The Clean Report of Findings was not genuine as the form 
used is not for shipments to Saudi Arabia but for shipments 
to Nigeria only 
- The cargo was not even booked on board the vessel 
- The Invoice showed the following details : 
1920 cases at $ 181.92 per case (F. O. B. ) =$ 349,286.40 
Freight 2% F. O. B. value =$7,363.20 
Camission 3% F. O. B. value =$ 11,030.20 
Total =$ 367,680.00 
SOURCE : 
IOC - International Maritime Bureau. 
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PRE-DATING BILL OF LADING TO MEET SHIPMENT DATE 
A Ltd. (Shipper) booked a consigment aboard the M. V. "Non 
Such". At the request of the shipper and on receipt of a Letter 
of Indemnity from A the Shipowner (SIO), B Ltd. of Korea, 
issued a pre-dated Bill of Lading (B/L). The B/L was dated 2nd. 
November 1981, B/L Nos. BUTI -B- 36 & 37. The vessel arrived at 
Busan on 5th. November 1981 and loaded the cargo. 
C Ltd. (Consignee), in London, learnt that the B/L was dated 
2nd. November, although the vessel was then at Inchon and did 
not arrive at Busan until 5th. November. C made enquiries at 
the Seoul office of the SIO to ascertain whether the cargo was 
indeed on board the vessel. C was not informed until 2nd. 
December by the United Kingdom agents of the SIO that the cargo 
was on board. 
In view of the circumstances C was concerned that the 
shipper might negotiate the documentary credit, opened in favour 
of the shipper, on the basis of what was a fraudulent B/L. In 
order to protect his interests C attempted to stop payment oný 
the documentary credit through a high court injunction against 
the issuing bank. In addition to considerable legal expenses in 
so doing, C also incurred investigative and telex/telephone 
costs. 
A 28 
The practice of pre-dating B/L, though illegal, may sometimes be 
a commercially expedient practice. However, no SIO can absolve 
himself of the responsibility for the consequences of such an 
act, if problems do arise. In this case C was totally 
ignorant of the existence of the letter of indemnity. 
SOURCE : 
Icc - International Maritime Bureau. 
FALSE DOCUMENTATION TO BREACH FOREIGN EXCHANGE REGULATIONS 
In this case false docuaentation was prepared by the shipper on 
the instructions of the consignee, to enable him to obtain a 
large amount of foreign currency abroad because of the local 
foreign exchange regulations in Nigeria. The shipper was to be 
paid by a representative of the consignee on his next visit to 
Taiwan. On the Invoice, No. ODE 8229 dated 18-, 3-82, the goods 
were described as : 
Wrist watch spare parts - Citizen Brand 
F. O. B. Value U. S. $ 145,000 
Freight U. S. $ 5,000 
C&F Value U. S. $ 150,000 
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I 
The goods shipped were Pedals (Model ODE-73-7) with a F. O. B. 
value of about U. S. $ 400. 
SOURCE : 
ICC - International Marithm Bureau. 
SUGAR SHIPMENTS TO NIGERIA 
Camodity broker (E Ltd), during January - April 1983 had 
been diverting cargoes of sugar,, destined for Nigeria, to more 
profitable markets in the Middle East. 
Consignments of sugar were ordered by E's own offices in 
Lagos, and payment was arranged by way of Documentary Credits 
opened through the First Bank of Nigeria. Sugar was purchased on 
the European market and transported on ships owned by F Ltd. 
(an associate company of E) or on chartered vessels. Bills of 
Lading would be issued enabling E to negotiate the documentary 
credits and collect payment. After this, however, the ships 
would be diverted to the middle East, where the sugar would be 
sold to local buyers at favourable market rates. E was thus 
paid twice for the sarm consignments and was able to make pse of 
the illegally obtained money for some considerable period. 
A 30 
At some later date, usually three to six months after the date 
of the original sailing, a second identical consignment would be 
purchased and shipped direct to Nigeria, but under the guise of 
the original shipment. As part of the credit transaction the 
Nigerian bank demanded surveyor's Clean Record of Findings (CRF) 
as the cargo was loaded. These surveys were undertaken by 
G Ltd. 
With E's liquidity problems in 1981, the sale of cargo in the 
Middle East together with payment on the Nigerian documentary 
credit would have provided E with the much needed cash. The 
liquidity problems were, therefore, the root cause of E taking 
taking such illicit action. Another factor is that on 30th. 
April 1982 licences became necessary for the import of sugar 
into Nigeria. No licences were, however, issued until September. 
Over this period the market was flooded with sugar causing a 
price drop. It was, therefore, advantageous for E to deliver 
cargoes with CRF's dated prior to 30th. April 1982 as late as 
possible. 
15 ships were involved on 26 voyages in some cases. the names 
of the vessels were changed to suit the documents and in other 
cases documents were altered. The following example illustrates 
the modus operandi : 
i 
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M. V. "Cheat" 
Voy. 1 Dunkirk to Port Sudan Deviation 
Voy. 2 Antwerp to Port Said Deviation 
Voy. 3 Dunkirk to Lagos Under documentation for voyage 1 
Voy. 4 Antwerp to Lagos 
Voy. 5 Antwerp to Lagos 
Under documntation for voyage 2 
Believed to have discharged under 
the guise of- M. V. "Repair" which 
was undergoing repairs in Piraeus. 
The IMB could not prove this. 
SOURCE : 
ICC - International Maritime Bureau. 
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APPENDIX -2 
PIYMOLfffi Director- R IF M Robbins. BSc. PhD, CChem. FASC. 
Drake Circus. Plymouth. Devon. PL4 8AA Poýiýhnic Phone (0752) 2131 ?- Jelex 45423 PPLRC G, 
Faculty of Maritime Studies 
Dean: Professor D. H. Moreby. Ex C.. Ph D. FNI 
Phone: (0752) 264664 
Faculty Officer. Mrs Suzanne Tolan 
Phone: (0752) 264673 
Reply to- 
P. Kapoor-Plymuth 264757 
Our ref 
Your ref- 
PK/bEL/1 
Date. July to October 1985 
Dear 
I have been conducting postgraduate research into Documentary Maritime 
Fraud at the Department of Shipping & Transport, Faculty of Maritime 
Studies, Plymouth Polytechnic, since 1981 in collaboration with the 
ICC-International Maritime Bureau. For the final phase my of research 
programme I have decided to use a panel of experts to assist me in an 
in-depth study of the problern of Documentary Maritime Fraud. I am 
enclosing my Curriculum Vitae for your perusal. 
I intend to send a series of questionnaires to the panel of experts, 
seeking their opinions in determining causes, possible solutions and ways 
of implementing their recommendations. It is envisaged that about three 
questionnaires will be sent to the respondents over a period of about six 
to eight months. The first questionnaire will be sent around November 
1985. - Each subsequent questionnaire is built upon the responses to the 
preceding questionnaire. one of the requirements of my method of research 
is that anonymity of the panelists be maintained, J. e. none of the 
panelists know who the other members of the panel are. 
I would like to invite you to participate as a member of the 
expert panel (representing the ........... ) to consider the problem of Documentary Maritime Fraud. Specifically, I need your help to identify and 
explore the issues from your industry's point of view. Whilst the 
results of the survey will be publicised, and it is hoped would be used 
by the international maritime community, it is stressed that the 
responses of the panelists would remain strictly confidential. In 
addition, you will receive a copy of the final report. 
I would be obliged if you would agree to participate as a member of the 
panel of experts, and would sincerely request you to comply with the 
requirement for anonymity. I look forward to hearing from you and working 
with you-in the near future. 
Yours sincerely 
(Peter Kapoor) 
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APPENDIX 
Director- R F. M. Robbins. BSc. PhD. CChern, FRSC 
flymouth 
Drake Circus. Plymouth. Devon PL4 SAA P*technic Phone (0752) 21312 Telex 45423 PPLRO, 
Faculty of Maritime Studies 
Dean: Professor D. H. Moreby. Ex. C . 
Ph D. FNI 
Phone: (0752) 264664 
Faculty Officer. Mrs Suzanne Tolan 
Phone: (0752) 264673 
Reply to- 
P. Kapoor-Plymouth 264757 
Our ref- 
Your ref- PK/DEL/QN1 
Date- 9th. December 1985 
Dear 
Thank you for agreeing to participate on the expert panel to consider 
the probleins of Documentary Maritime Fraud. Please accept my apologies 
for the delay in the despatch of the questionnaire. 
The panel is made up of 40 expertse from various parts of the world, who 
represent all sectors interested in international trade. The reputation 
and experience of the experts indicate that you will be making a 
valuable contribution towards tackling the problem of maritime fraud. As 
the panel is drawn from different areas of expertise it is expected that 
sane members will be experts in specialised areas while the competence of 
others will span a wide range of topics. The particular combination of 
experts selected should provide one of the most comprehensive analyses of 
maritime fraud to date. For this reason it is mo t important that all of 
the experts participate in the study. 
If I have anitted any factors relating to your area of expertise, which 
have an impact on maritime fraud in general and documentary fraud in 
particular, I should be grateful if you would draw these to my attention. 
To ensure anonymity each expert will be identified by a code number which 
will be linked to his name only for the purposes of mailing the 
questionnaire and checking the responses. It is stressed again that your 
responses will remain strictly confidential. 
The first questionnaire is enclosed with this letter. After completion 
please return it to me for analysis by 15th January 1986 in the 
enclosed addressed envelope. It is important that you reply within 
the specified time as the responses must be co-ordinated and analysed 
before the second questionnaire can be developed. 
Again, thank you for your help. 
Yours sincerely 
Peter Kapoor 
Encl: 1. Questionnaire No. 1 
2. Addressed Freepost Envelope 
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Plymouth 
Director: R. F M Robbins. BSc. PhD. CChem. FASC 
h i l t P 
Drake Circus. Plymouth. Devon. PL4 8AA 
n c y ý o Phone (0752) 21312 Telex 45423 PPLR('(, 
Faculty of Maritimo Studies 
Dean: Professor D. H Moreby, Ex C.. Ph D FNI 
Phone: (0752) 264664 
Faculty Officer Mrs. Suzanne Tolan 
Phone- (0752) 264673 
Reply to P. Kapoor-Plymouth 264757 
Our ref 
Your ref: 
PK/IDEL/QN1 
Date: 9th. December 1985 
Dear 
Thank you for agreeing to participate on the expert panel to consider 
the problems of Documentary Maritime Fraud. Please accept my apologies 
for the delay in the despatch of the questionnaire. 
The panel is made up of 40 experts, from various parts of the world, who 
represent all sectors interested in international trade. The reputation 
and experience of the experts indicate that you will be making a 
valuable contribution towards tackling the problem of maritime fraud. As 
the panel is drawn from different areas of expertise it is expected that 
some members will be experts in specialised areas while the competence of 
others will span a wide range of topics. The particular combination of 
experts selected should provide one of the most comprehensive analyses of 
maritime fraud to date. For this reason it is most iq)ortant that all of 
the experts participate in the study. 
If I have omitted any factors relating to your area of expertise, which 
have an impact on maritime fraud in general and documentary fraud in 
particular, I should be grateful if you would draw these to my attention. 
To ensure anonymity each expert will be identified by a code number which 
will be linked to his name only for the purposes of mailing the 
questionnaire and checking the responses. It is stressed again that your 
responses will remain strictly confidential. 
The first questionnaire is enclosed with this letter. After completion 
please return it to me for analysis by 15th January 1986 in the 
enclosed addressed envelope. It is important that you reply within 
the specified time as the responses must be co-ordinated and analysed 
before the second questionnaire can be developed. 
Again, thank you for your help. 
Yours sincerely 
Peter Kapoor 
Encl: 1. Questionnaire No. 1 
2. Addressed Envelope 
3. International Reply Coupons 
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DEPARTMENT OF SHIPPING & TRANSPORT 
PLYMOUTH POLYTECHNIC, DRAKE CIRCUS, 
PLYMOUTH, PL4 8AA, ENGLAND 
RESEARCH PROJECT : DOCUMENTARY MARITIME FRAUD 
Questiomaire No. 1 Code No. 
The questionnaire consists of THREE sections. Each section 
contains a number of statements relating to various aspects of 
maritime fraud. 
To ensure anonymity each expert on the panel will be identified 
by a code number which will be linked to his name only for the 
purposes of mailing the questionnaires and checking the 
responses. 
***************************************************************** 
SECTION A 
Please consider each of the following statements and tick the 
appropriate box opposite the statement. If you agree with the 
statement or are unable to comment, please leave it alone. If 
you disagree, make any alterations to the statements or add 
comments you need to indicate your view. If you are unable to 
comment please tick the appropriate box. 
1. Considering the known and/or 
suspected cases of maritime 
fraud over the last decade 
(1975 -. 1985) the pattern 
which has emerged indicates 
a considerable increase in 
the number of cases with an 
increase in the sums of 
money involved per case. 
DISAGREE 
UWM. E TO CDMMa? r 
"****** **... . ....... : *COMMENTS*(if*you . disagree) ................................ 
................. oo.. o. o .................................... 
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2. The Bill of Lading has outlived AGREE 
its usefulness as a document of 
title as there is very little DISAGREE 
or no security in it. 
UWMZ TO COMMEW 
:C******, ** iii*you 
isagree) 
............................... * ONIENTS 
................................................. 
3. By 1995 the conventional Bill of AGREE 
Lading will be replaced by the 
"Electronic Bill of Lading" by DISAGREE 
the use of data interchange via 
computers. UNABLE TO COMMENT 
you agr e 
******Ls 
e 
............................. 00 ............................. 
4. The Uniform Customs & Practice AGREE 
for Documentary Credits 1983 
Revision (UCP) does not provide DISAGREE 
adequate protection for the 
applicant (the buyer) against UNABLE TO COMMENT 
the unscrupulous beneficiary 
(the seller). 
: 'COMMENTS 
(if you agree 
-ýis 
........................................................... 
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5. In documentary credit operations, AGREE 
the relationship which exists 
between the Issuing Bank and the DISAGREE 
Advising/Confirming Bank is that 
of a Principal (Issuing Bank) UNABLE TO COMMENT 
and an Agent (Confirming/Advising 
Bank). 
........... : ...... ........................................ COMMENTS (if you isagree) 
................................... -0000 ... 0.0.0.0 ...... 0.. 
6. It is too easy to change the name, AGREE 
ownership and port of registry of a 
vessel without proof of cancellation DISAGREE 
of the previous registry. 
UNAME M COMMEM 
........ ... ... ...... COMMMUS (if you isagree 
................... 
a0............. 0.. 0.0.0.......... 0. 
7. It is too easy to register 
sub-standard vessels, the so-called 
AGREE 
"rust buckets", in some countries DISAGREE 
without surveys for seaworthiness. 
UNABLE TO COMMENT 
: *COMMENTS 
(if you disagree) 
........................................................... 
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8. In some countries it is too easy to AGREE 
register a company with complete 
anonymity for the directors, either DISAGREE 
by the use of foreign nominees or 
otherwise. UNAME To COMM&H 
.. t ............ 0 ................................... 0 .... 0 ... o 
o COMMENTS (if you disagree) 
......... -oo ... o ........... o ... o-o ........ oo. oo ...... oo: 
9. The lack of harmonisation in inter- AGREE 
national laws and procedures is 
exploited by commercial criminals. DISAGREE 
UNABLE TO COMMENT 
........... (: ...... ........................................ COMMENTS if you isagree) 
.......................................................... 
10. In some trading countries the AGREE 
judiciary is not sufficiently 
familiar with the concepts of DISAGREE 
maritime laws. 
UNABLE TO COMMENT 
................... : 'COt-2wffWS (iFyou disagree) 
.............................. - ........ o .................. 
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11. The present system of a lay jury AGREE 
is inadequate in commercial fraud 
cases. DISAGREE 
UNABLE TO COMMENT 
... ....... *COMMENTS* (ii*you isagree) 
................................ 
.......................................................... 
12. The international nature of shipping AGREE 
and the lack of jurisdiction outside 
national boundaries assist the DISAGREE 
perpetrators of fraud. 
UNA33LE TO COMMENT 
: *COMMENTS (if you disagree) 
............................................................ 
13. The majority of frauds are caused AGREE 
by the lack of proper checks 
carried out by the parties DISAGREE 
involved in international trade 
transactions. UNABLE 70 COMMENT 
........... ................... : 'COt't1ENTS (ii'you isagree 
........................................................... 
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14. The ship owner/operator details are not checked properly 
by the following parties : 
a) Charterer before entering AGREE 
into a charter. 
DISAGREE 
UNABLE TO COMMENT 
: *COFtIENTS (li*you disagree) 
..... 0....... 0400... 0................................. 
b) Shipper/Freight Forwarder AGREE 
before entering into a 
contract of carriage. DISAGREE 
UNAME TO COMMENT 
............ i ........... ...... 00 .... 0 ..... 0 COMMENTS (i you disagree) 
o 
... oo ............ o ............................... oo ....... 
c) Insurance brokers/underwriters AGREE 
before entering into a 
contract of insurance. DISAGREE 
UNAME TO COMM 
....................................... o-o ....... MtHMS (if you disagree) 
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d) Agents/Freight Forwarders 
before entering into a 
contract of agency. DISAGREE 
1_1 UNABLE 70 COMMENT 
: 'COMMENTS 
(if youdisagree) 
............................................................ 
15. A few frauds are caused by the AGREE 
secrecy of operations, i. e. 
all ships fixed for hire are DISAGREE 
not reported in the press. 
UNABLE TO COMMENT 
........... ( ...... ........................................ COMMENTS if you isagree) 
............................................................ 
16. The use of TWO or THREE original AGREE 
Bills of Lading in a set and the 
delivery of cargo on production DISAGREE 
of ONLY ONE has facilitated 
documentary frauds. UNMXX TO COMMUn 
***** -** F ............................... ... ....... COMMENTS (if you isagree) 
........................................................... 
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17. The lack of commercial expertise AGREE 
on the part of the State Trading 
organisations of developing DISAGREE 
countries has made thefn targets 
of the fraudsters. UNABLE TO COMMENT 
'--- ..... : ....................................... : *COMMENTS (ii*you disagree) 
............................................................ 
18. The need to cut costs has made AGREE 
buyers & shippers targets of the 
unscrupulous brokers, sellers, DISAGREE 
shipowners & forwarding agents. 
UNABLE TO COMMENT 
............................. ........... o ...... COMMENTS (if you disagree) 
............................................................ 
19. Payment under documentary credits AGREE 
by the banks without proper 
checks before payment has led DISAGREE 
the fraudsters to exploit the 
system. UNAME TO COMENT 
*--- .... .................. .................... : *COMMENTS (iFyou isagree) 
....... -oo ...... o ..... o ...... o .......... o ... o ..... 
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20. The acceptance of commercial AGREE 
malpractices and, at times, 
fraudulent practices as custom of DISAGREE 
the trade, in some countries, 
has contributed to the growth in UNABLE TO COMMENr 
documentary fraud. 
: *ý; ý**(Jii*you isagree 
.......................................................... 
21. The simplification of documenta- AGREE 
tion has contributed to the 
increase in documentary fraud. DISAGREE 
UNABLE TO CaMMENT 
*COtPgWS (if you disagree) 
............................................................ 
22. The non-negotiable sea waybill AGREE 
will prevent documentary maritime 
fraud. DISAGREE 
UNAIXX TO COMMENT 
....................................... : *COMMENTS (if you i-sagree) 
................................................... 0 ........ 
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23. Sane documentary frauds would be AGREE 
prevented if the cargo carrying 
capacity of the vessel was DISAGREE 
inserted on the Bill of Lading. 
UWWLE TO COMMENT 
......................... o00000000000000000*00aa0&00000a0aaa COMMENTS (if you disagree) 
............................................................ 
24. Underwriters should demand AGREE 
surveyors' reports together with 
certified valuers' reports prior DISAGREE 
to accepting Hull and Machinery 
risks. UNAME TO COMMENT 
: *COMMENTS (if you disagree) 
............................................................ 
25. If some sort of delay is built 
into the documentary credit 
system (perhaps a maximun of 
7 days), to allow for checks 
to be carried out by the bank 
before payment is made, it 
will reduce the incidence of 
fraud. 
AGREE 
DISAGREE 
UNABLE TO COMMEW 
: 'COMMENTS (if you agr ee 
........................................................... 
A 45 
26. The carrying out of the following checks, before payment is 
made under documentary credits, would provide adequate 
protection against fraud (the cost of these services would 
be borne by the applicant requesting them at the time of 
opening the credit; the bank will carry out the checks 
without incurring any additional liability) : 
a) Check the vessel's particulars, AGREE 
i. e. name, port of registry, 
ownership, and compare the DISAGREE 
deadweight with the quantity of 
cargo stated in the Bill of UNABLE TO COMMENT 
Lading. 
----------------------------- 
b) Check the vessel's geographical AGREE 
position at the time of loading. 
DISAGREE 
UNABLE TO COMMENT 
----------------------------- 
C) Check with the Port Authority AGREE 
or Customs that they have a 
cargo manifest lodged for the DISAGREE 
said vessel and that the Bills 
of Lading issued are mentioned UNABLE TO COMMENT 
in the manifest. 
*****''**i*....... 0.0................... : *COM1*4ENTS (if you isagreei 
a) 
-b) ----------------------------- 
: -C) ----------------------------- 
........................................................... 
If you feel there are other checks which should also be 
included, please specify below and give the reason for 
introducing thern. 
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27. Commercial crime, including cons- AGREE 
piracy to commit fraud, should be 
created as a universal crime by DISAGREE 
an international convention and 
should be made an extraditable UNABLE 70 COMMWr 
offence. 
**(l: i*you disagree) 
o .... o ........ oo-o ....... oo-- ......... o ........ o-oo.. 
28. In the event of a conviction in AGREE 
convercial crime, a policy of 
much heavier sentencing should DISAGREE 
be adopted. 
UNABLE TO COMMENT 
: *COMMENTS 
you disagree) 
.......................................................... 
29. Camercial criminals should not AGREE 
be granted bail. 
DISAGREE 
UNAME TO COMMEW 
............................................................ 
COM2M (if you disagree) 
............................................................ 
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30. The penalty for commercial AGREE 
criminals should be seizure of 
all assets from the proceeds DISAGREE 
of the crime. The burden of 
proving that some of his UNABLE TO COMMENT 
assets are not from the crime 
should rest with the criminal. 
---* ** .... ...... i ................................ : *COMMENTS (if you isagree 
............................................................ 
31. When a cornwrcial criminal is AGREE 
convicted on more than one 
count, the sentences should not DISAMIEE 
run concurrently. 
UNWME M COMMEW 
............................................................ 
COMMEWS (if you disagree) 
................ .......................................... 
32. The introduction of a difficult- AGREE 
to-forge Bill of Lading, with 
unique serial numbers, will DISAGREE 
provide a secure means of pre- 
venting fraud. UNABLE TO COMMENT 
COMMENTS (if you isagree) 
............................................................ 
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33. The centralised registry for AGREE 
Bills of Lading would be an 
effective instrumeent against DISAGREE 
documentary fraud in the oil and 
dry bulk trade but not in the UNABLE TO COMMENT 
dry cargo trade. 
-(if 
you disagree) 
.......................................................... 
34. Procedures for changing a ship's AGREE 
name should be rmre heavily 
supervised as a quick change of DISAGREE 
narm suggests fraudulent intent. 
UNABLE TO COMMENT 
: *COMMEWS'(if*you*disagree)******"*'******************'**. 
.......................................................... 
35. Every ship should be issued with 
a unique international ship 
AGREE 
identification number which will DISAGREE 
remain the same throughout the 
life of a vessel regardless of UNABLE TO COMMENT 
changes of name, ownership or 
nationality. 
: *COMMENTS (if you disagree)****-**--* 
.................................... 
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36. The introduction of a system AGREE 
of port classification in accor- 
dance with levels of cargo DISAGREE 
losses will increase port 
security, and will also highlight UNABLE TO COMMENT 
high security risk ports. 
........ ... ... ....... COMEWS (if you isagree) 
................................................. I ........... 
37. All types of shipping interme- AGREE 
diaries (i. e. ship's agent, 
freight forwarder, broker) DISAGREE 
whether acting for the ship or 
cargo interests should be regisý UNABLE TO COMMENT 
tered and licenced and should 
undergo a solvency test every 
year. 
........... (. i ..... ......................................... COMMENTS i you isagreLe) 
.......................................................... 
38. All ship's agents and all other AGREE 
agencies concerned with booking 
space on a vessel should provide DISAGREE 
indemnity bonds for the due 
performance of the voyage by the UNABLE TO COMMENT 
ship or shipping company whose 
agents they are. 
: *COMMENTS (if you*disagree) 
.......................................................... 
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SECTION B 
39. The information provided under the various headings below is 
required to combat fraud. If you disagree with any item, 
please put a cross in the column alongside, and if you 
wish give your reason(s) for disagreeing in the comments 
column. If you feel that there are other items of 
information which would assist in combating fraud, please 
specify. If you agree with all the items under the various 
headings, please put a tick in the appropriate box. 
39 (a) 
Ship Details Disagree 
comments 
If unable to comment on 
ship details tick this 
box and go to 39 (b). 
Ship's Name 
Former Name(s) 
Official Number 
Call Sign 
Port of Registry 
Type of Ship 
Age 
G. R. T. 
Deadweight 
Classification Details 
Details of Insurance 
Details of P&I Cover 
Position of Ship at 
the time of loading 
Details of Agent 
Others, please specify 
AGREE WITH ALL ITEMS 
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ccavaents 
39 (b) If unable to cament on 
Ownership Details Disagree ownership details tick 
this box and go to 
39 (c). 
Name, Address, Tel. & 
Telex Nos. of : 
- Registered Owner 
- Beneficial Owner 
- Operator/Manager 
Names of vessels owned 
Creditworthiness 
Reputation 
Track/Claims Record 
P&I Cover Details 
others, please specify 
AGREE WITH ALL ITEMS 
Comments 
39 (c) If unable to comment on 
Charterer's Details Disagree charterer's details 
& tick this box and go 
Sub-Charterer to 39 (d). 
Name, Address, Tel. & 
Telex Nos. of the 
Charterer 
Creditworthiness 
Reputation 
Track Record 
Names of chartered 
ships 
P&I Cover Details 
charterer's Agent 
Others, please specify 
AGREE WITH ALL ITEMS 
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Caments 
39 (d) If unable to comnent on 
Shipper's Details Disagree shipper's details tick 
this box and go to 
39 (e). 
Name, Address, Tel. & 
Telex Nos. of the 
Shipper 
creditworthiness 
Reputation 
Track Record 
P&I Cover Details 
Shipper's Agent 
Others, please specify 
AGREE WITH ALL ITEMS 
Ccaments 
39 (e) If unable to coment on 
Broker/Agent Details Disagree broker/agent details 
tick this box and go 
to 39 M. 
Name, Address, Tel. & 
Telex Nos. of the 
B roker/Agent 
Creditworthiness 
Reputation 
Track Record 
P&I Cover Details 
Membership of National 
or International 
Association 
Others, please specify 
AGREE WITH ALL ITEMS 
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Comments 
39 (f) If unable to comTent on 
Camparry Details Disagree company details tick 
If any of the above this box and go to 
are a company the 39 (g). 
following additional 
information required 
Name, Address, Tel. & 
Telex Nos. of the 
Registered Office 
Name, Address, Tel. & 
Telex Nos. of the Head 
Office if different 
Date & Place of 
Incorporation 
Share Capital 
Names & Addresses of 
major share holders 
Others, please specify 
AGREE WITH ALL ITEMS 
Conments 
39 (g) If unable to comment on 
Commercial Details Disagree commercial details 
tick this box. 
Name & Type of Charter 
Party 
Period of Charter 
Details of Charterer, 
Owner, and Broker or 
Agent arranging the 
Charter (as. above) 
Wbo issues Bills of 
Lading ? 
Others, please specify 
AGREE WITH ALL ITEMS 
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SECTION C 
40.. The increase in maritime fraud during the last decade 
(1975-85) can be attributed to a combination of the 
following causes : 
a) Greed 
b) World recession 
C) Port congestion 
d) Naivety of the victims 
e) Surplus tonnage 
f) Absolute reliance on paper documents 
g) Insurers paying out on suspect claims to maintain 
business 
If you disagree with any of the above causes, please 
write below which one(s) (letter a- g], and if you 
wish give your reason(s) for disagreeing next to the letter. 
If you feel that there are other reasons for the increase in 
fraud cases, please specify below. 
41. Over the last decade (1975-1985) which single type of marine 
related crime has, in your opinion, caused the greatest 
financial loss taking all cases of that crime together: 
[Please put a tick (V) in one box only] 
Arson 
Charter Party Fraud 
Cube-cutting/Tariff Manipulation 
Deliberate Liquidation 
Deviation/Illegal Sale of Cargo 
Docmientary Fraud 
Insurance Fraud 
Ship Scuttling 
Other (please specify) 
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42. Few fraud cases are reported by the victims because : 
a) of adverse publicity 
b) of lack of response by the authorities 
C) of the desire to protect and ensure future business with 
the same person/company who/which cormnitted the fraud 
d) of naivety of the victims 
e) losses are set off against profits 
f) perpetrators are not likely to be apprehended 
If you disagree with any of the above statements, please 
write below which one(s) [letter a- fl, and if you 
wish give your reason(s) for disagreeing next to the letter. 
If you feel that there are other reasons for not reporting 
fraud cases, please specify below. 
43. Wbich of the following statements best describe the adequacy 
of the existing systeýn of collection and dissemination of 
ship-related information at the international level: 
[Please put a tick (v-1 in one or more boxes] 
Information is not readily available 
Information is not reliable 
Information is too expensive to obtain 
Information is not available to all the interested 
parties 
Information is not adequate for preventing fraud 
others, please specify. 
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APPENDIX- 4 
Plymouth 
Director- RFIM. Robbins. BSc. PhD. CChem. FRSC 
Drake-Circus, Plymouth. Devon. PL4 8AA Pblytechnic Phone (0752) 2 1312 jelex 45423 PPLR( 
Faculty of Maritimo Studies 
Dean. Professor D. H. Moreby. Ex-C , 
Ph. D , 
FNI. 
Phone: (0752) 264664 
Faculty Officer Mrs. Suzanne Tolan 
Phone (0752) 264673 
Reply to 
P. Kapoor-Plymouth 264757 
Our ref 
Your ref: 
PK/t)EL/QN2 
Date: 10th. July, 1986 
Dear 
Thank you for your response to the first questionnaire. I am very 
grateful to you for finding time, in your busy schedule, to reply. 
The responses to the first questionnaire were analysed to determine 
areas of agreement and disagreement between the experts. The views 
expressed by the experts who disagreed with the original statements 
form the basis of the second questionnaire. This seeks to clarify the 
disagreements between the respondents to statements on the previous 
round. 
It is stressed again that your responses will remain strictly 
confidential. 
The second questionnaire is enclosed with this letter. After 
completion please return it to me by lst. September 1986 in the 
enclosed addressed freepost envelope. It is important that you reply 
within the specified time as the responses must be co-ordinated and 
analysed before the final report can be prepared. A copy of the final 
report will be sent to you. 
Again, thank you for your help. 
Yours sincerely 
Peter Kapoor 
Encl: 1. Questionnaire No. 2 
2. Addressed Freepost Envelope 
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(M Plymouth 
Director- R. F M. Robbins. BSc. PhD. CChem. FRSC 
Drake Circus. Plymouth. Devon. PL4 8AA Fblytýhnic Phone (0752) 21312 Telex 452123 PPLRC G 
Faculty of Maritime Studies 
Dean: Professor D. H. Moreby. Ex. C . Ph 
D, FNI 
Phone- (0752) 264664 
Faculty Officer Mrs. Suzanne Tolan 
Phone (0752) 264673 
Reply to P. Kapoor-Plymouth 264757 
Our ref 
Your ref 
PK/DEL/QN2 
Date 10th. July, 1986 
Dear 
Thank you for your response to the first questionnaire. I arn very 
grateful to you for finding tiffe, in your busy schedule, to reply. 
The responses to the first questionnaire were analysed to determine 
areas of agreement and disagreement between the experts. The views 
expressed by the experts who disagreed with the original statements 
form the basis of the second questionnaire. This seeks to clarify the 
disagreements between the respondents to statements on the previous 
round. 
It is stressed again that your responses will remain strictly 
confidential. 
The second questionnaire is enclosed with this letter. After 
completion please return it to me by lst. September 1986 in the 
enclosed addressed envelope and International Reply Coupons. It is 
important that you reply within the specified time as the responses 
must be co-ordinated and analysed before the final report can be 
prepared. A copy of the final report will be sent to you. 
Again, thank you for your help. 
Yours sincerely 
Peter Kapoor 
Encl: 1. Questionnaire No. 2 
2. Addressed Envelope 
3. International Reply Coupons 
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INSTRUCTIONS TO THE PANEL 
Please review the comments received from the panel where the 
experts disagreed with the statements in Questionnaire No. 1. 
The number of statements to be considered on this round have 
been considerably reduced, from 43 to 22, on the basis of the 
panel's response on the previous round. Only those statements 
are being considered where consensus among the experts was less 
than 80%. 
Subsequent events or further reading of the responses from other 
experts may have caused you to change your previously stated 
opinion. This does not matter, please state your views as they 
stand at the moment. As previously stated anonymity will not be 
breached in any case. 
After you have reviewed the comments please indicate ( V) 
whether you Agree, Disagree or are Unable to comment. If you 
Agree with any comments please indicate how important a 
qualification it is to the original statement. This can be 
indicated by circling the numbers in column 3. The scale is as 
follows : 
Not Important (N. IMP) -1 
Important (IMP) =2 
Very Important (V. IMP) -3 
Example 
IF YOU AGREE 
STATEMENT AGREE CIRCLE DEGREE OF DISAGREE UNABLE TO 
I11PORTANCE COMMENT 
N. IMP IMP V. IMP 
12 U3 
2 
-ý 
123 
3 
- 
1 (2) 3 
1 4 (D 23 
15 1 2- 3 
COMWNTS (IF ANY) 
A 59 
DEPARTHENT OF SHIPPING & TRANSPORT, PLYMOUTH POLYTECHNIC 
RESEARCII PROJECT : DOCUMENTARY MARTTIBE FRAUD 
Questionnaire No. 2 Code No. 
Original Statement 
The Bill of Lading has outlived its usefulness as a document of 
title as there is very little or no security in it. 
The following comments were received from experts disagreeing 
with the above statement : 
1. The Bill of Lading is still secure if properly used. 
2. The Bill of Lading is not at fault but the people handling 
the document are at fault. 
3. People handling the Bill of Lading are not aware of its 
importance. 
4. The Bill of Lading is still very useful and flexible. 
5. There is no viable alternative for the traditional Bill of 
Lading. 
IF YOU AGREE 
STATEMENT AGREE CIRCLE DEGREE OF DISAGREE UNABLE TO 
IMPORTANCE COMMENT 
N. IMP IMP V-IllP 
123 
2123 
3123 
4123 
5123 
COMMENTS (IF ANY) 
A 60 
Original Statement 
By 1995 the conventional Bill of Lading vill be replaced by 
the "Electronic Bill of Lading' by the use of data 
interchange via computers. 
The following comments were received from experts disagreeing 
with the above statement. 
1. The shipping industry is too diverse and fragmented for 
universal application. 
2. Computer compatibility will be a problem. 
3. There will be legal problems regarding the place of issuance 
of the Bill of Lading. 
4. The "Electronic Bill of Lading" will only be used in some 
sophisticated trades but not world-wide. 
5. The TEN year time span is too short for total replacement. 
6. Computer fraud will make the "Electronic Bill of Lading" as 
insecure as the traditional one. 
IF YOU AGREE 
STATEMENT AGREE CIRCLE DEGREE OF DISAGE E UNABLE TO 
IMPORTANCE COMMENT 
N-IMP IMP V-IMP 
123 
2123 
-3 123 
4123 
123 
-6 123 
COHMZNTS (IF ANY) 
A 61 
Original Statement 
The Uniform Customs & Practice for Documentary Credits 1983 
Revision (UCP) does not provide adequate protection for the 
applicant (the buyer) against the unscrupulous beneficiary 
(the seller). 
The following comments were received from experts disagreeing 
with the above statement. 
1. The buyer gets what he pays for. Any additional checks would 
result in an additional charge to him. 
2. The UCP give less responsibility to the banks, thereby 
giving opportunity for relaxation from the banker's side. 
3. There is certainly room for improvement of the UCP. 
4. Provided documentary credit properly drafted with proper 
precautions, UCP provides adequate security. 
IF YOU AGREE 
STATEMENT AGR CIRCLE DEGREE OF DISAGREE UNABLE TO 
IMPORTANCE COMMENT 
N. IMP IMP V-IMP 
123 
2123 
-3 123 
-4 123 
COMMMS (IF ANY) 
A 62 
Original Statement 
In documentary credit operations, the relationship which 
exists between the Issuing Bank and the Advising/Confirming Bank 
is that of a Principal (Issuing Bank) and an Agent 
(Confirming/Advising Rank). 
The following comments were received from experts disagreeing 
with the above statement : 
1. In law, they contract as principals with each other, and 
with the buyer and seller. 
2. Under the Uniform Customs & Practice the characteristics of 
agency between the banks are in a large measure obliterated. 
3. As the advising/confirming bank only makes a superficial 
documentary check without factual check, therefore it does 
not qualify as an agent for the issuing bank. 
IF YOU AGREE 
STATEMENT AGREE CIRCLE DEGREE OF DISAGREE UNABLE TO 
IMPORTANCE COMMENT 
N-IMP IMP V-IMP 
-1 123 
-2 123 
-3 123 
COMWNTS (IF ANY) 
A 63 
Original Statement 
The ship owner/operator details are not checked properly by the 
Charterer before entering into a charter. 
The following comments were received from experts disagreeing 
with the above statement. 
1. Checking is not always easy. 
2. Depends very much on the quality of broker used. 
3. Reputable charterers are very particular and make full 
enquiries. 
II IF YOU AGREE III 
STATE24EW AGREE CIRCLE DEGREE OF DISAGREE UNABLE TO 
IMPORTANCE COMMEW 
N. IMP IMP V-IMP 
123 
-2 123 
-3 123 
COHMENTS (IF ANY) 
A 64 
Original Statement 
The ship ovner/operator details are not checked properly by the 
Insurance brokers/undervriters before entering into a contract 
of insurance. 
The following comments were received from experts disagreeing 
with the above statement. 
1. The modern market certainly checks owner/operator details. 
2. So far as the contract of insurance is concerned I do not 
consider this necessary. 
3. It is the broker who should check details and decide whether 
to represent the owner/operator who approaches him. 
IF YOU AGREE 
STATEMENT AGREE CIRCLE DEGREE OF DISAGREE UNABLE TO 
IMPORTANCE COMMENT 
N-IMP IMP V-IMP 
123 
-2 123 
-3 123 
COHMMS (IF ANY) 
A 65 
Original Statement 
The ship ovner/operator details are not checked properly by the 
Agents/Freight Forwarders before entering into a contract of 
agency. 
The following comments were received from experts disagreeing 
with the above statement. 
1. Most agents are careful about owner/operator status. 
2. Responsible Agents/Freight Forwarders make full enquiries. 
II IF YOU AGREE III 
STATEMENT AGREE CIRCLE DEGREE OF DISAGREE UNABLE TO 
IMPORTANCE COMMENT 
N. IMP IMP V-IMP 
123 
123 
COMMENTS (IF ANY) 
A 66 
Original Statement 
A few frauds are caused by the secrecy of operations, i. e. 
all ships fixed for hire are not reported in the press. 
The following comments were received from experts disagreeing 
with the above statement. 
1. Secrecy of operations and unreported fixtures are unrelated 
vis-a-vis fraud. 
2. Secrecy is necessary for other reasons, e. g. to protect 
commercial advantage, to breach sanctions. 
3. Secrecy is voluntarily undertaken by both parties. 
4. Secrecy is used to protect/assist development of market 
rates. 
IF YOU AGREE 
STATEMENT AGREE CIRCLE DEGREE OF DISAGREE UNABLE TO 
IMPORTANCE COMMENT 
N. IMP IMP V-IMP 
123 
2123 
-3 123 
-4 123 
COMMMS (IF ANY) 
A 67 
Original Statement 
The use of TWO or THREE original Bills of Lading in a set and 
the delivery of cargo on production of ONLY ONE has 
facilitated documentary frauds. 
The following comments were received from experts disagreeing 
with the above statement. 
1. Possibly in a few cases, but payment/negotiation is normally 
conducted only against presentation of the full set. 
2. True, but should a system be changed because a very few 
dishonest people abuse it ? 
3. Have no personal knowledge that this has facilitated fraud. 
4. Disagree. However, the practice is outdated and needs 
revision. 
5. Use of copies is one of the big problems. 
IF YOU AGREE 
STATEMENT AGREE CIRCLE DEGREE OF DISAGREE UNABLE TO 
IMPORTANCE CONMENT 
N. IMP IMP V. IMP 
123 
2123 
3123 
4123 
5123 
COMMENTS (IF ANY) 
A 68 
Original Statement 
Payment under documentary credits by the banks without proper 
checks before payment has led the fraudsters to exploit the 
system. 
The following comments were received from experts disagreeing 
with the above statement. 
1. Banks make all the checks required of them under the UCP- 
2. Lack of checks carried out by the importer is exploited by 
the fraudster. 
3. Documentary credit is drafted with insufficient care. ' 
4. Additional checks by banks would greatly increase the cost of 
the service to the customer. 
IF YOU AGREE 
STATEMENT AGREE CIRCLE DEGREE OF DISAGREE UNABLE TO 
IMPORTANCE COMMENT 
N-IMP IMP V. IMP 
123 
2123 
3123 
4123 
COMWMS (IF ANY) 
A 69 
Original Statement 
The simplification of documentation has contributed to the 
increase in documentary fraud. 
The following comments were received from experts disagreeing 
with the above statement. 
1. Simplification is an aid to prevention of fraud. 
2. Criminals are becoming -more professional and the inter- 
national tradi. ng community are becoming more careless. 
3. Simplification should not mean reduction in protective 
clauses. 
4. Requirement for more documentation will not reduce 
documentary fraud. 
IF YOU AGREE 
STATEMENT AGREE CIRCLE DEGREE OF DISAGE UNABLE TO 
IMPORTANCE COMMENT 
N. IMP IMP V-IMP 
1123 
2123 
-3 123 
-4 123 
COMHMS (IF ANY) 
A 70 
Original Statement 
Some documentary frauds would be prevented if the cargo 
carrying capacity of the vessel was inserted on the Bill of 
Lading. 
The following comments were received from experts disagreeing 
with the above statement. 
1. This is believed to have only a marginal effect. 
2. The vessel's carrying capacity can be checked in the Lloyd's 
Register. 
3. In liner trades knowledge of capacity without full details of 
entire cargo to be carried would be worthless. 
4. Fraudsters will then select vessels with the correct capacity 
to Justify the tonnage entered in the Bill of Lading. 
IF YOU AGREE 
STATEMENT AGREE CIRCLE DEGREE OF DISAGREE UNABLE TO 
IMPORTANCE COMMENT 
N. IMP I07--V. IMP 
123 
2123 
3123 
4123 
COPMENTS (IF ANY) 
A 71 
Original Statement 
Underwriters should demand surveyors' reports together with 
certified valuers' reports prior to accepting Hull and 
Machinery risks. 
The following comments were received from experts disagreeing 
with the above statement. 
1. It would be better for underwriters to appoint their own 
surveyors and valuers as do certain Scandinavian insurers. 
2. Premium calculations contain an element of value assessment. 
3. Surveys should only be demanded on ships of unknown 
management regardless of age, and on ships classed with other 
than acceptable registers. 
4. The insurance contract has sufficient safeguards to deal with 
any problems that would become evident from these reports. 
IF YOU AGREE 
STATEMENT AGREE CIRCLE DEGREE OF DISAGREE UNABLE To 
IMPORTANCE COMMENT 
N. IMP IMP V. IMP 
123 
2123 
3123 
1-4 .123 
COMMENTS (IF ANY) 
A 72 
Original Statement 
If some sort of delay is built into the documentary credit 
system (perhaps a maximum of 7 days), to allow for checks to 
be carried out by the bank before payment is made, it will 
reduce the incidence of fraud. 
The following comments were received from experts disagreeing 
with the above statement. 
1. It would increase the pressure for fraudulent dating or issue 
of documents before goods are loaded. 
2. Commerce would come to a standstill and thefts after 
discharge would increase. 
3. The cost to international trade would be enormous. 
4. Not practical and banks have refused to do this. 
5. Checks should be made earlier than lodging of documentary 
credit or quicker, e. g. by using computerised data bases. 
IF YOU AGREE 
STATEMENT AGRE CIRCLE DEGREE OF DISAGREE UNABLE TO 
I IMPORTANCE COMMENT 
I N. IMP IMP V. IMP-1 
1231 
1 
-2 1231 
-3 1 -3 
-4 1123 
1 
-5 1123 
COMHEWS (IF ANY) 
A 73 
Original Statesent 
The carrying out of the following check, before payment is made 
under documentary credits, would provide adequate protection 
against fraud (the cost of these services would be borne by the 
applicant requesting then at the time of opening the credit; the 
bank will carry out the checks without incurring any additional 
liability) : 
Check with the Port Authority or Customs that they have a 
cargo manifest lodged for the said vessel and that the 
Bills of Lading issued are mentioned in the manifest. 
The following comments were received from the experts 
disagreeing with the above statement. 
1. Port Authority requirements are variable. In the U. K. 
Customs check of Bill of Lading is post shipment. 
2. Nice idea but I fear impractical. 
3. Manifest is a ship's paper and hence easy to 
manipulate. 
4. Port Authority/Customs may well not have the manifest 
at the time payment needs to be made. 
5. Who will pay Customs and Port Authority for extra 
staff necessary to answer enquiries ? 
IF YOU AGUE 
STATEMENT AGR CIRCLE DEGREE OF DISAGREE UNABLE TO 
IMPORTANCE COMMENT 
N. INP IMP V-IllP 
123 
-2 123 
3123 
4123 
5123 
COMMENTS (IF ANY) 
A 74 
Original Statement 
If you feel there are other checks which should also be 
included (to prevent fraud under documentary credits), please 
specify below and give the reason for introducing them. 
The following additional points were mentioned by the experts : 
1. Check beneficiary if the credit exceeds 0.5 million. 
2. Banks should check with a .. specially set up 
organisation" whether Bill of Lading is correct and 
gives a true picture. 
3. Check type of vessel, if you cannot check with Port 
Authority or Customs. 
4. Initiate loading surveys on quality and quantity of 
goods by reputable cargo surveyors. 
S. Check that the cargo quantity is as per the Bill of 
Lading. 
6. Check the vessel's route and ports of call by master's 
declaration. 
7. Lodge route or voyage plan with appropriate authority. 
IF YOU AGREE III 
STATEMENT AGR I? CIRCLE DEGREE OF DISAGREE UNABLE TO 
IMPORTANCE COMMENT 
- N. IMP IMP V-IMP 1I 
1231 
2 
- 
123 
1 3 
1 
- 
123 
1 4 
1 
1 -3 
1 -5 
1 
123 
1 -6 
1 
1 -3 
1 -7 
1 
123 
COMMEM (IF ANY) 
A 75 
Original Statement 
Commercial criminals should not be granted bail. 
The following comments were received from the experts 
disagreeing with the above statement. 
I. Bail could be set very high. 
2. Seize all assets and give a court allowance until trial, and 
withdraw the passport. 
3. Bail should generally not be granted. 
4. Each case must be judged on its merits. 
5. Length of time taken for cases to come to trial will impose 
severe hardships. 
IF YOU AGREE 
STATEMENT AGREE CIRCLE DEGREE OF DISAGREE UNABLE TO 
IMPORTANCE COMMENT 
N. IMP UY -V. IMP 
I "i-3 
-2 123 
1-3 123 
1 -4 123 
1 
-5 123 
COMMMS (IF ANY) 
A 76 
Original Statement 
When a coýerclal criminal is convicted on more than one count, 
the sentences should not run concurrently. 
The following comments were received from the experts 
disagreeing with the above statement. 
1. This would be contrary to the basic principles of justice and 
an interference with judicial independence. 
2. Why should this crime be different from others ? 
3. It depends on whether there was more than one episode of 
criminal behaviour. 
4. The maximum sentence available is high enough for a 
sufficient penalty to be imposed by concurrent sentences. 
IF YOU AGREE 
STATEMENT AGREE CIRCLE DEGREE OF DISAGREE UNABLE To 
IMPORTANCE COMMENT 
N. IMP IMP V. IMP 
123 
2123 
3123 
4123 
COMMENTS (IF ANY) 
A 77 
Original Statement 
The centralised registry for Bills of Lading would be an 
effective instrument against documentary fraud in the oil and 
dry bulk trade but not in the dry cargo trade. 
The following comments were received from the experts 
disagreeing with the above statement. 
1. It may be a partial deterrent only, even in oil and dry bulk 
trades. 
2. It is more a trade facilitation measure. 
II IF YOU AGREE III 
STATF14ENT AGREE CIRCLE DEGREE OF DISAGREE UNABLE TO 
IMPORTANCE COMMENT 
I N. IMP Iii-P V. IMFiP--l 
123 
21 -3 
COMKENM (IF ANY) 
A 78 
Original Statement 
All types of shipping intermediaries (i. e. ship's agent, freight 
forwarder, broker) whether acting for the ship or cargo 
interests should be registered and licenced and should 
undergo a solvency test every year. 
The following comments were received from the experts 
disagreeing with the above statement. 
1. Only if supervised by a recognised international self- 
regulatory body, e. g. FIATA, FONASBA. 
2. All intermediaries should belong to a recognised trade body 
or association. 
3. Cumbersome and expensive. 
4. Difficult to justify greater control of this type of 
intermediary than any other trader. 
5. Solvency is difficult to test. 
6. This will not prevent fraudsters from finding. gullible 
shippers. 
IF YOU AGREE 
STATEMENT AGREE CIRCLE DEGREE OF DISAGREE UNABLE TO 
IMPORTANCE COMMENT 
N. IMP IMP V. IMP 
1123 
-2 123 
-3 123 
-4 123 
-5 123 
6123 
COMMENTS (IF ANY) 
A 79 
Original Statement 
All ship's agents and all other agencies concerned with booking 
space on a vessel should provide Indemnity bonds for the due 
performance of the voyage by the ship or shipping company whose 
agents they are. 
The following comments were received from the experts 
disagreeing with the above statement. 
1. Possible when using chartered ships but not in liner trades. 
2. Committing agent to be responsible for master's actions 
destroys whole principle of agency. 
3. Cost would be prohibitive for large firms who represent 
several shipowners. 
4. Impossible, except for liner trades. 
5. Exporters who book direct will have to be included. 
IF YOU AGREE 
STATEMENT AGREE CIRCLE DEGREE OF DISAGREE UNABLE TO 
IMPORTANCE COMMENT 
N. IMP IMP V. IHP 
123 
-2 123 
-3 123 
1-4 3 
-5 123 
COMMEWS (IF ANY) 
A 80 
Original Statement 
The non-negotiable sea vaybill, will prevent doctmuentary 
maritime fraud. 
In view of the comments received from experts disagreeing with 
the above statement it has been changed to: 
The non-negotiable sea waybill will 
materially assist in the prevention 
of documentary maritime fraud. 
COMMENTS (IF ANY) 
AGREE 
DISAGREE 
UNABLE TO COMMENT 
A 81 
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